原创 2016-02-03 季天鹤央行观察

美国前财长保尔森关于中国的著作《Dealing With China》于2015年4月面世，这是他继《On the Brink》之后的第二部作品。和伯南克的回忆录几乎没有提到中国不同，保尔森的这部作品主要围绕中国展开。全书分为三部分，分享了其作为高盛高管、美国财长及退休后与中国打交道的经历和体会。全书内容十分丰富，国外读者可以领略其与中国经商的道与术，也可以一窥中美政治互动及相关人物的不同侧面，本文则着重关注该书中涉及的银行改革部分。

银行改革的原因：坏账

保尔森在高盛期间帮助多家中国企业上市或提供顾问，包括中国石油和中国银行等，而本书中也均有专门章节来展现上述交易的过程。其中，尤其以银行业的注资和上市最为重要。实体经济的问题，最后都会显示在金融领域，而在银行为主的融资体系里，实体经济的问题就是银行的问题。

实体经济的问题表现为很多企业经营困难，即企业生产的产品和服务，不能从买家那里圈回足够的钱。此外，企业不但无法通过卖东西圈回更多的钱，同时自己还要支付工资、房租乃至贷款利息等，于是只好从银行不断借钱支出。而对银行而言，其看到的景象，就是资产侧贷款不断增加，负债侧存款也不断增加，但看不到任何归还贷款本金时存款和贷款的同时减少，甚至看不到归还利息时的贷款不减少但存款减少。

当人们还不上贷款时，这种违约会通过两个渠道影响银行：一个是传统的减计，银行认为贷款质量下降，需要计提拨备，而这使得银行当期的费用增加，乃至在损益表上显示为净亏损，并使得银行资产和所有者权益规模同时减小，银行的资本充足率也由此下降。另一个是公允价值减少。债券在金融市场上的价格下降，银行相应调整债券在资产侧的估值，并相应减少所有者权益，并使银行的资本充足率下降，同时这一估值减少也使当期的费用增加，乃至在损益表上显示为净亏损。在中国的90年代，公允价值下跌导致的银行亏损应该还不明显，主要的问题则是在银行资产减计方面，即银行坏账导致的亏损。

鸵鸟会计行不通

或许有人说，如果不减计坏账而是放在那里装作好帐，那么银行不就不会亏损了么？确实如此，这样的话，银行资产侧的贷款本金以及相应的应收利息资产会越来越大，相对地负债侧存款会跟着贷款本金增大而不停增大，所有者权益侧跟着应收利息增大而不停增大。由于银行负债侧需要银行支付利息，表现为负债侧增加银行支付的利息部分，因此最终银行所有者权益增加的将是应收利息导致的增大减去利息支付导致的缩小。

在央行制定贷款利率和存贷款利差的年代，银行本来是可以看上去很赚钱的。周行曾经在讲话中提到过，过去银行向国务院报告经营业绩的时候都非常好，但其实是一团糟。之所以出现这样的情况，乃是因为银行可以采取上述的鸵鸟会计方法，本金收不回来也不减计，利息收不到就处理成应收，靠政策利差把利润做得漂亮。

国务院毕竟不是会计师事务所，不会仔细去看应收帐款等细项的。不过保尔森在回忆录中提到了一个细节，就是他和江泽民主席会面时，江主席告诉他会计很重要，“资产等于负债加权益”。这其实体现出决策层意识到了会计的重要性，以及玩弄会计花招的问题，因为不真实的会计报表会影响决策，在银行问题上就反应为昨天还业绩亮丽，今天就技术性破产。

不过看上去，中国银行业能在那个时候积累出40%甚至更高的不良贷款率，本身其实说明在不良贷款率为30%的时候并没有出什么事情，说不定50%甚至更高也未必会有事。但中国银行业能维持40%的不良贷款率而不坠，还是因为其不会遭受到流动性考验，特别是央行保证了银行能够应对储户提取纸币，因此储户不会因为银行的高不良贷款而去挤提银行导致银行倒闭。

但上述鸵鸟政策还是会通过经济和金融渠道带来负面影响。我们可以设想：银行不停发放贷款并且全都不减计，那么最后的结果将是存款越来越多，货币量越来越大。而这些货币量要么用来购买商品导致通货膨胀，要么购买外汇导致人民币巨幅贬值：我们知道发放人民币贷款并不会使外汇储备增加，因此外汇储备和人民币存款的比例将会越来越小，央行稳定汇率的能力会越来越差。

