2015-10-16 央行观察

作者：季天鹤，方正中期研究院研究员，央行观察专栏作家

市场经常讨论央行到底有没有在“放水”，往往因此而发生激烈的讨论。本文试图指出央行放水的三个池子，以分析央行往哪里“放水”这一问题，也有助于进一步认识“如何放水”这一问题。

第一个池子是准备金存款。央行可以通过逆回购、再贷款、购买新发银行债券、入股银行等方式，在放贷或入股的同时，增加银行在央行的准备金。央行也可以购买银行持有的资产，例如买入已发行的国债/贷款、央票、企业债/贷款、外汇、银行债券/同业存单等等。上述两类操作的目的，在于使银行在央行的存款增加。

对于央票，央行回购央票或者还本付息，使银行持有的央票减少，在央行的存款增加。对于银行债券/同业存单，“央行购买”是指从二级市场买入发行方以外的银行持有的同业存单或债券。例如央行从农行购买了中行发行的同业存单/银行债券，则农行持有的同业存单/银行债券减少，在央行的存款增加。如果讨论超额准备金存款，还会涉及到降准。

央行往准备金存款池“放水”，对非银行主体的资产规模没有直接影响。央行和非银行主体间隔着银行，央行的宽松或收紧姿态，若要影响非银行主体的资产规模，需要银行的配合和支持，即所谓传导机制。银行在央行的准备金存款，并不能用来向非银行主体放贷，因为非银行主体在央行没有存款帐户，无法使用在央行的存款买卖和投资。

那为什么央行要往准备金存款池“放水”？其目的在于促使银行通过放贷和买债等方式，扩大存款和货币总量，即让银行往下面提到的第二个池子放水。但现在的情况是，银行对于扩张信贷和货币量都较为谨慎，银行间的宽松尚未转化为货币量的宽松。所以近日人行张行助提到，银行必须愿意贷，企业和个人等微观主体必须愿意借，金融调控才会比较有效。

第二个池子是银行存款。央行这一类的操作，会直接增加货币量，而非银行主体可以直接使用央行放出来的货币买卖商品和投资。最常见的方法，乃是央行直接放贷给非银行主体在银行开存款户的机构。例如央行放贷给四大资产管理公司，后者在银行就增加了存款，也就可以购买不良贷款。最近央行借给证金公司2000亿元，使其得以购买股票，也是最新的例子。

除了放贷之外，央行也可以直接购买非银行主体持有的资产，从而使后者在银行的存款增加。例如央行直接从一家基金买入国债，卖出国债的基金将增加在银行的存款。如果基金用这些存款买入其他债券，则有助于降低债券利率水平。而如果基金用这些存款归还银行贷款，则有助于降低基金的杠杆率。

央行和非银行主体的交易，会让银行受到被动影响。银行一方面发现自身存款增加，另一方面发现自己在央行的存款增加，即央行在第一个池子上也放了水。上述现象，是央行购买非银行主体所持资产，或者借款给非银行主体的过程中，自然出现的结果。央行当然可以采取附加操作，在被动放了水的第一个池子上抽水。

当我们讨论欧美银行在欧美央行拥有巨大的存款规模时，不应将其看作是银行让度“资金”躺在账上白白浪费。首先，前面已经提到，银行在央行的准备金存款，并不能用来向非银行主体放贷。其次，银行在央行拥有巨大存款，意味着自身拥有扩张信贷创造货币的能力，但能力不是义务，银行需要根据自身情况来决定如何经营。

再次，并不是只有创造更多货币才是对实体经济的支持。银行完全可以撮合拥有巨大存款的储户以及需要存款用于投资和经营的融资人，把前者的钱融给后者，加速存款的流转速度，来支持实体经济，而不是单纯依靠信贷和创造存款的方式进行。何况，更大规模的信贷和存款，需要更大规模的资本，银行需要不停的融资，才能撑起自己的资产负债表。

第三个池子是其他资产。央行可以向市场主体出售或借贷自身资产。央行近期的外汇干预操作，就是一种放水，这里的水就是外汇资产。当然，人行放美元，用的是自己的资产，用一点少一点，而美联储放美元，则和人行放人民币一样，在理论上没有规模限制。当然，这里将外汇简化为在国外银行的存款，而非现实中的债券，因此隐含了央行干预时会卖出债券换外汇存款的步骤。

而央行放国债的操作，在中国并不常见，但在金融危机中的美国则非常重要。很多机构从事买断式回购，借来的国债已经被卖掉了，危机来了，想要买国债偿还，却发现大家都在买国债，自己根本买不到。这个时候就需要一家机构在国债市场放水。财政往往受制于国债上限，无法有效提供大量供给，而央行这种囤积国债用于公开市场操作的主体，此刻就变得非常重要。

央行放出资产往往伴随着缩表，这是因为央行的交易对手，需要用在央行的存款来换央行资产，使央行资产负债双降。央行如果想要维持银行在央行的存款规模，就要同时在第一个池子主动放水。这就是我们在8月份看到的，一方面央行抛售巨量外汇，同时又通过SLO和逆回购等方式放水。反之，若央行买入国债和外汇，则意味着央行会扩表。当然，这里的讨论焦点是外汇和国债，银行在央行的存款并非讨论的对象。

