2015-08-03 央行观察

央行新发布的《非银行支付机构网络支付业务管理办法（征求意见稿）》一石激起千层浪，可供关注的点很多。例如“江南愤青”对意见稿的解读，认为人行想让网络支付业务回到纯粹的支付业务，而非资金业务，其观点可谓切中要害。本文也试图从该角度分析央行的新规。

第三方支付的资金业务就是银行业务。传统银行业的兴起和客户在银行存放贵金属有关，客户持有的银行存款并不是贵金属本身，但客户有权支取贵金属，也有权要求银行划拨贵金属所有权给另一客户。而央行的意见稿第十条中也称，支付帐户资金余额不是银行存款，而是客户购买的，所有权归客户的预付价值，以机构名义放在银行，由支付机构发起指令进行调拨。

与现今的银行业务对照，客户存入支付机构的，是作为银行负债的存款，而银行客户存入银行的，则是作为央行负债的纸币。而银行存款对于支付机构，正如纸币对于银行，都相当于各自的准备金资产，以应对提款和转帐。支付机构客户的提款，便是将在支付机构的余额转出到银行，如同银行客户提款是将在银行的存款转为手中的纸币。银行客户要求转帐时，银行需要按照客户指令，转移在央行的准备金存款，或者增加对收款行的同业债务，同时收款客户在收款行的存款增加。而支付客户要求转帐时，则涉及了更多的层级。

如果收款客户的帐户和支付客户的帐户都在同一支付机构，那么转帐就是支付机构内部的帐目调整，不涉及银行存款的变动。而如果收款人和付款人在不同支付机构，但两个支付机构在同一银行开户，则转帐涉及双方支付机构的资产负债两侧的帐目调整，以及银行负债侧存款的帐目调整，但不涉及银行存款准备金资产或同业负债的调整。而如果支付机构在不同的银行开户，则在影响双方支付机构资产负债的同时，也影响银行存款，更会影响存款准备金或同业负债。如果一家支付机构在多家银行开户，则影响会更复杂。

支付机构中，支付宝已经把银行业务做得有声有色。余额宝依靠其份额和作为准备金的银行存款的随时等价兑换，以及淘宝和天猫的商品与服务，已经获得了媲美银行活期存款的流动性，更兼高于活期存款利率多倍的收益水平。“蚂蚁花呗”是信用卡，用户在使用“花呗”付款时，蚂蚁金服一方面增加对用户的债权，一方面将自己在银行的存款转帐给用户指定的收款方，或者增加对收款方的负债。而“蚂蚁借呗”则简直就实现了银行式的放贷，即把自身的负债或股权借给融资人当钱花，同时收取利息。

央行虽然着重强调，客户在支付机构的资金余额不是存款，不受存款保险保护，但支付机构完全可以联合保险公司解决“存款保险”的问题。更妙的是，通过将资金余额放入货币基金当中，基金持有人持有的是基金的股权而非债权，基金本来就没有保本义务。引入保险公司来做“存款保险”，目的恐怕乃是让人们放心持有，以实现基金份额的货币化，毕竟用的人越多就越好用。这也是为什么支付机构的负债能成为人们支付的手段，而中石油这样巨大的公司的债务就只是债券。

央行的出手可圈可点。首先，通过要求支付机构不得为客户办理或变相办理现金存取、信贷、融资、理财、担保、货币兑换业务，央行其实是想堵死支付机构在资产侧和负债侧与客户的金融业务。银行融资给客户，既可以贷出资产侧的纸币，也可以贷出负债侧的存款，而对于支付机构而言，相当于贷出银行存款或者增加自身资金余额给客户。新规后，支付机构或许还是可以靠吃在银行的存款收入与客户资金余额零利息的差赚钱，但不能靠放贷和货币扩张赚钱。支付机构应该对存款者负有保管义务，正如证券公司不能挪用客户保证金一样。

同时，央行还要求支付机构不得为金融机构以及从事金融业务的其他机构开立支付帐户，这可以避免出现以支付机构资金余额为准备金的新一层银行结构，不致形成“央行-银行-银行存款的支付机构-支付机构余额的支付机构”的链条。如前文所述，同一支付机构内部帐户间的转帐就已经和银行存款没关系了，如果又多一层银行结构就更难监管。股灾前，炒股公司在证券公司开一个户，用IT系统把这一个户分给多个投资者交易的故事，可谓前车之鉴。

而且，如果银行在支付机构开户，那么支付机构就如同银行有央行一样，给自己找到了最后贷款人。如果支付机构为了高收益率有很多定期存款，以致不能应对客户向其他支付机构转帐或提现为银行存款，此时支付机构可以向银行借款，在为银行创造更多份额的同时，也为自己争取到更多的银行活期存款，以应对客户要求。这种支持所代表的“央行看跌期权”，使支付机构在期限错配的同时，寻找提供高利率存款的银行开户，从接受低利率资金余额的银行融资，赚取更多利差。

对于新生的事物，总是面临着两条路，一条是“不忘初心”，即该干支付的就好好干支付。而另一条是“顺其自然”，例如四大资产管理公司除了清理不良资产外，还扩展了很多新的业务。对支付企业，既可以不让他们成为银行，也可以用银行的标准监管这些支付企业，当然两种办法孰优孰劣，需要斟酌比较。

另外一点思考是，对很多金融机构甚至企业而言，如果按照银行的思路来发展，在高科技的支持下，不少恐怕真能发展成银行。余额宝就是复制着传统银行的发展路径，顺应着时代的潮流，满足着用户的需要，一步一步走来。如何在未来让这些新型“银行”造福社会而不造成麻烦，是各家监管机构需要一起进行前瞻性思考的问题。

The People's Bank of China's (PBOC) newly released draft of the "Administrative Measures for Non-Bank Payment Institutions' Network Payment Business" has stirred up a lot of discussion and attention. One noteworthy interpretation by some experts is that the PBOC aims to bring network payment business back to being purely payment-related, rather than involving financial transactions. This perspective seems to hit the core issue. This article attempts to analyze the central bank's new regulations from this angle.

