原创 2015-11-08 季天鹤央行观察央行观察

作者：季天鹤，方正中期研究院研究员，央行观察专栏作家

11月5日，彭博报道中国政府高层正在考虑将银行的存款准备金率扩大适用对象范围至任何放贷机构。这一措施是否落实，以及如何落实，都引人深思。

放贷机构适用存款准备金率，意味着要有一系列用来当作存款准备金率分母的财务项目。如果放贷机构又有存款又有贷款，听上去就和银行差不多了，银监会恐怕不会轻易批准这样的机构。所以放贷机构的存款准备金率，未必作用于存款，而可能作用于较为广泛的债务种类，比如说发行的债券，或者像目前银行存款准备金制度一样，由央行按会计科目一一确认。

债券融资如何帮助放贷机构放贷？首先，放贷机构发行债券，很多银行储户认购，放贷机构有了银行存款，可以将存款转移给融资人。可是转移之后，放贷机构没有银行存款可用来转移了，于是再发行债券，很多储户再认购，放贷机构又有了银行存款，又可以放贷。这个过程不断进行，银行存款不停被放贷机构转移，而放贷机构自身资产负债越来越大。

之所以说这个过程经典，因为这和教科书上的存款创造类似。银行放贷将纸币给与融资人，融资人花掉给了收款人，收款人重新存入银行形成存款，银行又可以把纸币放贷给另一个融资人，银行和放贷前相比增加了债权和存款。只不过放贷机构发行的债券并不是货币量的一部分，算不上创造货币，只能算转移货币。

除了分母之外，存款准备金率生效还要有分子。如果放贷机构能在央行拥有一个准备金账户，那么这将开启了一扇通往新时代的大门。现在，只有银行、财政、金融机构、国外银行等能在央行有存款账户，一般的企业和个人想和央行发生往来，方式只有手持央行发行的纸币和硬币这一方式。

从目前的口径看，现在不交存款准备金的放贷机构，一部分可能算在金融性公司里（例如贷款公司，小额贷款公司），但大部分恐怕根本算不上金融性公司，想在央行开户几无可能。放贷机构最多只能挪一挪银行存款，本身和在央行有准备金和备付金的银行不在一个层次，有没有资格使用央行的支付系统都是个问题。

如果能在央行开户，放贷机构就有可能成为下一个国开行。开行的特色在于一手发债，一手放贷。在前面的叙述中，放贷机构发债给另一群有银行存款的人，导致银行存款从储户转移到放贷机构，放贷时再从放贷机构转移给融资人；而开行发债，若对银行，是直接圈来别的银行在央行的存款，而若对银行客户，则是在圈来别的银行在央行的存款同时，还帮投资者开户的银行消除了存款，也就是帮银行缩了表。

相比较放贷机构发债，国开行发债的用意更为复杂。开行放贷本身直接创造了银行存款，和放贷机构帮助银行存款转移不同。但由于开行网点和存款人都不比商业银行，创造的存款很快被融资人在支付中转帐给其他银行的储户，而转帐本身会使开行在央行的备付金和准备金存款流失到其他银行。

开行发债的目的在于获取在央行存款，使得自己能够应对放贷后存款转帐导致的准备金流失。开行用来放贷的并不是在央行存款，在央行存款的流失也不是因为贷款，而是因为客户转帐。如果开行足够大，网点很多客户很多，存款转帐大多在体内完成，那么融资的需求会少很多。

开行是帮助其他银行满足存贷比要求的活雷锋，一边发行债券从其他银行借入在央行存款，一边任凭自己创造的银行存款变成别人的银行存款，让其他银行一方面在负债侧增加了存款，而另一方面在资产侧不增加贷款，而是增加债券。开行自己的存贷比恐怕不受限制，事实上也超过了75%的上限（恐怕得有750%），同时也帮助其他银行降低存贷比。

放贷机构在央行开户，就能实现上述国开行的功能。不过由于放贷机构不能创造存款，因此支出的时候不会像国开行一样，有在央行存款和自身存款双减，而是将发债融来的在央行存款，直接转帐给融资人在某银行的存款户，而这一转帐使该银行在央行存款和负债侧存款同时增加，类似财政支出。

这里面，虽然放贷机构的转帐，转的是在央行存款，但融资人融到的不是在央行存款，而是在银行存款。融资人开户的银行，在收到在央行存款时，自动进行了存款创造。如果央行直接向非银行机构放贷，就像给资产管理公司再贷款那样，那么银行也会有在央行存款和客户在银行存款的双增。

除了放贷机构有了新的发展可能性之外，当局似乎也有了对于非银行机构准备金问题的新思路。现在非银行金融机构在银行的存款也纳入了存款准备金缴存的范围。这样的做法让银行的流动性风险小了，银行负债规模受到约束了，但放贷机构的流动性风险并没有减小，资产负债规模也并未受到约束。