如果银行不用在央行的存款来换取央行资产，就不会发生上述缩表扩表的效应，央行就可以纯粹在第三个池子放水，而不会在第一个池子上抽水。例如，银行用自身持有的国债或地方债直接从央行换取外汇。当然，在这个过程里，央行放的水是外汇，而同时抽了国债和地方债的水。另一种方法则是借贷或投资，例如央行用外汇注资国开行，或者将国债借给银行，这里就只有放水没有抽水了。

之所以目前央行有上述三个池子可以“放水”，是由于三个原因。一是实体经济中的货币量包括纸币和银行存款。考虑到纸币已经不再主流，因此“放水”就是使银行存款增加的措施。二是银行间买卖资产互相拆借使用的是在央行的准备金存款，发放贷款创造存款的基础也是在央行的准备金存款，因此使银行在央行存款增加的措施也是“放水”。三是央行可以将自身资产卖给或者借给银行，从而增加某种资产的供给，算是放出了特别的水。

央行一个新的操作出来，首先可以观察央行在往哪个池子“放水”。如果是准备金存款的池子，那么对于实体经济还需要一个传导机制。银行向实体经济放贷4万亿的效果，和央行向银行贷款4万亿的效果，以及央行直接买4万亿股票/土地的效果，是不一样的。而放水了之后要考虑的，是要让水动起来。放在银行的存款，如果不去购买商品，就产生不了GDP，海浪与海啸的区别，也在于此。

未来会不会有更多的放水池子？这取决于会不会有新的货币形态出现。如果余额宝份额成为货币，那么余额宝在银行的存款与其份额的比例，“花呗”等贷款的规模，就变得很重要。央行通过向一个市场主体贷款，使其在余额宝的份额增加，同时使余额宝在银行的存款以及银行在央行的存款也同时增加，或许也会成为一种放水的方式，不过货币政策的传导链条，也就更长了，同时需要从其他池子抽的水，恐怕也多了。

The market frequently debates whether the central bank is engaging in "water-releasing" (monetary easing) actions, leading to intense discussions. This article attempts to outline the three "water-releasing" pools of the central bank, aiming to analyze where the central bank directs its easing measures. This analysis also aids in understanding the question of "how to implement monetary easing."

The first pool is the reserve deposit. The central bank can increase banks' reserve deposits through methods like reverse repurchase agreements, rediscounting, purchasing newly issued bank bonds, and taking equity stakes in banks while providing loans or investing. The central bank can also buy assets held by banks, such as purchasing issued government bonds/loans, central bank bills, corporate bonds/loans, foreign exchange, bank bonds/interbank certificates of deposit, and more. The purpose of these two types of operations is to increase banks' deposits with the central bank.

Regarding central bank bills, the central bank repurchases or redeems central bank bills, reducing the amount held by banks and increasing deposits with the central bank. Concerning bank bonds/interbank certificates of deposit, "central bank purchase" refers to buying interbank certificates of deposit or bonds held by banks other than the issuing institution from the secondary market. For example, if the central bank buys interbank certificates of deposit/bank bonds issued by Bank A from Bank B, the amount of interbank certificates of deposit/bank bonds held by Bank A will decrease, increasing its deposits with the central bank. Discussion of excess reserve deposits might also involve reserve requirement ratio reductions.

When the central bank injects liquidity into the reserve deposit pool, it doesn't directly affect the assets of non-bank entities. The central bank and non-bank entities are separated by banks. If the central bank's easing or tightening stance is to impact the asset sizes of non-bank entities, it requires the cooperation and support of banks—a process called the transmission mechanism. The reserve deposits that banks hold with the central bank cannot be directly used to provide loans to non-bank entities because these entities lack deposit accounts with the central bank for buying and selling, or investing.

So why does the central bank inject liquidity into the reserve deposit pool? The goal is to encourage banks to expand deposits and the overall money supply through lending and bond purchases, which, in turn, allows banks to inject liquidity into the second pool mentioned below. However, currently, banks are cautious about expanding credit and the money supply. Loose interbank conditions have not yet translated into a loose money supply. This is why the People's Bank of China (PBOC) has recently emphasized that banks must be willing to lend, and microeconomic entities like businesses and individuals must be willing to borrow for financial regulation to be effective.

The second pool is bank deposits. Central bank operations in this category directly increase the money supply, and non-bank entities can directly use the money released by the central bank to buy goods and invest. The most common method is the central bank directly lending to institutions that have deposit accounts with banks. For instance, if the central bank lends to the four major asset management companies, they will increase their deposits with banks, which can then be used to purchase non-performing loans. A recent example is the PBOC lending 200 billion yuan to China Securities Finance Corporation, enabling it to buy stocks.

