原创 2016-01-19 季天鹤央行观察

之前的《让人迷惑的人民币参加行准备金率》一文，提出了对银发[2016]11号文的一些问题，特别是对准备金率和准备金的交存方式提出了疑问。但经过仔细和深入的思考，特别是和业界人士的交流，可以看出，银发[2016]11号文，将意味着所有银行负债侧存款拥有者将要经历的一次巨大革命。

央行和余额宝的过往

2014年3月，人行的盛司在《金融时报》发文《余额宝与存款准备金管理》，指出要对余额宝开征准备金。当时，他认为“银行能对余额宝存款支付较高利率的重要原因是，基金存放在银行的款项无需向央行缴存存款准备金”。当时的背景是利率很高，因此盛司的文章认为，银行资产侧有一块低息资产即法定准备金，而余额宝的资产侧则全是高息资产。因此，应该让余额宝的存款也进入存款准备金缴存范围，这样余额宝有一部分资产也是低息的，余额宝投资者的收益就下来了。

2015年6月“央行观察”发表的《余额宝和存款准备金的那些事》则指出，余额宝在银行的存款进入缴存范围，并不意味着余额宝在银行的存款就会出来一块低息资产，而是银行在央行的超额准备金中，有一部分要进入到法定准备金的池子里。并且，由于超额准备金的利率低于法定准备金利率，因此余额宝在银行的存款进入缴存范围，还会使得银行从央行得到更多利息收入，更能够给余额宝高利息，使余额宝给投资者的收益率更高。

除了上述利息收入和收益率的区别之外，从余额宝自身的资产负债来讲，我们看到它在银行有存款资产，而它的所有者权益侧则是投资者的份额。除此之外，余额宝还持有一些债券资产。《余额宝和存款准备金的那些事》中指出，仅把余额宝在银行存款纳入银行向央行缴纳的法定准备金的基数，并不能约束余额宝所有者权益侧的规模，因为准备金率并不适用于余额宝的资产负债两侧。

余额宝可以把自己在银行的存款当作一种准备金。如果余额宝将上述准备金的规模维持在一个固定的水平，例如1000亿元，而把所有新进来的投资资金都用来购买债券，我们会发现余额宝的份额和余额宝的债券资产共同增长，但余额宝在银行的存款维持在1000亿元，最终我们发现，余额宝在银行的存款比上余额宝份额这一比率，在余额宝不停买债的过程中不断减小。这和银行在放贷过程中准备金率不断降低是完全一样的过程，只不过余额宝份额是余额宝的所有者权益，而银行存款是银行的负债。

也就是说，仅把余额宝在银行的存款纳入缴存范围，而让银行自己用在央行的超额准备金去交法定准备金，既不会直接影响余额宝从银行得到的收入，又不会影响到余额宝自己在银行存款与其份额规模的比例。盛司的观点，尽管符合了银行准备金的标准理论框架，即银行在央行交准备金，余额宝在银行存款作为基数，但并没有达到约束余额宝收入和规模的意图。

银发[2016]年11号文的新思路

2014年12月，人民银行出了银发[2014]387号文，把很多非银行机构在银行的存款都放到了缴存范围里，包括存款类金融机构吸收的证券及交易结算类存放、银行业非存款类存放、SPV存放、其他金融机构存放以及境外金融机构存放。上述的各类存放，都是在银行的某种负债，有的叫存款，有的叫同业存放，尽管名称不同，但性质都是银行负债侧的某种负债。“银行”和“负债侧”是理解这一问题的关键点，不要被银行的不同名字以及负债的不同名字迷惑。

而银发[2016]11号文，则延续着387号文的境外金融机构存放做文章。而我们看到，和2014年3月盛司的《余额宝与存款准备金管理》思路一样，人行首先指定了一些缴存的基数。如果说余额宝的例子里面，缴存基数就是余额宝在银行的存款，那么在11号文里，缴存基数就是参加行在代理行的存款，以及其他清算行在母行的存款。港澳清算行的情况，我们后面专门讨论。