The Financial Business of Third-Party Payments is Banking Business

The rise of traditional banking business was related to customers depositing valuable assets in banks. The bank deposits held by customers do not represent the valuable assets themselves, but customers have the right to withdraw these assets or transfer ownership to another party. The draft of the PBOC also mentions in Article 10 that the funds in payment accounts are not bank deposits; instead, they are pre-paid values purchased by customers, with ownership belonging to customers. These values are nominally held by institutions in banks, and instructions for transfers are initiated by payment institutions.

Comparing this to traditional banking business, funds deposited by customers in payment institutions are liabilities of the institution, similar to how bank customers' deposits in banks are liabilities of the central bank. The deposits of payment institution customers are equivalent to reserve assets for the institution, allowing them to handle withdrawals and transfers. When payment institution customers make withdrawals, it means transferring the balance from the payment institution to the bank, similar to how bank customers withdrawing money receive physical currency. When bank customers request transfers, the bank needs to follow the customer's instructions to move reserve deposits with the central bank or increase interbank liabilities to the recipient bank while increasing the recipient customer's bank deposits. Requests for transfers from payment institution customers involve even more levels.

If the accounts of the recipient and payer are both with the same payment institution, transferring funds between accounts is merely an internal adjustment within the payment institution and does not involve changes in bank deposits. If the recipient and payer are with different payment institutions but both institutions have accounts with the same bank, then the transfer involves adjusting the assets and liabilities of both payment institutions on both sides and adjusting bank liabilities, but it does not involve changes in bank reserve assets or interbank liabilities. If the payment institutions have accounts with different banks, it affects the assets and liabilities of both institutions and also impacts bank deposits, which further affects reserve assets or interbank liabilities. If one payment institution has accounts with multiple banks, the impact becomes even more complex.

Alipay, among payment institutions, has developed banking services extensively. Yu'EBao, with its instant equivalent exchange based on its shares and bank deposits as reserves, as well as the integration of Taobao and Tmall's goods and services, has achieved liquidity comparable to bank demand deposits and offers returns many times higher than demand deposit interest rates. "Ant Huabei" is similar to a credit card; when users make payments using "Huabei," Ant Financial increases its claim on the user while transferring its bank deposits to the designated recipient or increasing liabilities to the recipient. "Ant Jiebei" essentially realizes bank-style lending, by lending its own liabilities or equity to borrowers while charging interest.

Although the PBOC emphasizes that the funds held by customers in payment institutions are not deposits and are not protected by deposit insurance, payment institutions could still cooperate with insurance companies to address the issue of "deposit insurance." Even more ingeniously, by placing funds in currency funds, fund holders own shares in the fund rather than debt, and funds themselves have no obligation to preserve capital. Introducing insurance companies to provide "deposit insurance" likely aims to give people confidence in holding funds, enabling the monetization of fund shares. After all, the more people use it, the more convenient it becomes. This is also why payment institutions' liabilities can serve as a means of payment, while the enormous debts of companies like PetroChina are just bonds.

The Central Bank's Measures

First, by prohibiting payment institutions from handling or indirectly handling cash deposits, credit, financing, wealth management, guarantees, and currency exchange for customers, the central bank aims to block the financial transactions between payment institutions and customers on the asset and liability sides. Banks can provide financing to customers using either assets or liabilities, while for payment institutions, it is equivalent to lending bank deposits or increasing their own balance to customers. After the new regulations, payment institutions may still earn money by the difference between the zero-interest income from bank deposits and the income from holding customer funds in banks, but they cannot profit from lending and monetary expansion. Payment institutions should have the obligation to safeguard depositors, just as securities firms cannot misappropriate customer margin.

Additionally, the central bank requires payment institutions not to open payment accounts for financial institutions or other entities engaged in financial activities. This can avoid the formation of a new layer of banking structures based on payment institution fund balances, preventing a chain like "PBOC-bank-payment institution-payment institution balance" from forming. As mentioned earlier, transferring between accounts within the same payment institution is unrelated to bank deposits. If another layer of banking structures is added, supervision becomes more difficult. Before the stock market crash, the story of securities companies opening accounts with brokerage firms and using IT systems to allocate the single account to multiple investors is a cautionary tale.

Moreover, if banks open accounts with payment institutions, then payment institutions, like banks, have the central bank as their ultimate borrower. If payment institutions have many fixed-term deposits to achieve high interest rates and cannot meet customer demands for transfers or withdrawals into bank deposits, they can borrow from banks. This supports the "central bank put," allowing payment institutions to create more shares for banks while also securing more demand deposits for themselves to meet customer demands. This support represents a "central bank put option," enabling payment institutions to find banks that offer high-interest deposits while accepting low-interest income from bank financing, thereby earning more from the interest rate spread.

For emerging phenomena, there are usually two approaches: "stick to the original intention," meaning focusing on payment services; and "go with the flow," which involves expanding into new business areas. For payment companies, they could be prevented from becoming banks or regulated like banks. Which approach is better needs to be carefully considered and compared.

Another point for consideration is that for many financial institutions, and even companies, if they follow the banking approach and leverage high technology, many could potentially develop into banks. Yu'EBao, for example, follows the development path of traditional banks, aligns with the trend of the times, and meets user needs step by step. How to allow these new "banks" to benefit society in the future without causing trouble is a forward-thinking issue that regulatory bodies need to consider collectively.