当然，如果人们持有货币并不用来购买商品，也不用来购买外汇，那么上述40%不良贷款率的情况还能够延续，这当然是2000年真实的情况。但问题在于人们的行为有一天总会变化，中国总要对接世界，前面提到的稳定条件（不买东西、不买外汇）总会有一天由于外在的原因而被打破，那个时候让银行鸵鸟下去的代价，就会是物价和汇率的不稳定。

而且鸵鸟得越久，问题积累越多，不稳定也会越大，鸵鸟会计会使得银行在目前的5%不良率上继续犯更多的错误，发放更多的坏账，而在正常的会计制度下，5%的不良贷款率就已经足以让一家银行认真反思了，而不会任由其发展到40%的惊人水平。而在从5%-40%的过程中，每一笔错误的贷款都在增加着潜在的风险。风险不是一个立刻到来的报应，但该来的总会来。

如何通过坏账造富？

不过很少有人思考：企业通过贷款得到钱之后肯定把钱花掉了，不然企业也就不会还不起债了，那么企业花的钱都去哪里了呢？考虑到那个时候股票和债券规模还不太大，这个问题就变成了作为货币量组成部分的现金和存款如何分布。我们其实可以看到，在90年代，个人存款增长对货币总量增长的贡献比重，几乎一直都高于企业存款的贡献比重，或者说很多时候新增个人存款高于新增企业存款。例如1996年，个人存款从29662亿增长到38520亿，增幅为8858亿，而同期企业存款（M2-M0-个人存款）仅增加5585亿。

所以这个问题问到最后，恐怕是企业当年从银行贷款后获得的纸币和存款，很多其实都流向了个人，无论是发工资也好，采购产品后供货商发工资也好，最终都会成为个人存款，最极端的例子当然是周行提到过的“包饺子贷款”，即企业过年没钱给员工发福利，就从企业贷款来发，这反映在银行的资产负债表上，当然就成了对企业贷款增加，但个人存款增加了。

所以我们也可以回顾吴晓灵老师提到过的名言，即没有银行坏账就没有这么多百万富翁。遥想当年，遍布各线城市和乡村的银行，为遍布各线城市和乡村的企业发放贷款，而发放贷款中产生的存款和纸币，最终形成了各线城市和乡村广大居民在银行的存款和手里的纸币。银行通过发行贷款创造货币，最终造福了个人和一些赚钱的企业，而这一过程中不赚钱的企业债台高筑，银行自己也坏账百出。

而国退民进时期各种管理层收购，也让人们看到，很多人恐怕把国有企业当作套银行贷款的工具，钱流进自己的腰包，而让企业资不抵债，银行坏账堆积，而自己再拿出钱来收购企业，而企业其实本来很好，一收购一正常经营就活了，但所有权已然变化。银行当时规模恐怕太大，没有谁有吃掉的能力，于是才留下来。

不过更隐秘的计策是，把银行留在国家手里，大家总是可以继续找一些国有企业当套钱者，自己站在这些国有企业背后收银行的钱。如果银行也私有化了，放贷认真严格起来了，不良贷款没有了，套钱者企业贷不到款了，钱就不好套了。当然，那个时候的金融市场以及制度安排也没有给银行私有化任何可能。

银行改革的方法：注资

当时银行改革的方法是注资同时清理坏账，即从资产和所有者权益两侧来操作。这里面不涉及负债侧，也就是说所有储户都没有蒙受损失。最后的结果将是减少总资产，增加所有者权益，最终提高了资本充足率。这个思路在财务上或者在货币分析上当然是没有什么问题的。但关键在于清理之后的动态发展，会不会回到过去的老路上。

之所以说财务上或者货币分析上没有问题，因为央行和财政都有创造负债作为资产的能力。保尔森在书中提到，98年银行改革使用了”fancy financial engineering”，即通过降准释放银行准备金，银行用准备金买国债，财政部再用拿到的钱注资银行。而我在《汇金与中投：精彩的注资大戏》一文中透视了这一交易，指出降准乃是幌子，财政部的实质就是印国债注资，和央行印钞乃是同一模式。

