原创 2016-01-14 季天鹤央行观察

季天鹤
方正中期研究院研究员，央行观察专栏作家

伯南克的回忆录于2015年10月5日出版上市。比他更早离职的保尔森和盖特纳，已经分别在《On the Brink》和《Stress Test》中详述了各自在金融危机中的观察和经历，两本书也广受追捧。伯南克作为当时的联储主席，其回忆录早已为市场所期待，而他的这本《The Courage to Act》也不负众望。读罢此书，不得不说这本书对得起那段日子的壮阔波澜。总体来说，这本书内容丰富，文字冷静流畅，期待高质量的中文译本早日面世。

2007年开始的金融危机，尽管涉及了花样繁多的金融产品和高度关联的金融市场，但始终没有摆脱19世纪以来金融危机的一般情节，即经济繁荣伴随的信贷扩张，银根紧缩和无效投资导致的信贷紧缩和经济萧条，并且在一定情况下触发流动性危机而形成金融危机。但和两个世纪前有所不同的是，过去很多的非流动金融产品在现在纷纷具有了流动性和公允价值，从而加剧了价值涨跌和偿付/违约的相互影响，这也大大增加了联储操作的复杂性。

伯南克作为研究大萧条的专家，能够亲身迎战2007年开始的金融危机，可谓是美国的幸运。美国大萧条之所以特别严重，重要原因在于金本位和央行的紧缩政策，任凭物价自由下跌和货币量剧烈缩减。伯南克下定决心不要重蹈覆辙，因此在行动上也极为果断，并多次动用《联邦储备法》的应急条款，对各类金融机构进行非传统/非正统的流动性支持。

而有机会大战金融危机，也是伯南克自己的幸运，毕竟没有很多经济学者能够用自己一生研究的理论，应用在万亿美元级别的实践上。他的回忆录中多次提到他的研究与所习，无论是在迎战金融危机时重温Bagehot的央行理论，还是在考虑货币政策正常化时反思大萧条期间过早收紧政策造成的恶果，都体现出伯南克作为金融理论研究者的深厚功底。

虽然大规模的救市从范围上和工具上都突破了传统的框架，但其套路仍然是古典的中央银行学理论与实践。流动性要足够充足，抵押品要足够优质，联储右手扩表印钞，左手把买来的债券用来放贷，同时满足市场对钱和券的需求。此外，联储还直接针对货币基金等非存款类机构放款，同时影响银行的资产和负债侧。

上述操作相当于在央行能够放水的所有三个池子及央行资产侧、央行负债侧和银行负债侧全面放水，传统的央行-银行-非银金融-非金融的界限和传导链条，被联储只手全部串联和超越。这一场景在2015年的7、8月间也被人民银行所使用，即一方面通过证金充实银行负债侧，一方面动用央行资产侧提供美元流动性，同时在8月底通过SLO放出人民币流动性。对央行放水机制感兴趣的读者，欢迎参考《央行“放水”的三个池子》。

正由于抱着坚决不重蹈大萧条覆辙的信念，伯南克在面对金融危机时力主宽松，特别是十分强调预期的作用，以及货币政策沟通和透明化的关键性。当然，联储并不是伯南克一人的联储，在他的回忆录中，我们看到联储中的鹰派和鸽派如何进行激烈而复杂的博弈，从而对货币政策的表达和执行产生影响。

伯南克的记述对于理解美国货币政策的制定过程，显然是非常宝贵的资料。例如2007年底和2008年初，很多市场人士认为联储的动作不够迅速，降息力度不足以稳定市场。事实上这背后上演的，乃是在当时高通胀背景下，联储对于金融风险和通胀风险的权衡与纠节。鹰派在当时依然高度关注通胀风险，反对过快地降低利率，因此当时联储的决策并没有市场认为必要的那样宽松和激进。

不过更让联储疲于应对的，乃是来自其他监管机构和美国国会的挑战。负责存款保险的联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）被伯南克和保尔森视为非常精明的合作者。在银行等金融机构的救援方面，FDIC一方面努力保护自己的保险基金，同时又努力扩大自己的话语权，并且非常懂得利用媒体和美国政治运作，在救市中起到了举足轻重的作用。

而美国国会则扮演了更为复杂的角色。无论是伯南克还是保尔森，都提到了美国参众两院议员的咄咄逼人和大权在握。事实上，美国国会议员的行为背后，乃是形形色色的观点与动机。部分议员是自由市场的铁杆粉丝，任何干预都被看作是对自由市场的亵渎和对社会主义的膜拜。但同样是这些议员，在遇到自己选区选民抱怨议会否决救市法案时，又屈服于选票和选举的压力，突显了意识形态和实际利益间的矛盾。