然后我们看到，11号文的准备金率考察，是单独进行的，而不是把上述的基数并入到一般存款里面，形成一个大基数，然后让银行按照这个大基数，来缴存一个大基数上的准备金。11号文是把上述的基数单拿出来，要求银行单独对这个基数交一个准备金。这在事实上形成了两个准备金体系，一个是基于一般存款的准备金体系，一个是基于三类境外金融机构存款的准备金体系。

我们完全可以预计，在未来可能会有更多的准备金体系，比如货币基金的准备金体系、证券公司保证金的准备金体系等等。这样做的意义，在于每个准备金体系都可以有自己的准备金率和准备金利率。例如，建行为余额宝存款在央行缴纳“货币基金专项准备金存款”，如果央行专门对此给出0.1%的准备金利率，那么建行就可以很容易地把央行的这一意图传导到给余额宝的回报里面。又例如，央行要求余额宝存款的准备金率是50%，那么建行需要拿出一部分超额准备金来缴纳“余额宝专项准备金存款”，央行对余额宝收益率影响就更大。

而更让人叫绝的是，人行通过直接让参加行在代理行存款冻结一部分、其他清算行在母行的存款冻结一部分的方式，事实上越过了代理行和母行，直接和参加行和其他清算行搭上了线。人行相当于是对参加行说，虽然你在我这里没有准备金账户，但你要在银行那里冻结。相比之下，在一般存款这一准备金体系里，一般存款持有者并不会因银行缴准而遭遇存款冻结，因此银行自己缴自己的准，银行储户自己转自己的帐。

对于余额宝而言，类似一般存款的准备金制度，意味着银行在央行那里该缴准缴准，而自己在银行的存款则可以任意转帐，投资也好供赎回也罢，和央行都没有关系。但如果央行要求余额宝在银行的存款拿出来一块儿，放到“余额宝专项准备金存款”里，那么余额宝能够任意转账，应对投资和赎回的能力就大打折扣。

央行就通过这样的方式，把自己的控制力延伸到了余额宝资产的背面，即余额宝的所有者权益。控制住了余额宝在银行的非冻结存款规模，就是冻结了余额宝能够扩张的最大规模，因为余额宝毕竟要留有一部分存款应对赎回，而这部分备付金和整个余额宝规模的比例，肯定存在一个下限。如果央行把余额宝的准备金率提高到99%，使得余额宝在银行的存款的绝大部分都被冻结，那么余额宝就无法继续扩张自己的规模，余额宝的末日就到来了。

对于离岸的人民币参加行而言，情况也是如此。过去央行和离岸参加行之间隔着代理行，离岸参加行在代理行持有存款，可以用来转帐和投资，而离岸参加行以在这些行的存款作为备付金，可以在离岸放贷等等，而人行对此鞭长莫及，因为离岸银行没有义务向人民银行汇报自己这里有多少客户存款，放了多少贷款等等。

但现在11号文的出台意味着，人行可以根本不管离岸银行的其他业务到底如何，只要不听话，人行就可以提高离岸银行在在岸银行的存款的冻结比例。现在所说的参照外资行、代理行准备金率执行等等，恐怕只是找一个大家目前主观上愿意接受的基准先办起来。未来如果要求50%甚至90%，我都不会奇怪，因为三类机构准备金体系的“准备金率”的分子和分母，和一般存款准备金体系的分子分母，完全不是一个概念。

我们也可以从超额准备金的角度来理解这个问题。如果我们把参加行-代理行、港澳行-人行支行、其他清算行-母行的关系，都放到境内银行-央行这个框架里面，在没有11号文的时候，参加行在代理行的存款、港澳清算行在人行的存款、其他清算行在母行的存款，都可以看作是参加行、港澳清算行、其他清算行的“超额准备金”存款，而“法定准备金”是0。

港澳清算行在这个时候就被涉及到了。虽然它在央行是有存款的，但这部分存款都是自由可以用的，和参加行在代理行的存款，以及其他清算行在母行的存款一样。约束港澳清算行在央行头寸的冻结比例，央行便可以直接影响港澳清算行的负债侧。如果参加行的账户和其他清算行的账户直接开在央行，也就不需要代理行和其他清算行母行什么事情了。