这也是后来很多人指责人行贱卖银行股份给外国人的原因，因为财政部这一操作其实可以无限地重复下去。既然这样，为什么需要外国人的钱呢？除此之外当然还有很多阴谋论和外行人的问题，比如外国投资者出价是否太低、人行为什么同意这种出价、上市后股价涨那么多是不是说明上市定价太低等等，但这些问题和前面的问题相比都是细枝末节。

所以问题其实根本不出在“钱”这个层面。人民银行其实也不用非要拿外汇储备注资，它当然也可以和财政部一样发行特别央票来给银行注资，效果可以和外汇注资完全等价。关键问题不在货币分析，不在如何把资本充足率提高上去，而是实体分析的层面，即如何提高银行每一笔贷款的质量，提高银行每一天营业的效率。再高的金融工程和报表粉饰，也改变不了办业务靠算盘的现实。

上述的只看财务/货币层面，而不看实体的分析思路，在十几年后反映为对国际收支表投资收益项目的大讨论。有人认为收益项目的逆差表现为中国对外投资亏钱，而这显然是把中国对外投资和外国对华投资两件事情搞在了一起。我们可以说中国对外投资挣的钱不如外国来对华投资挣的钱多，但不能说中国对外投资亏钱。而回答了这个问题之后紧接着的问题是，为什么外国来华投资挣钱这么多，还要让外国来华投资？

这个问题其实是想说，中国银行也可以创造资金出来，为什么非要外国人的资金呢？一个显然的答案是因为很多生产需要从国外采购，中国的银行创造的人民币资金无法购买外国产品。但更重要的答案，乃是在于中国需要资金以外的东西，即技术、管理等等。当然，不是说中国自己就无法研发或者不该研发，非要外国投资不可，而是说在考虑外国投资的时候，只看到钱是不够的，必须看到引进外资除了一起赚点钱之外，还有更多别的收获。

银行改革恐怕也要从这个角度来理解。其实从保尔森对中金公司和摩根士丹利的合作的叙述中就能看到。保尔森意识到，中国成立中金的目的不是和摩根士丹利一起做业务转赚钱，而是通过让渡股份的方式买到做业务的能力。因此保尔森积极和中金合作，给方风雷各种传授投行技巧和知识，最后的回报当然是丰厚的。

但丰厚的回报里面是包含了部分中金交的学费的，作为学习知识的对价。如果只是做做业务的话，不但没有回报还会被踢到一边去。给学费是为了学到东西，而如果学不到东西，我又干嘛要交学费？就像摩根士丹利是中金的股东，但王岐山还是找保尔森以及高盛来和中金一起做业务，因为摩根士丹利只是把中金当作一个做做业务的普通合资公司。

贱卖银行论者不理解这种让渡股权买机制的思路，恐怕他们也不理解为什么中国越来越多年轻人要花那么多钱留学再回国了：反正也要回国，干嘛出去折腾呢，在国内花钱不一样么？这说明国外有些大家愿意出钱的东西。当然总会有失败的留学体验，但这并不是否定留学的理由。卖股份给国外也有失败的案例，但这并不足以否定这一模式。不能迷信，也不能迷不信，还是要具体问题具体分析。

现在中国的银行业面临的挑战和15年前差不多，都是坏账。在保尔森看来，4万亿刺激政策使得中国银行重新回到了上世纪90年代，成为贷款印钞拯救企业的工具，相当于用自己的亏损为一时的稳定买单。90年代的问题主要是国企亏损以及个别行业全面亏损，而2010年代的问题则增添了政府债务、民营企业等等，挑战不可谓不大。

不过好在现在解决问题的工具也比那个时候多。98年银行改革的时候，没有一家银行是上市银行。但在现在，很多银行都已经上市，可以更方便地从市场上募集资金，而且可以有债券和股票等多种形式，保险、基金等机构投资者也远较90年代活跃，新股认购中签率更是连创新低。现在恐怕不需要什么fancy financial engineering了。

Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's work on China, "Dealing With China," was released in April 2015. This is his second work following "On the Brink." Unlike Bernanke's memoir, which hardly mentioned China, Paulson's work revolves primarily around China. The book is divided into three parts, sharing his experiences and insights as a Goldman Sachs executive, U.S. Treasury Secretary, and his interactions with China after retirement. The content of the book is rich, allowing foreign readers to grasp his methods and strategies for doing business with China, as well as offering a glimpse into different aspects of Sino-U.S. political interactions and related figures. This article focuses on the banking reform aspects discussed in the book.