而另一部分议员则认为联储的干预是一种阴谋的体现，代表了银行家和富人的利益，而使得穷人们和工薪阶层丢了工作和房子。联储货币政策的松紧，就是在执行一个劫贫济富的计划，使得贫者越贫、富者越富，中产的财富不停流失。他们要做的，就是制止联储的阴谋。于是在这里，失业不是联储救市的理由，而反倒是联储之前政策带来的苦难，甚至是救市政策可能带来的恶果。

从对货币政策的理解来讲，部分议员是紧缩政策的拥趸，认为紧缩是对过度宽松的纠正，亏损和破产是对前期冒险和莽撞的惩罚，现在的萧条是为未来的盲目敲响警钟，乃至书中提到“没有倒闭的资本主义，如同没有地狱的基督教义”。他们的口号是不能容忍道德风险，他们担心的永远是通货膨胀。但当失业和破产潮来袭的时候，当人们还不上房贷坐看房子被银行收走的时候，他们也开始问自己，这样痛苦的惩罚是否值得。

短期内生产要素不可能一夜之间顺利转移，均衡的调整需要一定时间和条件。创造条件和争取时间，使生产要素得以重新配置，在经济政策上是值得的，当然前提条件是生产要素会主动转移，而不是吃定政策会给条件和时间。而在短期迅速的崩盘式衰退中，给与一定的政策托底更是十分必要，需要讨论的则是微观上如何执行，使得既不托市太过，又不任其坠落。

比较美、欧、中三国的经济拯救结果，我们发现美国调整迅速且到位；欧洲宏观偏紧，微观上也不够灵活，以致目前部分国家的失业率依然高企，欧元区内部经济运行两极分化。中国调整足够迅速，但在个别方向上走得太远，微观上又缺乏约束，于是导致了实体经济的过剩以及金融层面的债务高企，但微观上配置机制较为灵活，因此失业并不严重，反而有民工荒招工难等现象。

从对联储的理解上，议员们的观点既来自对于金融体系的不够了解，也体现了美国特色货币史和货币思想在他们身上留下的遗迹。例如，有议员对联储能动辄拿出几百亿上千亿美元救市感到迷惑，以至于担心美联储会不会哪天囊中羞涩，这显然是不了解央行的运行机制。现实的金融体系和立法者与公众理解的金融体系有非常大的不同。

让公众懂和利用公众的不懂都可以是达成货币政策目标的途径。例如联储扩张资产负债表，嘴上说是让银行有更多的资金来放贷给实体经济，但其实懂的人都知道银行不可能使用在联储的存款放贷给企业。不过虽然如此，只要不懂的议员以及民众认同联储扩表是在支持实体经济，联储扩表就是一路绿灯。

而美国特色货币史和货币思想，则会让中国读者感到大开眼界。事实上，美国历史上包含了很多激进的货币思想和行动，包括对于银行的仇视、对央行的仇视、对弹性货币量的仇视等等，这在罗斯巴德的《古典经济学》一书中有精到的解说，特别是在和19世纪同期的英国通货学派与银行学派的对比下，更为明显。

纵观美国的十九世纪货币史可以看到，美国人民对金属货币有一种痴迷，认为使用金属货币可以避免通胀和银行破产，把银行以及银行扩张信贷和存款（在那个时代是银行券）看作是通胀和萧条的原因，对于银行的最后贷款人也就是央行更是颇多抗拒，认为央行是纵容银行犯罪的最大恶魔。

尽管联储在1907年大危机之后得以建立，但美国十九世纪的货币思想仍游荡在美国议会。美国著名议员Ron Paul，就依然高喊着“重返金本位”的口号，甚至写了本书叫《End the FED》。中国不太可能有人会兜售“重返龙银”和“关掉人行”的主意，大家反而都在想如何拥抱电子货币、理解货币政策。不过，伯南克在书中插了一张与Ron Paul的合影。他认为Ron Paul是真诚地相信自己的观点，而不是像另外一些人一样，把批判联储、批判宽松政策等当作一种作秀方式。