In addition to lending, the central bank can also directly purchase assets held by non-bank entities, thereby increasing their deposits with banks. For example, the central bank directly buying government bonds from a mutual fund increases the fund's deposits with banks. If the fund uses these deposits to buy other bonds, it helps lower bond interest rates. If the fund uses these deposits to repay bank loans, it helps reduce its leverage.

Transactions between the central bank and non-bank entities passively affect banks. Banks find their deposits increasing while noticing their deposits with the central bank increasing. This phenomenon results from the central bank purchasing assets held by non-bank entities or lending to them, and it's a natural outcome. The central bank can take additional measures to draw liquidity from the first pool where it passively injected liquidity.

When discussing the substantial deposits that European and American banks hold with their respective central banks, it should not be perceived as banks allowing "funds" to remain unused on their accounts. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the reserve deposits that banks hold with the central bank cannot be used to provide loans to non-bank entities. Secondly, banks having significant deposits with the central bank indicates their capacity to expand credit and create money. However, capacity is not an obligation, and banks need to decide how to operate based on their circumstances.

Furthermore, supporting the real economy doesn't solely rely on creating more money. Banks can facilitate depositors with significant deposits and borrowers needing funds for investment and operations, encouraging the circulation of deposits to support the real economy. It's not just about relying on credit and creating deposits to achieve this. Moreover, larger-scale credit and deposits require larger-scale capital. Banks need continuous financing to uphold their balance sheets.

The third pool consists of other assets. The central bank can sell or lend its own assets to market participants. The central bank's recent foreign exchange intervention, for instance, is a form of "water-releasing," with foreign exchange assets as the water. Of course, when the PBOC releases US dollars, it uses its own assets, and the scale is adjustable. Here, foreign exchange is simplified as deposits in foreign banks rather than bonds, implying that the central bank will sell bonds and exchange them for foreign exchange deposits in its intervention process.

The central bank's operations of releasing government bonds are uncommon in China but vital, as seen during financial crises like the United States in 2008. Many institutions engaged in repurchase agreements where they borrowed government bonds that were subsequently sold. When the crisis hit and they needed to buy government bonds for repayment, they realized everyone was buying government bonds, making it impossible to purchase enough. This situation requires an institution to release liquidity in the government bond market. Fiscal policy is often constrained by government bond limits, making it unable to provide sufficient supply. Hence, an entity like the central bank, which stockpiles government bonds for open market operations, becomes crucial at such moments.

When the central bank releases assets, it often involves shrinking its balance sheet. This is because the counterparties in the central bank's transactions use their deposits with the central bank to exchange for central bank assets, resulting in both reduced assets and liabilities for the central bank. If the central bank wants to maintain banks' deposit sizes with it, it needs to proactively release liquidity into the first pool. This aligns with what we saw in August, where the PBOC sold a massive amount of foreign exchange while also releasing liquidity through Standing Lending Facility (SLF) and reverse repurchase agreements. Conversely, if the central bank buys government bonds or foreign exchange, it indicates that the central bank will expand its balance sheet. However, the focus of this discussion is foreign exchange and government bonds, not bank deposits with the central bank.

If banks don't need to exchange their deposits with the central bank for central bank assets, the effects of shrinking or expanding balance sheets won't occur. The central bank can purely release liquidity into the third pool without drawing from the first pool. For example, banks can directly exchange their government bonds or local bonds for foreign exchange with the central bank. In this process, the central bank is releasing foreign exchange as liquidity while simultaneously releasing government bonds and local bonds. Another method involves lending or investing, such as the central bank injecting foreign exchange into China Development Bank or lending government bonds to banks. In these cases, only liquidity is being released without drawing any.

The central bank's ability to release liquidity into the three mentioned pools results from three factors. First, the money supply in the real economy includes both banknotes and bank deposits. Given that banknotes are no longer mainstream, "releasing liquidity" refers to measures that increase banks' deposits. Second, interbank trading of assets and the basis for creating deposits through loans are based on banks' reserve deposits with the central bank. Hence, measures that increase banks' deposits with the central bank are considered "releasing liquidity." Third, the central bank can sell or lend its assets to banks, increasing the supply of specific assets—an instance of releasing "special" liquidity.

When the central bank introduces a new operation, the initial observation can be where the central bank is "releasing liquidity." If it's aimed at the reserve deposit pool, a transmission mechanism is required to impact the real economy. The effects of banks lending 4 trillion yuan to the real economy, the central bank lending 4 trillion yuan to banks, and the central bank directly buying 4 trillion yuan in stocks/land are distinct. After liquidity is released, the focus becomes setting the water in motion. Deposits held by banks won't generate GDP unless they're used to purchase goods. The difference between waves and tsunamis lies here.

Will there be more liquidity-releasing pools in the future? This depends on whether new forms of currency emerge. If Yu'e Bao shares become a form of currency, then the ratio of Yu'e Bao deposits in banks to their shares, as well as the scale of loans like "Ant Credit Pay," become crucial. By lending to a market participant, the central bank can increase their Yu'e Bao shares and, consequently, their deposits with banks and the central bank. This might become a way of releasing liquidity. However, the transmission chain of monetary policy would be longer, requiring more liquidity drawn from other pools.