2015-11-11 季天鹤央行观察央行观察

作者：季天鹤，方正中期研究院研究员，央行观察专栏作家

邮储银行和国家开发银行是两家非常独特的银行。开行的独特较为人知，毕竟作为政策性银行，听上去就已经不同于一般商业银行。而邮储银行其实也很特殊，熟悉银监会分类体系的读者，一定知道邮储被银监会当作“其他机构”，和新型农村金融机构以及中德住房储蓄银行被归在一起。

谈起邮储银行，人们一般都会听说过邮政储蓄存款。起初这一存款是全额转存央行的，用央行的说法是：邮储当时无资产运用的能力和渠道、只相当于央行吸收存款从而回笼货币的特定存款机构。2003年邮储资金管理体制改革，邮储部门自主投资、委托理财的渠道开通。2007年邮政储蓄机构被组建为邮政储蓄银行，2015年9月底总资产为6.7万亿元。

邮储银行的独特历史，使其资产负债具有一般银行不具备的特点。邮储银行的存款不少，达到6.12万亿，但贷款和垫款很少，只有2.36万亿，无论怎么算存贷比都距离75%的红线非常遥远。邮储也不是债务工具的积极发行人，仅于2015年发行过一次规模250亿的二级资本债券，并全部反映在负债侧，说明并无未到期的其他债券。

而相比之下，开行的资产负债表是邮储的镜像。2014年底，开行的资产为10万亿，但存款仅1.08万亿，最主要的负债是6.34万亿的债券，而在资产侧，开行的贷款垫款高达7.67万亿。开行是不缴存款准备金的，年报附注里面“存放中央银行法定存款准备金”项目干脆就是一条横杠。而按照其贷款与存款的规模，恐怕存贷比对其也不曾有过约束。

开行“存款少债券多+大贷款”的结构，和邮储“存款多债券少+小贷款”的结构互为镜像，两者也和一般的商业银行大相径庭。没有存款的国开行也能放贷，是不是说明存贷比没有必要？存款丰富的邮储贷款很少，是不是资金都在同业体内循环，而没有用于实体经济？更贴近现在的问题是：为什么国开行和农发行的专项建设债券，要定向发给邮储银行？

首先，在广泛使用纸币的年代，人们产生存款对贷款很重要的错觉，是因为存款是纸币进入银行的唯一渠道，而那个时候银行没有债券和其他融资工具发行，缺乏其他纸币的来源渠道。在现在人们使用银行存款买卖商品，银行放贷直接创造存款，不需要存款带来的纸币也能贷款，追求存款与贷款的对应当然就没必要了。

然而，国开行不需要存款，不代表其不需要在央行的存款。前面提到，开行不需要缴准，但开行需要在中央银行存放备付金，规模达到500多亿，用于核算存放于中国人民银行的各种业务款项，包括业务资金的调拨、办理同城票据交换和异地跨系统资金汇划所提取或缴存现金等。

考虑到国开行存款仅1万亿，500多亿的备付金真不算少。工行2014年底的超额准备金是800亿（包括用作资金清算用途的资金以及其他各项非限制性资金），但工行有15万亿的存款。国开行的备付金率，恐怕和农村信用社差不多，后者是6.7%。当然，国开行需要应对其他债务对于流动性的需求，但考虑到其他银行也有存款以外的其它债务，这一观点可能只能解释部分情况。

更重要的原因，是在《如果存准机构扩围、货币信贷将会怎样》中提到的，即开行网点太少，客户的收款人大多在其他银行，开行放贷创造的存款无法以行内转帐的方式流转，而总是发生跨行收付，而贷款人付款在减少开行存款的同时，也减少开行在央行的备付金，即“异地跨系统资金汇划”之类。

解决这个问题有两个方式，一个是通过减少其他银行的负债，间接套来备付金/超额准备金等在央行存款，或者守住自己的负债，不要在流失的同时带走开行的备付金/超额准备金等在央行存款。另一个是直接套来其他银行的备付金/超额准备金等在央行存款，或者守住自己的。

对于第一种方式，开行2014年大力固化存款，达到了前述1.08万亿的规模，同比增长60%。过去开行放贷后，新存款就任由客户转走，而客户往往受到商业银行的高利率吸引，而将存款全数转出，获取较高利息收入。同时，开行还直接向居民企业发行开行债，在减少购买者在银行存款的同时，也圈来这些银行的备付金/超额准备金。

对于第二种方式，开行一方面努力吸引同业银行在自己这里存放，另一方面也通过向银行发债的方式，直接圈来备付金。国开行在央行的备付金，通过发债从别的银行被圈过来，而在客户转帐中又流失出去，国开债的累积就是这些转帐留下的印记，如同开行的贷款就是其创造存款的印记一样。