我还记得自己观看的伯南克和保尔森听证会转播。议员们高高在上，作证者低坐台下。议员们表情夸张言辞激烈比比划划，作证者小心翼翼战战兢兢不敢乱动。保尔森尽管曾任高盛的CEO，此时也只能嗓音嘶哑磕磕巴巴地回答着问题，而且不停被打断，相比之下伯南克还比较淡定。对这一情景，伯南克提到，他觉得有些议员的问题根本不是在提给他，而是提给摄像机的。

伯南克还提到，有些议员公开批判联储之后私下就打电话给他，说自己先前的表态不是自己的本意。有议员甚至说自己的投票是违心之举，投反对票只是“给块红肉让人别拽裤脚”罢了。这不禁让人疑问，美国的经济政策反映的，到底是共识还是讨价还价的结果？类似否决TARP这样，把美国经济前景牺牲在利益交换里的情节，是否还会重现？

如果美国议会中的强硬派得逞，联储无法施展拳脚，美国的前景将会如何？答案或许可以从欧洲央行那里寻找。除了在雷曼倒闭2个月前的2008年7月加息0.25%之外，欧洲央行还在欧债危机的大幕拉开后，于2011年4月和7月分别加息0.25%。不料前一个加息之后就是美国的两房国有化和雷曼倒闭，后两个加息之后就是欧债危机集中爆发。太投入地和通胀和道德风险死磕，结果反而是经济二次探底以及负利率。

相比欧洲而言，中国对于伯南克以及那个时候的联储来说，是一个非常边缘的存在。日本央行在全书中出镜多次，日本的萧条和货币政策也是伯南克的研究重点。而中国的出场，则是以伯南克的爷爷从西伯利亚劳改营跑到上海坐船回欧洲开始，之后是中投和中信对美国金融机构的注资，人民银行追随世界几大央行的降息，最后以关于中国经济的一点看法结束，在整部书里是个小小小角色。

平心而论，这客观反映了在5、6年前，中国的经济与金融实力，确实和美国和日本还有较大距离。这也反映了伯南克和保尔森个人与中国的联系有所不同，后者在回忆录中多次提到其与中国高层的互动，甚至中投和高西庆为何放弃二度入股摩根等细节。不过几年过去，中国的情况发生了巨大变化，相信当耶伦出版自己的回忆录时，2015年8月中国央行的汇率改革，以及“汇改”引发的全球金融市场剧烈动荡，必将是她书中的重要段落。

Ben Bernanke's memoir was published and released on October 5, 2015. Paulson and Geithner, who left their positions earlier than him, had already detailed their observations and experiences during the financial crisis in their respective books "On the Brink" and "Stress Test," both of which were well-received. Bernanke, as the Fed chairman at the time, had been eagerly awaited in the market for his memoir, and his book "The Courage to Act" lived up to expectations. After reading this book, it must be said that it truly captures the grand and turbulent days of that period. Overall, the book is rich in content, with calm and fluent writing, and there is an expectation for a high-quality Chinese translation to be released soon.

The financial crisis that began in 2007, although involving a variety of financial products and interconnected financial markets, still followed the general plot of financial crises since the 19th century. This plot involves economic prosperity accompanied by credit expansion, followed by tight money and credit contraction caused by ineffective investments, leading to an economic downturn. In certain cases, this sequence triggers a liquidity crisis and forms a financial crisis. However, unlike two centuries ago, many non-liquid financial products now have liquidity and fair value, intensifying the interplay between value fluctuations and defaults, which greatly increases the complexity of Fed operations.

As an expert in studying the Great Depression, Bernanke's ability to face the financial crisis that began in 2007 could be considered fortunate for the United States. The severity of the Great Depression in the United States was largely due to the gold standard and the central bank's contractionary policies, allowing prices to plummet freely and the money supply to shrink dramatically. Bernanke was determined not to repeat this mistake, so his actions were resolute, and he repeatedly used emergency provisions of the Federal Reserve Act to provide unconventional/non-traditional liquidity support to various financial institutions.

Having the opportunity to lead the fight against the financial crisis was also fortunate for Bernanke himself. After all, not many economists can apply their lifelong research theories to trillions of dollars in real-world practice. His memoir mentions many times his reliance on his studies and education. Whether it's revisiting Bagehot's central banking theory while confronting the financial crisis or reflecting on the consequences of prematurely tightening policy during the Great Depression when considering normalizing monetary policy, it demonstrates Bernanke's deep theoretical foundation as a financial researcher.

Although the massive market rescue efforts broke traditional frameworks in terms of scope and tools, the underlying strategy remained rooted in classical central banking theory and practice. Ensuring sufficient liquidity, quality collateral, expanding the balance sheet by printing money, lending out the purchased bonds, and meeting the market's demand for money and securities. Additionally, the Fed directly lent to non-deposit institutions like money market funds, simultaneously affecting the assets and liabilities of banks.