放贷机构完全可以维持在银行的存款不变，但把资产负债表扩张得很大。很多货币基金都买入大量债券，在银行存款与整体余额的比并不大，如果把债券替换成贷款便是放贷机构的可能情况。此番将准备金率适用机构范围扩大，而不是将存款范围扩大，应该说是更有效地对放贷机构的行为进行约束。

如果放贷机构在央行有了准备金账户，那么是否意味着放贷机构可以直接接入银行支付系统呢？如果是，这可能对于第三方支付影响深远。第三方支付是把银行存款当存款准备金，把支付份额相当于银行存款。这些机构及其客户支付来支付去，都在银行存款侧甚至是支付机构份额侧，和银行在央行的存款（准备金与备付金）非常遥远。

这不得不让人想起证券公司和软件公司合作，在一个证券帐户里对接多个客户。监管当局只能看到这个账户各种买卖，但事实上并不是代表一个单独投资者的利益和意图，而是多个。在支付的问题上，如果央行只能看到很多银行存款在转帐，但一个存款户的转出转入代表了好多人的利益和意图，则对于监管将是巨大的挑战。

央行当然可以把监管之网覆盖到这些机构上，察看他们的帐目等等。但更简单直接高效的办法，乃是让这些机构干脆把备付金账户开在央行，央行直接就看到钱从谁付给了谁。这样一来，贷款机构一方面交了准备金，流动性上受了监管，货币扩张上受了约束，同时还能在流量上让央行看得清清楚楚。

同样让人感兴趣的是所谓放贷机构的范围。在中国，放贷机构的监管不是铁板一块。小贷公司是央行管，典当行大概是商务部管，此外还有形形色色的融资机构大概只有工商部门在管。如果央行通过准备金的方式，打造出许多的小开行，负债侧全部对接银行间利率，那么这个放贷体系对价格型调控就敏感得很了。

当然，新措施还有一些问题有待观察。首先，当局可能要求贷款机构在银行缴存“准备金存款”，如同证监会给证券公司约束流动性比率一样，这样的话贷款机构依然和央行没什么关系，也和现在的情况差别不大，只不过是放贷机构自己定流动性比例，还是当局定个下限的区别。其次，仅对放贷机构要求存款准备金，而不对买债机构要求存款准备金，似乎监管上不太公平，也留下了套利空间，不过也不排除央行有意发展债券市场。

第三，放贷机构发债会新增对准备金的需求。如果放贷机构向企业等储户发债，从而需要在央行交准备金，那么满足发债前存款准备金率的准备金规模就显得不足，央行也就需要再提供更多的准备金。而如果放贷机构向银行发债，则会使银行创造出新存款来。这样的话，新存款需要对应一部分新准备金，而放贷机构发债本身又要对应一部分准备金，似乎同一个新增存款被要求了两次准备金缴存，有点重复计算的感觉。

如果在未来，个人和企业都能在央行开户，那么银行负债将全部债券化，商业银行全部国开行化，存款保险基金变成发行银行债CDS的机构，央行的利率意图直接作用于储户存款以及银行债券收益率；原先央行-银行-企业个人的层级结构被打破，发展成央行-银行、银行-企业个人、企业个人-央行的三角结构。

在理论上，如果这个举措能够实现，将掀开货币理论的新一页。货币发行再次成为一个银行的外生变量，货币的定义就是央行负债，而不会像目前一样，只有M0是央行负债，其它都是银行负债；银行还原成搬运货币的传统的贷款银行，只负责货币转移而不负责货币创造，货币量和信贷从此根本性地脱钩。央行存款和银行负债各走各的路，不会再有任何“存款是不是托管”的讨论，几代货币学者和经济学者的争论都可以划上句号了。

On November 5th, Bloomberg reported that senior officials of the Chinese government are considering expanding the scope of institutions subject to bank deposit reserve ratio requirements to include any lending institutions. The implementation and implications of this measure are thought-provoking.

Applying the deposit reserve ratio to lending institutions implies that a series of financial items will be used as the denominator for calculating the reserve ratio. If lending institutions have both deposits and loans, they would resemble banks to some extent, and the banking regulatory authority might hesitate to approve such institutions. Therefore, the deposit reserve ratio for lending institutions might not necessarily apply to deposits, but could extend to a wider range of debt categories, such as bonds issued or, similar to the current bank deposit reserve system, be confirmed by the central bank based on accounting items.

How does bond financing help lending institutions provide loans? First, lending institutions issue bonds, many bank depositors subscribe to them, and the lending institutions obtain bank deposits that can be transferred to financiers. However, after the transfer, lending institutions will no longer have bank deposits to transfer. Thus, they issue more bonds, many depositors subscribe again, and lending institutions gain bank deposits again, enabling them to provide loans once more. This process continues, with bank deposits being constantly transferred from banks to lending institutions, resulting in the lending institutions' assets and liabilities growing larger.

