2015-05-14 季天鹤央行观察

作者：季天鹤，万门大学CFO、央行观察专栏作家

原创不易，转载请注明原作者和来源微信公众号央行观察

什么是资本外流？直观上就是把在中国的资产换为现金汇往国外的过程，比如卖掉房子换来了现金，然后汇款到国外银行，自身境内房屋资产减少，境外外币存款资产增加。人民币国际化使得跨境汇款这一过程可以是人民币也可以是外币。外汇局的跨境收付款数据显示，今年前三个月银行代客涉外收入中30%为人民币，而付款中25%是人民币。我们先讨论人民币汇款，然后讨论外币。

人行的李斌与伍戈在《信用创造、货币供求与经济结构》一书中认为，汇出人民币的资产负债表影响，取决于境外银行是把清算账户开在人行的负债侧，还是境内银行的负债侧，还是境外非金融主体直接在境内银行负债侧开户。第一种开在央行负债侧的情形下，汇出人民币会导致央行基础货币减少，因为境外银行在央行的存款算作央行的“国外负债”而不是“其他存款性公司存款”。同时，境内商业银行资产侧在央行的准备金存款减少，负债侧客户存款减少，从而境内货币量减少。第二种和第三种汇出对央行和基础货币没有影响，只是对商业银行的存款有影响，只不过第二种汇出使各项存款变成了境外金融机构同业存款，从而减少广义货币量，因为存款类金融机构的同业存款目前不算M2，而第三种汇出使各项存款变成境外非金融机构的境内存款，并不影响广义货币量。以上便是人行的描述。

如果用开户在央行还是境内银行负债侧，以及开户主体是境外银行还是境外非金融机构来作为划分标准，除了上面三种情形外，应该还有境外非金融机构直接在央行开设人民币帐户的情况。当然这种情况在实际操作当中还不允许，但我们可以想象这种情况和境外银行在央行负债侧开户的情形一样，都会减少基础货币和广义货币量。我们当然还可以增加境内非金融机构直接在央行开户的情况，当然这种情形目前只可能是财政部将在央行负债侧的人民币存款划转给某境外银行或非金融机构，这里就不展开讨论了。

如果资本外逃表现为人民币汇出，我们会看到上述三种方式下，人行的总负债不变。基础货币量要么不变，要么在减少时对应另外一种央行负债侧存款的增加。只要境外银行不要求兑换央行资产侧的外币或者其他资产，那么央行资产并不受影响。当然，如果境内银行购汇，则央行售汇会导致外汇储备（外汇占款）和境内金融机构人民币存款同时减少，境内银行直接持有在境外的外汇资产，这应该是外汇局经常提到的“藏汇于民”的过程的一种表现。另外一种表现当然就是境内银行客户直接持有外币存款或其他资产。

对于境内银行而言，在第一种方式下，如果一部分境内银行持有的央行负债侧准备金存款被转换为了非准备金存款，那么银行的准备金存款规模下降。虽然境内银行自身负债侧的存款也减少了，但准备金存款与银行存款的比例下降，在法定准备金率不变的前提下，超额准备金减少。当然境外银行可以将自己在央行的“国外负债存款”借给境内银行，但利率肯定比外逃前高。央行或许需要采取逆回购之类的手段来短期增加准备金存款的规模，使其达到外逃前的水平，或者降低准备金率。

第二种方式下，算作M2的存款变成了不算M2的同业存款，或者第一种方式中部分算作M2的存款随准备金存款一同消失，那么M2规模下降。若央行仍然盯住M2，则M2增速下降将引发宽松政策，但这时需要考虑M2与增长和物价的关系，因为这部分M2即使没有外逃也未必会用来消费和投资。而且如果资本又重新“流入”，同业存款转化为M2，或央行负债侧“国外负债存款”转化为商业银行资产侧的准备金存款，并在负债侧增加M2，则央行之前的扩张操作又需要扭转，是否需要频繁地松紧货币政策也需要斟酌。