Reasons for Banking Reform: Non-Performing Loans

During his time at Goldman Sachs, Paulson helped several Chinese companies go public or provided advisory services, including China Petroleum and China Bank. These transactions are showcased in dedicated chapters in the book, with particular emphasis on capital injections and listings in the banking industry. Problems in the real economy ultimately manifest in the financial sector. In a financing system centered around banks, problems in the real economy translate into problems for the banks.

Issues in the real economy are evident in many companies struggling to operate, meaning that the products and services produced by these enterprises fail to generate sufficient revenue from buyers. Additionally, these companies not only fail to recoup more money by selling their products, but they also have to cover expenses such as salaries, rent, and loan interest payments. Consequently, they continuously borrow money from banks. From the bank's perspective, this results in increasing assets on the loan side and increasing liabilities on the deposit side. However, there is no simultaneous reduction in loans and deposits when loan principal is repaid, nor does a reduction in loans coincide with a decrease in deposits when interest payments are made.

When borrowers fail to repay loans, this default affects banks through two channels. One is the traditional write-down, where the bank perceives deteriorating loan quality and needs to allocate provisions. This increases the bank's current expenses, even resulting in net losses on the income statement. It reduces the size of the bank's assets and owner's equity, consequently lowering the bank's capital adequacy ratio. The other channel is the decrease in fair value. As bond prices drop in the financial market, banks adjust the valuation of bonds on the asset side, reducing owner's equity. This simultaneously lowers the bank's capital adequacy ratio and increases expenses, reflecting net losses on the income statement. In China during the 1990s, the major issue was the reduction in bank assets due to bad loans, rather than losses resulting from a decrease in fair value.

The Ostrich Accounting Method Doesn't Work

Someone might argue, wouldn't the banks avoid losses if they don't write down bad loans and pretend they are good loans? Indeed, that's the case. In this scenario, the bank's loan principal and corresponding interest receivable assets will keep increasing. Conversely, liabilities in the form of deposits will continue to grow alongside the expansion of loan principal, and owner's equity will increase in tandem with the growth of interest receivable. As banks have to pay interest on liabilities, the liability side reflects the increased interest payments, resulting in an increase in owner's equity primarily caused by larger interest receivables, minus the reduction caused by interest payments.

During the era when the central bank determined loan rates and interest rate spreads for deposits and loans, banks appeared quite profitable. Zhou Xiaochuan once mentioned in a speech that banks reported excellent performance to the State Council, although the reality was a mess. This was possible because banks could adopt the aforementioned ostrich accounting method. Even if they couldn't collect principal or interest, they wouldn't write down the accounts. Instead, they would classify interest as receivables. The policy interest rate spread made profits look good.

The State Council isn't an accounting firm and wouldn't scrutinize items such as accounts receivable in detail. However, in his memoir, Paulson mentioned a detail: during his meeting with Chairman Jiang Zemin, Jiang stressed the importance of accounting, stating that "assets equal liabilities plus equity." This reflects the leadership's awareness of the significance of accounting and the problem of playing tricks with accounting, as distorted financial statements can influence decision-making. In the context of banking issues, it translates to yesterday's impressive performance turning into today's technical bankruptcy.

However, it seems that the fact that China's banking industry was able to accumulate a non-performing loan ratio of 40% or even higher at that time indicates that there was no issue when the non-performing loan ratio was at 30%. Perhaps, even a non-performing loan ratio of 50% or higher might not have led to significant problems. China's banking sector was able to maintain a 40% non-performing loan ratio without collapsing because it didn't face a liquidity crisis. Particularly, the central bank ensured that banks could handle cash withdrawals by depositors, preventing a run on banks due to high non-performing loans.

However, the ostrich policy outlined above still brought negative effects through economic and financial channels. Consider this scenario: banks continuously issue loans without writing down bad loans. The result would be an increasing volume of deposits and a larger money supply. These additional funds would either be used to purchase goods, leading to inflation, or to buy foreign exchange, causing a significant devaluation of the renminbi. We know that issuing RMB loans doesn't increase foreign exchange reserves. As a result, the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to RMB deposits would decrease, weakening the central bank's ability to stabilize the exchange rate.