如前所述，人行面对上述这些超额准备金，要求代理行、人行支行、母行把这些超额准备金中一部分冻结起来，把这些冻结的存款叫做“准备金”。这其实就是降低了“超额准备金”的规模，也减少了一般存款准备金体系下的超额准备金率。《让人迷惑的人民币参加行准备金率》中提到，这种降低超额准备金率的方法是打折，而非挪走一块。尽管方式不同，但一旦人行给三类行搞出“50%准备金率”这样的要求，挪走一块和打折的差异就没有那么大了。

推而广之，对于任何在境内银行有存款/存放的市场主体，央行以后都可以按照三类机构准备金体系的办法，要求这些市场主体自己冻结一部分存款。这在货币扩张主体从银行扩大到非银行金融机构的今天，是非常有力的约束措施。如果余额宝真的想变成银行，把余额宝份额当作货币，同时积累债权，那么央行就成了余额宝在货币意义上的调控者。

货币政策从此由银行扩展到非银行，货币基金、证券公司、P2P平台等等，都将受到央行的准备金率约束，不听话就冻结你的银行存款，给你个差别准备金率，让你的资产负债规模无法随心所欲地扩张，而是央行让你扩张多少，你才能扩张多少，你永远都要收到自己的流动资金规模的约束。

央行的潜在对手

显然，央行的潜在对手，在于两类人，一类是在银行没有存款，而在余额宝有余额的市场主体。这些主体把余额宝份额当作准备金和备付金，而把自己的负债或者权益弄得如货币般流动，搞事实上的货币扩张，媒体管这个叫“第四方支付”，即第三方支付和央行隔着银行，第四方支付和央行隔着银行和第三方支付，说不定以后还可以有第n方支付。央行尽管可以让银行冻结余额宝在银行的存款，但央行能不能约束余额宝负债侧的行为就很难说了，更不用说第n方支付了，相当于是余额宝替后面的第n方支付们挡住了央行，使央行和第n方支付隔离。

另一类对手，则是和银行一点关系没有的人。首先就是比特币玩家们。这些玩家持有比特币的同时会减少银行存款。比特币来回流动，央行并不能通过控制玩家的银行存款进行约束，因为玩家的银行存款已经支出了，而收到存款的人又没有比特币，不属于比特币玩家。其次就是把实物商品作为资产来扩张负债的人。我们熟知的月饼券发行人，手上有比如说价值100万的月饼，但却卖出200万的会过期的月饼券。买月饼券的人的目的不是为了买月饼，而是为了送月饼券给别人，但拿到月饼券的人未必会兑换月饼。只要兑换月饼的人少于月饼的价值，比如只有一半的月饼券被兑换，那么月饼券发行人就净赚100万。而央行对月饼券的发行毫无办法，总不能把月饼冻结作月饼准备金。

小结

如果说《让人迷惑的人民币参加行准备金率》主要是表达一种迷惑，即不知道为什么央行会创造出这样的一种不符合教科书标准的准备金率，那么本文则是在抛弃了标准的准备金框架的情况下，试图理解和探索央行这一新型准备金率框架的意义，而一旦抛弃了标准的准备金框架，即分子分母跨越资产负债两侧，我们便发现了一片广阔的新天地，即人行直接把准备金的金箍，跨过了银行，直接套在了银行负债那边的机构头上。

而和2014年3月盛司文章中的主张相比，人行的11号文在两个方面有了创新。一是单独创造了新的准备金体系，二是直接让银行负债侧的储户自己冻结存款。这种安排的根源，还是在于非银行金融机构在央行没有账户。如果有账户的话，央行就可以直接让这些机构在央行交准备金，而不用像现在这样，银行负债侧的机构冻结一部分存款，银行又让一部分资产冻结成准备金存款了。

The previous article "Confusing People's Bank of China's Reserve Ratio for Participating Banks" raised some questions about Document No. [2016]11 of the People's Bank of China, especially concerning the reserve ratio and the method of depositing reserves. However, after careful and in-depth consideration, particularly through discussions with industry professionals, it can be seen that Document No. [2016]11 of the People's Bank of China will signify a significant revolution for all deposit holders on the liability side of banks.