如果中国的商业银行出现倒闭，那么境外金融机构一定不会满足于在国内商业银行进行同业存放，而会直接在央行存放，也就是第二种方式会切换为第一种方式，这种切换即使不伴随任何的跨境汇款，本身也会直接导致准备金存款减少和商业银行同业存放的减少。如果第二种方式特别发达，这些境外银行在境内银行的同业存款总额比境内银行在央行的准备金存款总额还大，则一种办法是同业存款和境内银行的某种资产同时出表，境外银行直接持有某种他们认为安全的境内资产，比如国债，这样M2口径下的存款不变，同业存款以及等量的“境内银行准备金存款+国债资产”减少。

还有一种办法当然是央行借贷给境内银行，央行资产侧增加对境内银行债权，负债侧增加准备金存款，这部分新增存款和原有的境内银行在央行的存款一起，被境外银行转换为央行的“国外负债”，而境内银行与境外银行间的同业存款消失。

如果资本外逃表现为外币汇出，境内主体的外汇存款应该是境内银行负债而非央行负债。对于境内银行而言，其可能在人行负债侧有外币存款，也可能直接在境外银行或境外央行负债侧持有外币存款。当资本外逃发生时，客户在境内银行的外币存款减少，在境外银行的外币存款增加。同时，境内银行负债侧外币存款减少，资产侧可能是在人行的外币存款减少，也可能是在境外央行或银行的外币存款减少。如果是前者，则央行持有的外汇储备资产也会减少。如果央行和境内银行持有流动性差的外币资产，该资产无法有效转换为在境外央行或银行的存款，那么央行和境内银行会遇到一种外币情况下被挤提的状况，这时候需要境外银行或境外央行的借贷支持。

而将人民币换为外币汇出则直接影响上述两个市场。如果“藏汇于民”规模很大，商业银行直接持有境外大量资产，那么商业银行客户将人民币存款换为外汇汇出，将使商业银行的外币资产和境内人民币存款同时减少。如果法定准备金率不变，由于银行在央行的人民币准备金存款规模不变而存款基数减少，因此人民币超额准备率上升。但在中国，由于人民币升值的缘故，长期以来银行倾向于持有较少外币资产，而在央行结汇，从而持有人民币准备金存款。因此当商业银行客户换汇并汇出时，商业银行首先找央行购汇，自身人民币准备金存款减少而境外资产增加，或在央行的外币准备金存款增加，负债侧人民币客户存款换成外币存款后和银行自身外币资产同时离表。央行的外汇资产和负债侧银行外币存款同时离表。由于商业银行资产侧的人民币准备金和负债侧的人民币存款同时减少，在法定准备金率不变的情况下，人民币超额准备金率降低。

在上述的操作中，境内银行的客户发起了人民币或外币的向境外转帐，对基础货币和广义货币量造成了影响，除了造成资产和负债不同项目间的转移之外，还会造成境内银行资产负债表的收缩，例如境外银行在央行开户的情形下，转帐导致了境内银行资产负债表收缩，而外币汇款则更直接引发这种收缩。但转帐和资产负债表的关系并不是单向的，人民币或外币汇出也可能是资产负债表扩张的结果，例如工商银行总行给巴西一笔贷款，工行的资产负债表扩大，巴西的银行或非金融机构在中国境内拥有了人民币存款，境内的“资本”或“货币”并没有因这一“资本外流”而减少。所以，“资本外流”或“资本外逃”等短语模糊了转帐或汇款这一操作背后不同的资产负债变化，容易引发分析上的混乱。

即使不存在新的贷款，人民币和外币“资本外逃”对货币政策的意义也并不相同，因为人民币是人民银行的负债，而外币是人民银行的资产和外国央行的负债。人民币跨境流动并没有使人民银行对人民币的控制发生变化。而外币跨境流动和相关的结售汇可以影响基础货币和广义货币量，也可以通过对央行的挤提而造成破坏。但人民币和外币的相互兑换，又使得跨境流动的币种可以迅速变化，所以并不能因为人民币在国际化进程中而误以为持有外币流动性资产的重要性下降，至少现在还不是时候。

What is capital outflow? At a glance, it refers to the process of converting assets in China into cash and sending it abroad, such as selling a property for cash and then transferring the funds to a foreign bank, resulting in a decrease in domestic property assets and an increase in foreign currency deposits. The internationalization of the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) allows cross-border remittances to be in either RMB or foreign currency. Data from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on cross-border receipts and payments shows that in the first three months of this year, 30% of incoming funds and 25% of outgoing funds were in RMB. Let's first discuss RMB remittances and then foreign currency.