如果商业银行不撑起开行的负债，恐怕就得让央行来顶。而央行购买开行的6.34万亿债券，就要创造等量的在央行存款。现在基础货币规模趋势性下降，央行撑起开行可以是一种补充基础货币的手段，但央行放着那么多商业银行不管，唯独偏心开行，恐怕对于货币政策利率的传导，以及公平方面，都有不利。

和开行努力主动负债圈来备付金不同，邮储反而是被动负债，而备付金也不请自来。其存款的主要来源，并不是自身贷款创造，而是广大储户的存入。这种存入未必是贪图高利率，而可能是由于网点服务以及其他历史原因，正如开行存款少一样。邮储收到了和存款等量的超额准备金，但无法通过单纯扩张存款的方式，提高法定准备金要求，从而使新增超额准备金充分转化成法定准备金。

所以邮储就只好把这些转化不了的新增超额准备金，通过同业和买债的方式回投到其他银行那里。这里便可以回答第二个问题。邮储银行并没有让资金在金融体系内部循环，或者说热衷于搞同业或者影子银行交易。邮储由于历史的原因，在放贷方面的竞争力大概不强，或者其经营的地域和客户贷款需求不多，因此若不回投，就只能吃超额准备金的微薄利息。

但这不意味着邮储没有支持实体经济。邮储借给同业或者存放同业，则融资方增加了在央行的存款，同时增加了同业负债，而融资方在央行存款的增加，意味着更高的超额准备金率，为贷款同时创造存款留下了数量空间。可见邮储通过支持其他银行放贷的方式，间接支持实体经济。
而邮储直接和非银金融机构合作，则同时增加了非银金融机构在其开户行的存款，以及开户行在央行的存款。这样，一方面开户行有了更多的超额准备金，便可以扩表放贷创造更多存款，而另一方面非银机构有了银行存款，便可以放贷给企业融资人，产生存款在借贷中流转的效果。

这样来看，开行和邮储是两个相当厉害的角色。前者本来就不受存贷比约束，放贷创造的存款白送给商业银行，自己通过负债的方式圈回备付金，但国开债的风险权重又为0，其他银行愿意持有。因此可以有这样的一种业务：开行不停放贷发债，其他银行把贷款业务都介绍给开行，同时持有国开债，对资本充足率无压力，银行可以有比现在更大的资产负债表。

这一招在不能轻松补充资本的情况下恐怕会很好用，特别是目前商业银行坏账压力很大，靠利润补充资本已经越来越难，金融市场融资又有估值的问题。开行发债放贷，既可以看作开行用自身债务换商业银行的贷款资产，也可以看成开行自己就是中国最大的资产抵押债券发行人。开行的资本充足率应该不是问题，因为有更厉害的大佬站在后面。

邮储和开行以及农发搞专项建设债，可谓天生绝配，反正邮储也有大笔的备付金经常流入，说不定很多还是国开和农发的支农贷款创造的。开行和农发先用专项建设债扩表圈到备付金，然后慢慢扩表投资放贷，同时在被投资放贷主体转帐的过程中缩表。如果开行和邮储合体，这家“开邮银行”就既有存款又有贷款，既有同业又有发债，必将是宇宙行的强力挑战者。

除了邮储和开行的组队，另一家更巨大的被动负债机构已经开始和各大银行合作，这就是人行。商业银行长期以来的天量外汇抛售，在央行这里形成了巨额的存款和巨额的外汇储备，正如邮储形成了巨额的存款和（曾经有过的）巨额的在央行存款。央行手里攥了一大笔外汇，又像邮储一样没有能力直接发放贷款，就只能先买国外同业发行的债券，正如邮储拆借或存放给国内同业一样。

也正如邮储主动提供备付金给能够放贷的商业银行和政策性银行一样，人行现在有了委托贷款和丝路基金等机制后，也找来了很多小伙伴，把自己的外汇交给这些银行配置，自己只负责收取利息和本金。开行等机构在海外的放贷经验和经营范围大概胜过储备司，这些银行也能通过发放外汇贷款受益。

这里我们还会看到，邮储和开行之间的借贷，造成了债务存量的增加。这种债务存量增加的原因，在于其机制上的历史特性，即开行没存款，邮储不会贷，存款转账把备付金一起拽。因此两者之间长期的债务联系，与其说是增加了债务存量，还不如说是把两者清算关系固化的一种方式。