The Past of the Central Bank and Yu'EBao

In March 2014, Sheng Si of the People's Bank of China published an article titled "Yu'EBao and Deposit Reserve Management" in the Financial Times, pointing out the need to impose reserve requirements on Yu'EBao balances. At that time, he believed that "a significant reason banks can offer higher interest rates on Yu'EBao deposits is that the funds placed in banks do not need to be deposited with the central bank." At that time, with high interest rates prevailing, Sheng Si's article argued that banks' assets included a low-interest asset, which is the statutory reserve, while Yu'EBao's assets were all high-interest assets. Therefore, Yu'EBao's deposits should also be subject to reserve requirements, allowing Yu'EBao to hold a portion of its assets as low-interest, thus reducing the returns to Yu'EBao investors.

In June 2015, the "Observations of the Central Bank" published an article titled "Matters Regarding Yu'EBao and Deposit Reserves," which clarified that while Yu'EBao's deposits in banks would be subject to reserve requirements, this wouldn't necessarily mean that Yu'EBao's bank deposits would become low-interest assets. Instead, a portion of banks' excess reserves with the central bank would enter the statutory reserve pool. Furthermore, as the interest rate on excess reserves is lower than the statutory reserve interest rate, the inclusion of Yu'EBao's deposits within the reserve requirements would allow banks to earn more interest income from the central bank and offer higher interest rates to Yu'EBao, increasing Yu'EBao's returns to investors.

Apart from the differences in interest income and returns, considering Yu'EBao's own asset-liability structure, it's noted that it holds bank deposit assets, while the owner's equity side consists of investors' shares. However, the article "Matters Regarding Yu'EBao and Deposit Reserves" points out that including Yu'EBao's bank deposits in the base for calculating statutory reserves for banks would not directly constrain the scale of Yu'EBao's owner's equity side, as the reserve ratio does not apply to both sides of Yu'EBao's asset-liability structure.

Yu'EBao could treat its bank deposits as a form of reserve. If Yu'EBao maintains the scale of these reserves at a fixed level, such as 100 billion yuan, and uses all new investment funds to purchase bonds, it will be observed that the shares of Yu'EBao and its bond assets will grow simultaneously. Still, Yu'EBao's bank deposits will remain at 100 billion yuan. Eventually, the ratio of Yu'EBao's bank deposits to Yu'EBao shares will decrease over time as Yu'EBao continuously purchases bonds. This process is similar to the continual reduction of reserve ratios in the process of lending by banks, except that Yu'EBao shares represent Yu'EBao's owner's equity, while bank deposits are bank liabilities.

In other words, only including Yu'EBao's bank deposits in the scope of reserve requirements and allowing banks to use excess reserves with the central bank to meet statutory reserve requirements will not directly affect the income Yu'EBao receives from the bank, nor will it affect the ratio of Yu'EBao's bank deposits to its share size. Despite Sheng Si's viewpoint fitting within the standard theoretical framework of bank reserves, where banks deposit reserves with the central bank and Yu'EBao's bank deposits serve as the base, it does not achieve the intention of constraining Yu'EBao's income and scale.

A New Approach in Document No. [2016]11

In December 2014, the People's Bank of China issued Document No. [2014]387, which included many non-bank institutions' deposits with banks in the scope of reserve requirements. This included deposit-type financial institutions' securities and trading settlement deposits, non-deposit-type deposits by banks, SPV deposits, deposits by other financial institutions, and deposits by overseas financial institutions. All these various types of deposits are forms of bank liabilities, some called deposits and others called interbank placements. The key point for understanding this matter is "banks" and "liabilities side." Despite different names for banks and liabilities, their nature remains that of bank liabilities.

Document No. [2016]11 then continues to focus on deposits by overseas financial institutions, building upon Document No. [2014]387. We can observe that, just like in Sheng Si's article from March 2014, the central bank first designates a base for reserve requirements. If, in the case of Yu'EBao, the base for reserve requirements is Yu'EBao's bank deposits, then in Document No. [2016]11, the base for reserve requirements consists of the deposits by participating banks with their correspondent banks and the deposits by other clearing banks with their parent banks. The situation of clearing banks in Hong Kong and Macau will be discussed later.