The operations mentioned above were like opening all three floodgates available to central banks – central bank assets, central bank liabilities, and bank liabilities – releasing liquidity. This integrated the traditional boundaries and transmission chains of central banks, banks, non-bank financial institutions, and non-financial entities. This scene was also used by the People's Bank of China in July and August 2015, where on the one hand, it enriched bank liabilities through China Investment Corporation and used central bank assets to provide USD liquidity, while at the end of August, it released RMB liquidity through SLO. For readers interested in the mechanism of central bank liquidity provision, the article "The Three Pools of Central Bank Liquidity" is recommended.

Due to his unwavering commitment to avoiding the mistakes of the Great Depression, Bernanke advocated for accommodative policies during the financial crisis. He particularly emphasized the role of expectations, as well as the importance of clear communication and transparency in monetary policy. Of course, the Fed is not just Bernanke's Fed. In his memoir, we see how hawks and doves within the Fed engage in fierce and complex games that influence the expression and execution of monetary policy.

Bernanke's account is valuable for understanding the process of formulating U.S. monetary policy. For instance, at the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008, many market participants believed the Fed's actions were not swift enough and that the rate cuts were insufficient to stabilize the market. In reality, the decisions made by the Fed were the result of balancing and managing financial and inflation risks. Hawks were still highly concerned about inflation risks, opposing rapid rate cuts. Therefore, the Fed's decisions were not as accommodative and aggressive as the market believed them to be.

However, what exhausted the Fed's efforts even more were challenges from other regulatory agencies and the U.S. Congress. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), responsible for deposit insurance, was considered a clever collaborator by Bernanke and Paulson. In the rescue of banks and other financial institutions, the FDIC worked to protect its insurance fund while expanding its influence and skillfully leveraging media and U.S. political operations, playing a crucial role in the rescue efforts.

The U.S. Congress played a more complex role. Whether Bernanke or Paulson, both mentioned the forceful and dominant behavior of members of the House and Senate. In fact, the behavior of U.S. congressional members is motivated by various viewpoints and motives. Some members are staunch advocates of free markets, considering any intervention as sacrilege against free markets and reverence for socialism. However, when facing complaints from their constituents about the rejection of the bailout bill, these same members yield to the pressure of votes and elections, revealing the contradictions between ideology and practical interests.

Another group of members believe that the Fed's interventions represent a conspiracy that serves the interests of bankers and the wealthy, causing job and home losses for the poor and the working class. The tightness or looseness of the Fed's monetary policy is seen as executing a plan that enriches the rich and impoverishes the poor, with the wealth of the middle class continuously eroding. Their goal is to stop the Fed's alleged conspiracy. Here, unemployment is not a reason for the Fed's market rescue policy; instead, it is a consequence of the hardships caused by the Fed's previous policies, and even a potential outcome of the market rescue policy.

In terms of understanding monetary policy, some members are advocates of tightening policies, believing that tightening corrects excessive accommodation, and that losses and bankruptcies are punishments for previous risks and recklessness. The current recession is a warning for the future, and even mentioned in the book is "Capitalism without bankruptcy is like Christianity without hell." Their slogan is that they cannot tolerate moral hazards, and they are always concerned about inflation. However, when unemployment and bankruptcies surge, and people are unable to pay their mortgages and see their houses taken away by banks, they begin to question whether such painful punishments are worth it.

In the short term, it's not possible for factors of production to transition smoothly overnight. Balanced adjustments require time and conditions. Creating conditions and buying time for factors of production to be reconfigured is worth it in economic policy. Of course, the premise is that factors of production will move willingly, rather than assuming that policy will provide conditions and time. In the rapid collapse of the short term, providing certain policy support is necessary, and the discussion then shifts to how to execute it in microterms, allowing for support without being excessive or allowing for a complete free fall.

Comparing the results of economic rescues in the United States, Europe, and China, we can observe that the United States adjusted rapidly and effectively. Europe's macro policy is relatively tight, and its micro policy is not flexible enough, resulting in high unemployment rates in some countries and internal economic polarization within the eurozone. China adjusted quickly enough, but it has gone too far in some directions, leading to overcapacity in the real economy and high debt levels in the financial sector. However, the micro-allocation mechanism is relatively flexible, so unemployment is not severe and there are phenomena like labor shortages and difficulty in hiring.