如果把两者看作一个整体，那么其间的债权债务抵销，债务水平也就下来了。更进一步，如果邮储不是购买开行发行的债券，而是直接入股开行，从备付金的流转角度讲没有区别，但这个操作就不产生债务。如果机构合并是十三五规划中“降低杠杆率”的一个选项，大批的同业债务就都没了，杠杆率轻松达标不是梦。

Postal Savings Bank and China Development Bank are two very unique banks. The uniqueness of China Development Bank is better known, after all, as a policy bank, it already sounds different from general commercial banks. Postal Savings Bank is also quite special, and readers familiar with the China Banking Regulatory Commission's classification system must know that Postal Savings Bank is classified as "other institutions," grouped together with new rural financial institutions and China-Germany housing savings banks.

When it comes to Postal Savings Bank, people generally have heard of postal savings deposits. Initially, these deposits were fully transferred to the central bank. According to the central bank's explanation, Postal Savings Bank at that time had no capacity and channels for asset utilization and was equivalent to a specific deposit institution that absorbed deposits from the central bank to withdraw currency. In 2003, the Postal Savings Bank's fund management system was reformed, and channels for autonomous investment and entrusted wealth management were opened. In 2007, the postal savings institutions were reorganized into Postal Savings Bank. As of the end of September 2015, its total assets were 6.7 trillion yuan.

The unique history of Postal Savings Bank gives its balance sheet unique characteristics that general banks do not possess. Postal Savings Bank has a large amount of deposits, reaching 6.12 trillion yuan, but loans and advances are very few, only 2.36 trillion yuan. Regardless of how the deposit-to-loan ratio is calculated, it is far from the 75% red line. Postal Savings Bank is not an active issuer of debt instruments; it issued only one sizeable 25 billion yuan Tier 2 capital bond in 2015, all of which is reflected on the liability side, indicating no outstanding bonds.

In contrast, China Development Bank's balance sheet is a mirror image of Postal Savings Bank. At the end of 2014, China Development Bank had assets of 10 trillion yuan, but deposits were only 1.08 trillion yuan. The main liability was bonds of 6.34 trillion yuan, while on the asset side, China Development Bank's loans and advances reached as high as 7.67 trillion yuan. China Development Bank does not have to maintain reserve deposits; the "central bank statutory reserve deposit" item in its annual report note is simply a hyphen. And based on the scale of its loans and deposits, it probably has not been constrained by the deposit-to-loan ratio.

The "less deposits, more bonds + large loans" structure of China Development Bank, and the "more deposits, fewer bonds + small loans" structure of Postal Savings Bank are mirror images of each other, and both are quite different from general commercial banks. Without deposits, China Development Bank can still lend, which suggests that the deposit-to-loan ratio might not be necessary. While Postal Savings Bank has abundant deposits, it lends very little. Does this mean that funds are circulating within the interbank system, without being used for the real economy? A more relevant question now is: Why are China Development Bank and Agricultural Development Bank's special construction bonds targeted at Postal Savings Bank?

Firstly, in an era when paper currency was widely used, people had the misconception that deposits were crucial for lending. This is because deposits were the only channel for paper currency to enter banks, and at that time, banks did not issue bonds or other financing tools, lacking alternative sources of paper currency. Nowadays, people use bank deposits to buy and sell goods, and banks create deposits directly through lending, so there's no need to rely solely on deposits for lending.

However, China Development Bank not needing deposits doesn't mean it doesn't need deposits at the central bank. As mentioned earlier, China Development Bank doesn't need to reserve reserves, but it needs to hold reserves at the central bank, totaling over 50 billion yuan, to account for various business funds held by the People's Bank of China. This includes the allocation of business funds, local bill exchanges, and cash withdrawals or deposits for cross-system fund transfers between different locations.

Considering that China Development Bank's deposits are only 1 trillion yuan, over 50 billion yuan in reserve funds is quite substantial. At the end of 2014, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) had excess reserve funds of 80 billion yuan (including funds used for fund clearing purposes and other unrestricted funds), but ICBC had deposits of 15 trillion yuan. China Development Bank's reserve funds rate is probably similar to that of rural credit cooperatives, which is around 6.7%. Of course, China Development Bank needs to address the liquidity needs of other debts, but given that other banks also have non-deposit liabilities, this view might only explain part of the situation.

A more important reason is mentioned in "What Will Happen to Monetary Credit if Reserve Institutions Expand?" China Development Bank doesn't need to hold deposits, but it still needs to maintain deposits at the central bank. China Development Bank doesn't need to comply with the reserve requirement, but it needs to maintain reserves with the central bank, amounting to over 50 billion yuan. This is used to account for various business funds held by the People's Bank of China, including fund transfers, local bill exchanges, and cross-system fund transfers for different locations.