Then, we see that Document No. [2016]11 examines the reserve ratio separately, rather than incorporating the aforementioned bases into the general deposit base to form a large base, then requiring banks to deposit reserves based on this large base. Document No. [2016]11 takes these individual bases and requires banks to separately deposit reserves based on them. In effect, this forms two reserve systems: one is the reserve system based on general deposits, and the other is the reserve system based on the deposits of three categories of overseas financial institutions.

We can predict that there might be more reserve systems in the future, such as a reserve system for money market funds or a reserve system for securities company margin deposits, and so on. The significance of this lies in the fact that each reserve system can have its own reserve ratio and reserve interest rate. For example, if a state-owned bank wants to deposit "money market fund special reserve deposits" for Yu'EBao deposits at the central bank, and the central bank specifies a reserve interest rate of 0.1% for this, the bank can easily transmit this intention from the central bank into the returns for Yu'EBao. Similarly, if the central bank requires a reserve ratio of 50% for Yu'EBao deposits, the bank needs to allocate a portion of its excess reserves to deposit "Yu'EBao special reserve deposits," giving the central bank a greater influence over Yu'EBao's returns.

Even more astonishingly, by directly having participating banks freeze a portion of their deposits with correspondent banks and other clearing banks freeze a portion of their deposits with parent banks, the central bank effectively bypasses the correspondent and parent banks and directly connects with participating banks and other clearing banks. The central bank is essentially telling participating banks that although they don't have reserve accounts with the central bank, they should freeze funds with the banks. In contrast, in the general deposit reserve system, deposit holders would not face deposit freezes due to reserve requirements. Thus, in the general system, banks pay reserves without any impact on depositors, and bank depositors transfer funds as they want.

For Yu'EBao, under a reserve system similar to the general deposit system, it means that banks need to pay reserves to the central bank, and Yu'EBao's own bank deposits can be freely transferred, invested, or redeemed, without any impact from the central bank. However, if the central bank requires Yu'EBao's bank deposits to be moved into a "Yu'EBao special reserve deposit" category, then Yu'EBao's ability to freely transfer funds and respond to investments and redemptions would be significantly compromised.

Through this approach, the central bank extends its control to the back end of Yu'EBao's assets, namely Yu'EBao's owner's equity. By controlling the non-frozen bank deposit scale of Yu'EBao with the bank, the central bank effectively freezes the maximum scale that Yu'EBao can expand to, as Yu'EBao needs to retain a portion of deposits to meet redemptions, and there must be a lower limit to the ratio of this reserve to the entire scale of Yu'EBao. If the central bank raises the reserve ratio for Yu'EBao to 99%, freezing most of Yu'EBao's bank deposits, then Yu'EBao will be unable to further expand its scale, leading to its demise.

The same applies to offshore renminbi participating banks. Previously, there was an intermediary bank between the central bank and offshore participating banks. Offshore participating banks held deposits with the intermediary bank, which could be used for transfers and investments. These banks used deposits in these accounts as reserve funds and could engage in offshore lending and more, without direct oversight from the central bank.

However, the introduction of Document No. [2016]11 means that the central bank can now increase the freeze ratio of offshore banks' deposits with onshore banks if they don't comply. The mention of applying the reserve ratio of foreign banks and the intermediary bank's reserve ratio is likely just a benchmark that people currently find acceptable. In the future, it wouldn't be surprising if they demand 50% or even 90%, as the numerators and denominators of the reserve ratios for the three categories of institutions are completely different from those in the general deposit reserve system.

This issue can also be understood from the perspective of excess reserves. If we place the relationships between participating banks and correspondent banks, Hong Kong and Macau banks and People's Bank of China branches, other clearing banks and parent banks, within the framework of domestic banks and the central bank, and before the introduction of Document No. [2016]11, the deposits of participating banks with correspondent banks, deposits of Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks with People's Bank of China branches, and deposits of other clearing banks with parent banks could all be considered as "excess reserves" deposits of participating banks, Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks, and other clearing banks, respectively. Here, the "statutory reserves" were 0.

At this point, the issue involving Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks arises. Although they hold deposits with the central bank, these deposits can be freely used. They are similar to the deposits of participating banks with correspondent banks and deposits of other clearing banks with parent banks. By freezing a portion of these positions, the central bank can directly influence the liability side of Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks. If participating banks' accounts and the accounts of other clearing banks were directly opened with the central bank, then there would be no need for correspondent banks and parent banks.