In terms of understanding the Fed, the viewpoints of the members are derived from a lack of understanding of the financial system and reflect the remnants of American monetary history and monetary thought. For instance, some members were puzzled by the Fed's ability to offer hundreds of billions or even trillions of dollars to support the market, and even worried that the Fed might run out of resources one day. This clearly indicates a lack of understanding of the central bank's operational mechanism. The real financial system differs significantly from the financial system perceived by legislators and the public.

Both understanding the public and leveraging their lack of understanding can be pathways to achieve monetary policy goals. For example, when the Fed expanded its balance sheet, it stated that it was providing banks with more funds to lend to the real economy. However, those who understand know that banks cannot use the deposits at the Fed to lend to businesses. Nevertheless, as long as uninformed legislators and the public perceive the Fed's balance sheet expansion as support for the real economy, the expansion will receive widespread approval.

The unique American monetary history and monetary thought leave a significant impact. For instance, throughout the 19th century, Americans were obsessed with metallic currency, believing that using metallic currency could prevent inflation and bank failures. They viewed banks, including bank credit expansion and banknotes (which were bank deposits in that era), as the causes of inflation and depression. Even the last lender, which is the central bank, was seen as the biggest devil that allowed banks to commit crimes.

Although the Fed was established after the 1907 crisis, the radical monetary thoughts of 19th-century America continued to influence the U.S. Congress. Renowned Congressman Ron Paul continues to advocate for a return to the gold standard and even wrote a book titled "End the FED." In China, it's unlikely that anyone would promote ideas like "returning to the silver standard" or "shutting down the People's Bank of China." Instead, everyone is trying to understand and embrace electronic currency and comprehend monetary policy. A photo of Bernanke with Ron Paul is included in the book. Bernanke believes that Ron Paul genuinely believes in his viewpoints, unlike some other individuals who criticize the Fed and loose policies as a form of performance.

I still remember watching the broadcast of Bernanke and Paulson's congressional hearings. The congressmen sat high above, while the witnesses sat meekly below. The congressmen's exaggerated expressions and passionate words contrasted with the cautious and motionless witnesses. Although Paulson was once the CEO of Goldman Sachs, he could only hoarsely and haltingly answer questions, often being interrupted. In comparison, Bernanke remained relatively composed. He mentioned that some questions from congressmen didn't seem to be directed at him but rather at the cameras.

Bernanke also mentioned that some congressmen publicly criticized the Fed but then called him privately, saying their previous statements didn't reflect their true opinions. Some congressmen even said their votes were against their hearts, and voting against was merely a show to appease their constituents. This raises questions about whether U.S. economic policy reflects consensus or the result of bargaining. Instances like the rejection of TARP, sacrificing the future of the U.S. economy in the exchange of interests, make one wonder whether this will happen again.

If the hardliners in the U.S. Congress succeed and the Fed's actions are restricted, what will the future of the U.S. look like? The answer might be found by looking at the European Central Bank. Except for the rate hike of 0.25% in July 2008, two months before Lehman's collapse, the European Central Bank also raised rates by 0.25% in April and July of 2011 after the curtain rose on the European debt crisis. However, the aftermath of the first rate hike was the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and Lehman's collapse, while after the latter two rate hikes, the European debt crisis erupted. A rigid focus on inflation and moral hazards led to a second economic downturn and negative interest rates.

Compared to Europe, China was a peripheral presence for Bernanke and the Fed at the time. The Bank of Japan appeared in the book multiple times, and Japan's depression and monetary policy were focal points of Bernanke's research. China's appearance, on the other hand, was limited to Bernanke's grandfather escaping from a Siberian labor camp to Shanghai before taking a ship to Europe, China Investment Corporation and CITIC's investments in U.S. financial institutions, the People's Bank of China following other major central banks in cutting rates, and finally ending with a brief view on China's economy. In the entire book, China played a minor role.

Objectively speaking, this reflects China's economic and financial strength compared to the U.S. and Japan about five to six years ago. This also shows that Bernanke and Paulson's personal connections with China were different; the latter mentioned multiple interactions with high-level Chinese officials in his memoir, including the reasons for China Investment Corporation and CITIC's decisions to forgo a second round of investment in Morgan Stanley. However, a few years have passed, and China has undergone significant changes. When Janet Yellen publishes her memoir, the August 2015 currency reform by the People's Bank of China, the intense turmoil in global financial markets caused by the "currency reform," will surely be a significant section in her book.