Of course, if people held money without using it to buy goods or foreign exchange, the situation of a 40% non-performing loan ratio could continue. This was indeed the reality in the year 2000. However, the issue is that people's behavior will eventually change. China will inevitably engage with the world, and the stability conditions (not buying goods, not buying foreign exchange) mentioned earlier will one day be broken due to external factors. At that point, the cost of letting the bank operate with the ostrich policy will be instability in prices and exchange rates.

Furthermore, the longer the ostrich policy persists, the more problems accumulate and the greater the instability becomes. The ostrich accounting method will cause banks to make more mistakes, issue more bad loans, and in the process from 5% to 40% non-performing loan ratio, each incorrect loan adds potential risk. Risk isn't an immediate retribution, but it will inevitably arrive.

How to Create Wealth through Bad Debts?

However, few people consider: after companies receive loans, they must have spent the money; otherwise, they wouldn't have trouble repaying the debt. So where did the money go that companies spent? Considering that stock and bond markets weren't as substantial at that time, this issue becomes about how cash and deposits, components of the money supply, were distributed. In the 1990s, one can observe that the contribution of personal deposits to the growth of the money supply was consistently higher than the contribution of corporate deposits, or in many cases, new personal deposits exceeded new corporate deposits. For instance, in 1996, personal deposits increased from 2,966.2 billion to 3,852 billion, an increase of 885.8 billion, while corporate deposits (M2-M0-personal deposits) only increased by 558.5 billion.

So, in the end, it's likely that a significant portion of the currency and deposits acquired by enterprises through bank loans ended up flowing to individuals. Whether it's used for paying salaries or for purchasing products that are used to pay suppliers and employees, the funds eventually become personal deposits. An extreme example is the "dumpling loan" Zhou Xiaochuan mentioned, where companies borrowed money to give out holiday bonuses when they couldn't afford them, which is reflected on the bank's balance sheet as increased loans to companies and increased personal deposits.

This brings us to Wu Xiaoling's famous quote: "Without bank bad debts, there wouldn't be so many millionaires." Thinking back to those years, banks spread across cities and rural areas, granting loans to enterprises. The deposits and currency generated from these loans ultimately became the savings of residents in cities and rural areas. Banks created money through loan issuance, benefiting individuals and some profitable enterprises. However, this process also left numerous debt-ridden enterprises and banks with countless bad debts.

During the era of "retreat of the state and advancement of the people," various management layers' acquisitions revealed that many people regarded state-owned enterprises as tools to secure bank loans, funneling money into their pockets. This caused enterprises to become insolvent, leading to a buildup of bad debts in banks. Subsequently, they used their own funds to acquire the enterprises, even though the enterprises were initially healthy. Once acquired and turned around, ownership had changed. Perhaps the banks were too big at the time, and nobody had the capability to devour them, so they remained.

However, a more concealed strategy is to keep the banks under state control, allowing individuals to continue using state-owned enterprises to secure bank loans while they profit from behind. If banks were also privatized and lending practices became strict, resulting in no bad loans, the enterprises wouldn't be able to secure loans for their schemes, and the schemes would fall apart. Nevertheless, the financial market and institutional arrangements at the time did not provide room for bank privatization.

Bank Reform Approach: Capital Injection

The method of bank reform at that time involved capital injection and bad debt cleanup, targeting both assets and owner's equity. This didn't involve the liability side, meaning that no depositors suffered losses. The end result would be a reduction in total assets and an increase in owner's equity, ultimately improving the capital adequacy ratio. Financially or in terms of monetary analysis, there's no issue with this approach. However, the critical aspect lies in the dynamic development after the cleanup – whether it would revert to old practices.

There's no problem with this approach in terms of finance or monetary analysis because both the central bank and the government possess the ability to create liabilities as assets. Paulson mentioned in his book that the 1998 banking reform used "fancy financial engineering," releasing banks' required reserves through a reserve ratio cut. Banks used these reserves to buy government bonds, and the Ministry of Finance injected capital into banks with the funds received. I previously discussed this transaction in the article "CIC and CIC International: An Intriguing Capital Injection Drama," pointing out that the reserve ratio cut was a cover-up; the Ministry of Finance was essentially issuing government bonds for capital injection, which follows the same model as central bank money printing.