As mentioned earlier, the central bank, facing these excess reserves, requires intermediary banks, People's Bank of China branches, and parent banks to freeze a portion of these excess reserves and calls these frozen deposits "reserves." This actually reduces the scale of "excess reserves" and also reduces the excess reserve ratio under the general deposit reserve system. The method of reducing the excess reserve ratio is a form of discount, not reallocation. Although the methods are different, if the central bank stipulates a requirement for a "50% reserve ratio" for the three types of institutions, the difference between reallocation and discounting wouldn't be significant.

Broadening this perspective, for any market entity with deposits or holdings at domestic banks, the central bank can now, based on the method of the three categories of institutions' reserve system, require these entities to freeze a portion of their deposits. In a time when the scope of monetary expansion subjects extends from banks to non-bank financial institutions, this becomes a powerful constraint. If Yu'EBao truly wishes to become a bank, treat Yu'EBao shares as currency, and accumulate debt rights, then the central bank becomes the controller of Yu'EBao's monetary regulation.

Monetary policy has now extended from banks to non-banks. Money market funds, securities companies, P2P platforms, and more will all be subject to the central bank's reserve ratio constraints. If they don't comply, the central bank can freeze their bank deposits, assign them a different reserve ratio, and limit the expansion of their asset-liability scale. In this way, the central bank controls how much expansion is allowed.

The central bank's potential adversaries are apparent: two types of people. One type is market entities with balances in Yu'EBao but no deposits with banks. These entities treat Yu'EBao shares as reserves and backup funds, enabling them to conduct effective monetary expansion, a phenomenon referred to as "fourth-party payment." If the central bank wants to extend this to the "n-th party payment," it's possible that Yu'EBao is blocking the central bank on behalf of the future "n-th party payments," creating a separation between the central bank and "n-th party payments."

Another type of adversary is individuals with no relationship with banks. First are Bitcoin players. These players hold Bitcoin while reducing their bank deposits. Bitcoin flows back and forth, and the central bank cannot restrain these players by controlling their bank deposits, as these players' bank deposits are already spent. Those who receive the deposits do not hold Bitcoin and are not Bitcoin players.

Second are those who expand their liabilities using physical goods as assets. Familiar examples include issuers of coupons, who might hold, for example, 1 million yuan worth of mooncakes but sell 2 million yuan worth of expiring mooncake coupons. Those who buy the coupons are not interested in purchasing mooncakes but rather intend to gift the coupons to others. However, not all coupon recipients will redeem them. As long as the redemption rate is lower than the value of the mooncakes, such as if only half of the coupons are redeemed, then the coupon issuer profits by 1 million yuan. The central bank has no control over the issuance of coupons.

The central bank's approach to reserve ratios is a new path that goes beyond the traditional framework and recognizes the evolving landscape of financial institutions and the complexity of their interactions. It's a more direct way for the central bank to exert influence and control over various types of financial entities and their monetary behaviors. This approach accounts for the fact that many financial entities operate outside the traditional banking system, and it allows the central bank to manage their activities more effectively.

In summary, this article seeks to understand and explore the significance of the new reserve ratio framework introduced by the central bank in Document No. [2016]11. It aims to shed light on the innovative aspects of this framework that deviates from standard reserve models. The framework encompasses two key innovations: the creation of a new reserve system and the direct freezing of bank deposit accounts of various financial institutions. This model emerges from the central bank's aim to regulate financial institutions that lack accounts with the central bank. If these institutions had accounts, the central bank could directly regulate their reserves. However, in the current scenario, financial institutions on the liability side of the bank need to freeze a portion of their deposits as reserves, resulting in the freezing of a portion of their asset holdings as well. This approach aims to provide the central bank with more direct control over a broader range of financial entities' asset-liability scales, thereby enabling effective monetary policy management. The central bank's approach to reserve ratios goes beyond traditional frameworks and leverages new mechanisms to influence and control diverse financial entities' monetary behaviors. This marks a departure from standard reserve models and showcases the central bank's adaptability in an evolving financial landscape.