Considering China Development Bank's deposits are only 1 trillion yuan, over 50 billion yuan in reserve funds is quite substantial. At the end of 2014, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) had excess reserve funds of 80 billion yuan (including funds used for fund clearing purposes and other unrestricted funds), but ICBC had deposits of 15 trillion yuan. China Development Bank's reserve funds rate is probably similar to that of rural credit cooperatives, which is around 6.7%. Of course, China Development Bank needs to address the liquidity needs of other debts, but given that other banks also have non-deposit liabilities, this view might only explain part of the situation.

Another significant reason is that Postal Savings Bank has passive liabilities and reserve funds also naturally flow in. Its main source of deposits is not loans created by itself, but rather deposits from a large number of depositors. This type of deposit may not necessarily be driven by seeking high interest rates, but could be due to network services and other historical reasons, just like China Development Bank's low deposit level. Postal Savings Bank receives excess reserve funds equivalent to its deposits, but it cannot directly increase the statutory reserve requirement by simply expanding deposits. Therefore, it has no choice but to use the excess reserve funds that can't be transformed directly and reinvest them through interbank and bond transactions with other banks. This may explain why Postal Savings Bank cooperates with other banks for interbank transactions or shadow banking deals.

Considering that Postal Savings Bank's loan competition might not be strong due to historical reasons, or it might not have much demand for customer loans in certain regions or customer segments, the only option left is to reinvest excess reserve funds, as these funds can't be fully converted into statutory reserve requirements. This could explain the question of why China Development Bank and Agricultural Development Bank's special construction bonds are directed towards Postal Savings Bank.

If you view both China Development Bank and Postal Savings Bank as a unified entity, their lending and borrowing create an increase in debt stock. The reason for this increase in debt stock lies in their historical characteristics—China Development Bank lacks deposits, while Postal Savings Bank does not lend. The transfer of deposits drags along the reserve funds. Therefore, the long-term debt connection between the two can be seen not so much as an increase in debt stock but rather as a way of solidifying their clearing relationship.

If you consider them as a whole, the offsetting of debts between China Development Bank and Postal Savings Bank reduces the debt level. Furthermore, if Postal Savings Bank does not purchase bonds issued by China Development Bank but instead directly invests in China Development Bank, there is no difference from the perspective of reserve fund circulation, but this operation does not generate debt. If these institutions merge, this "China Post Bank" would have both deposits and loans, as well as interbank transactions and bond issuance, making it a formidable challenger in the financial industry.

In addition to the collaboration between Postal Savings Bank and China Development Bank, another much larger passive liability institution has begun collaborating with major banks, and that is the People's Bank of China. The massive foreign exchange sales by commercial banks have formed significant deposits and foreign exchange reserves in the central bank, just as Postal Savings Bank has accumulated substantial deposits and (formerly substantial) reserves in the central bank. The People's Bank of China has a large amount of foreign exchange in its hands, but like Postal Savings Bank, it lacks the ability to lend directly. Therefore, it can only buy bonds issued by foreign banks, just as Postal Savings Bank engages in interbank transactions or deposits with domestic peers.

Just as Postal Savings Bank actively provides reserve funds to commercial banks and policy banks capable of lending, the People's Bank of China has also found many partners after establishing mechanisms such as entrusted loans and the Silk Road Fund. These partners allocate the central bank's foreign exchange, and the People's Bank of China only collects interest and principal. Institutions like China Development Bank have more overseas lending experience and a broader scope of operations compared to the Reserve Funds Department. These banks can also benefit from foreign exchange loans.

This perspective reveals that the lending and borrowing between Postal Savings Bank and China Development Bank has led to an increase in debt stock. This increase in debt stock is due to their historical characteristics, namely, China Development Bank lacking deposits and Postal Savings Bank not lending. This leads to the transfer of deposits and reserve funds. Therefore, the long-term debt relationship between the two institutions can be seen as solidifying their clearing relationship rather than simply increasing debt stock.

If we view these two as a whole, then the offsetting of debt and credit between them would result in a reduction of debt levels. Furthermore, if Postal Savings Bank didn't purchase bonds issued by China Development Bank but instead directly invested in China Development Bank, from the perspective of reserve fund circulation, there would be no difference, but this operation wouldn't generate debt. If institution merging is an option in the 13th Five-Year Plan to "reduce leverage," a significant amount of interbank debt would disappear, and achieving a healthy leverage ratio would be easily attainable.