This process is considered classic because it resembles the concept of money creation in textbooks. Banks lend paper currency to financiers, who spend it on recipients, who then deposit it back into banks, creating deposits that banks can lend to another financier. This increases both the bank's assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits) compared to before the loan was made. However, the bonds issued by lending institutions are not part of the money supply; they can't be considered money creation but rather money transfer.

Apart from the denominator, the effectiveness of the deposit reserve ratio also depends on the numerator. If lending institutions could hold a reserve account at the central bank, it would open a door to a new era. Currently, only banks, financial institutions, foreign banks, etc., can have deposit accounts at the central bank. Regular enterprises and individuals can only interact with the central bank through holding central bank-issued banknotes and coins.

From the current perspective, lending institutions that don't hold reserves might be classified as financial companies (such as loan companies or microfinance companies). However, most of them probably can't be categorized as financial institutions at all and might have little chance of opening an account with the central bank. Lending institutions can only shift bank deposits around, and they are not in the same league as banks with reserve and liquidity accounts at the central bank. Whether they are qualified to use the central bank's payment system remains a question.

If they are allowed to open accounts at the central bank, lending institutions might become the next development of policy banks. These banks have the feature of issuing bonds and providing loans. In the process described earlier, lending institutions issue bonds to a group with bank deposits, shifting bank deposits from depositors to the lending institutions, which then transfer them to financiers when making loans. Policy banks, however, issue bonds that directly pull deposits from other banks at the central bank and help these banks reduce their balance sheets.

Compared to lending institutions issuing bonds, the intention behind policy banks issuing bonds is more complex. Policy banks' lending directly creates bank deposits, different from lending institutions aiding in the transfer of bank deposits. Due to the limited network and depositors of policy banks compared to commercial banks, the created deposits are quickly transferred from financiers to other banks' depositors through payments. This outflow causes a decrease in policy banks' reserve and liquidity deposits at the central bank.

The purpose of policy banks issuing bonds is to obtain deposits at the central bank to counterbalance the outflow resulting from deposit transfers after lending. Policy banks use assets other than deposits for lending, and the outflow from central bank deposits is not due to loans but due to customer transfers. If policy banks are large enough, with many branches and customers, and most transfers occur within the system, the need for financing would be reduced significantly.

Policy banks act as "good Samaritans" helping other banks meet their reserve-to-loan ratio requirements. They issue bonds to other banks to borrow deposits at the central bank. This helps them manage their deposit reserve requirements while allowing them to create deposits, and, in doing so, increase their liabilities without increasing loans but instead through issuing bonds. Policy banks' reserve-to-loan ratios likely remain unrestricted, exceeding the normal 75% upper limit (possibly reaching 750%), thereby assisting other banks in reducing their reserve-to-loan ratios.

If lending institutions are allowed to open accounts at the central bank, they could potentially achieve the functions of policy banks. However, since lending institutions cannot create deposits, their expenditures wouldn't decrease their central bank deposits as with policy banks. Instead, they would transfer the central bank deposits obtained through issuing bonds directly to the bank deposit accounts of financiers, increasing both the central bank deposits and the bank's liabilities, much like government spending.

In this process, although lending institutions transfer central bank deposits, what the financiers receive are not central bank deposits but bank deposits. When the bank where financiers hold accounts receives central bank deposits, it automatically generates bank deposits. If the central bank directly lends to non-bank institutions, similar to re-lending to asset management companies, it would effectively create new bank deposits. In this case, new deposits would require a corresponding amount of reserves, creating an impression of double-counting the same deposit for reserve purposes.

If in the future, individuals and enterprises can open accounts at the central bank, all bank liabilities would be turned into bonds, commercial banks would resemble policy banks, the deposit insurance fund would transform into an issuer of bank bond credit default swaps (CDS), and the central bank's interest rate policy would directly affect both depositor accounts and bank bond yields. The previous hierarchical structure of central bank-bank-enterprise/individual would be disrupted, developing into a triangular structure of central bank-bank, bank-enterprise/individual, and enterprise/individual-central bank.

In theory, if this measure can be realized, it would mark a new page in monetary theory. Currency issuance would become an exogenous variable of a bank again, and the definition of money would be central bank liabilities, unlike the current situation where only M0 constitutes central bank liabilities and the rest are bank liabilities. Banks would revert to being traditional loan banks responsible for money transfer, not money creation. Money supply and credit would fundamentally decouple. Central bank deposits and bank liabilities would take separate paths, eliminating debates about whether "deposits are held in custody." This could bring an end to the debates among several generations of monetary scholars and economists.