This is also why many criticize the idea of selling bank shares cheaply to foreign investors, as the Ministry of Finance's approach could be repeated endlessly. If so, why would foreign investors be needed? Besides conspiracy theories and layman's concerns, such as whether the foreign investors' offers were too low, why the central bank agreed to such offers, and whether the substantial increase in stock prices after listing indicated low initial pricing, these issues are minor in comparison to the previous question.

Hence, the fundamental problem doesn't lie in the "money" aspect. The People's Bank of China doesn't necessarily need to use foreign exchange reserves for capital injection. It could issue special central bank notes for capital injection, which would have the same effect as foreign exchange injection. The key issue isn't in monetary analysis or raising capital adequacy ratios; rather, it's at the entity level – how to enhance the quality of each loan made by banks and improve the efficiency of daily operations. No matter how sophisticated the financial engineering and financial statements are, they can't change the reality that business operations rely on the abacus.

The perspective discussed so far is purely financial/monetary, without considering the entity analysis. This would later be reflected in the extensive discussions about the international investment income item in the balance of payments. Some believe that the deficit in the investment income item indicates that China's foreign investments are losing money. However, this clearly conflates China's outward investments with foreign investments into China. We can say that the money earned from China's foreign investments is less than what foreign investments in China earn, but we can't claim that China's foreign investments are losing money. And after answering this question, the subsequent question is: why do so many foreigners still want to invest in China if they're making so much money?

In fact, this question implies that Chinese banks can also create funds; why do they need foreign capital? The apparent answer is that many production needs require procurement from abroad, and the Renminbi funds created by Chinese banks can't purchase foreign products. However, the more crucial answer lies in China needing more than just funds; it requires technology, management, and more. Of course, this isn't to say that China can't or shouldn't develop these capabilities on its own; foreign investment isn't the only solution. Yet, when considering foreign investment, it's not enough to just focus on the money; there must be more to gain beyond profits, such as knowledge transfer and technological advancement.

Bank reform might also need to be understood from this perspective. This can actually be seen from Paulson's account of the cooperation between Goldman Sachs and China International Capital Corporation (CICC). Paulson realized that CICC was established not to make immediate profits through joint business ventures with Goldman Sachs, but to acquire the ability to conduct business through the transfer of ownership. Therefore, Paulson actively cooperated with CICC, sharing investment banking skills and knowledge with Fang Fenglei, and the eventual return was certainly rewarding.

However, within these rewarding returns, a portion also covered the "tuition" paid to CICC, a fair exchange for knowledge acquired. If only business was conducted without gaining knowledge, there would be no return, and one would wonder why they paid tuition. Similarly, while Morgan Stanley is a shareholder of CICC, Wang Qishan sought cooperation with Paulson and Goldman Sachs instead of Morgan Stanley and CICC, as Morgan Stanley treated CICC as a typical joint venture for conducting business, offering no more than that.

Critics of selling bank shares cheaply perhaps don't comprehend this mechanism of exchanging ownership for capabilities. They might also not understand why an increasing number of young Chinese are spending substantial amounts to study abroad and then return home. After all, they will return anyway, so why go through the trouble of going abroad when spending money in China seems sufficient? This demonstrates that certain things that foreigners are willing to provide are available abroad. Certainly, there will be failed study abroad experiences, but that doesn't negate the reason for studying abroad. Similarly, there are cases of failed equity sales to foreign entities, but that doesn't negate the entire model. It's important to avoid blindly believing or disbelieving; instead, specific issues require specific analysis.

The challenges China's banking industry is facing now are similar to those of 15 years ago—both involve bad debts. According to Paulson, the 4 trillion yuan stimulus package has brought China's banks back to the 1990s, once again becoming tools to print money and rescue enterprises. This is akin to using one's own losses to buy temporary stability. The problems of the 1990s mainly revolved around state-owned enterprise losses and comprehensive industry losses, while the problems of the 2010s have added government debt and private enterprises, among others. The challenges are certainly not insignificant.

However, fortunately, the tools available to address these problems are now more diverse. During the 1998 banking reform, no banks were publicly listed. However, many banks are now publicly listed, making it easier to raise funds from the market. Additionally, banks have multiple forms of financing available, including bonds and stocks. Insurance companies, funds, and other institutional investors are more active than in the 1990s, and the subscription rate for new stock offerings has reached historic lows. There's probably no need for any "fancy financial engineering" now.