Li Bin and Wu Ge of the People's Bank of China discuss in their book "Credit Creation, Money Supply, and Economic Structure" that the impact of asset and liability movements resulting from RMB outflows depends on whether foreign banks place their clearing accounts on the liability side of the central bank, on the liability side of domestic banks, or directly as liabilities of foreign non-financial entities within domestic banks. In the case of foreign banks placing clearing accounts on the liability side of the central bank, the RMB outflow will lead to a reduction in the central bank's base money, as foreign bank deposits at the central bank are considered "foreign liabilities" of the central bank rather than "deposits from other financial companies." At the same time, on the asset side of domestic commercial banks, required reserve deposits at the central bank decrease, and on the liability side, customer deposits decrease, leading to a decrease in the domestic money supply. In the second and third cases of RMB outflows, the central bank and base money are not affected, only the bank deposits are impacted. However, in the second case, the bank deposits transform into interbank deposits which are not included in the M2 money supply, while in the third case, the deposits transform into domestic deposits of foreign non-financial entities and do not affect the M2 money supply. This is the description provided by the central bank.

If we use the criteria of whether the account is held at the central bank or domestic bank and whether the account holder is a foreign bank or a foreign non-financial entity to classify, in addition to the three cases mentioned above, there might be the scenario where foreign non-financial entities directly open RMB accounts at the central bank. Of course, such a situation is not allowed in practice currently, but we can imagine this situation to be similar to the case of foreign banks holding accounts at the central bank, both of which would reduce the base money and broad money supply. Another possibility is the case where domestic non-financial entities directly open accounts at the central bank. However, this scenario is not explored further here.

If capital flight is represented by RMB remittances, we will see that in the above three cases, the central bank's total liabilities remain unchanged. The base money either remains unchanged or decreases, but in the case of a decrease, it corresponds to an increase in another type of liability deposit at the central bank. As long as foreign banks do not require conversion of the central bank's foreign currency assets or other assets, the central bank's assets are not affected. However, if domestic banks purchase foreign exchange, then the central bank's sale of foreign exchange will lead to a simultaneous decrease in foreign exchange reserves (foreign exchange settlements) and domestic bank RMB deposits. This is a manifestation of the process frequently referred to as "hiding foreign exchange among the people" by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. Another manifestation is that foreign banks or non-financial entities directly hold foreign currency deposits or other assets in China.

For domestic banks, in the first case, if a portion of their required reserve deposits at the central bank is converted into non-reserve deposits, the scale of their required reserve deposits will decrease. Although the domestic banks' own liability-side deposits also decrease, the ratio of required reserve deposits to bank deposits decreases, causing excess reserves to decline, given a constant statutory reserve requirement. Foreign banks might lend their deposits at the central bank to domestic banks, but the interest rates are certainly higher than before the outflow. The central bank might need to employ reverse repurchase agreements and similar methods to temporarily increase required reserve deposit levels and bring them back to the pre-outflow levels or lower the reserve requirement ratio.

In the second case, deposits counted as part of M2 transform into interbank deposits not counted in M2, or in the first case, a portion of deposits counted as M2 disappears along with required reserve deposits, leading to a reduction in the M2 money supply. If the central bank still uses M2 as a target, a decrease in the M2 growth rate could trigger a loose monetary policy. However, it's necessary to consider the relationship between M2 and economic growth and inflation, as this portion of M2 may not necessarily be used for consumption and investment. If capital starts to "flow in" again, interbank deposits could transform into M2, or foreign liabilities of the central bank's asset side could transform into reserve deposits on the asset side of commercial banks, leading to a reversal of the central bank's previous expansionary operations. The need for frequent adjustments of monetary policy will also need to be considered.

If Chinese commercial banks were to collapse, foreign financial institutions would definitely not settle for placing interbank deposits with domestic banks; they would directly deposit with the central bank. In this case, the second scenario could switch to the first one. This switch, even without any cross-border remittances, would directly lead to a reduction in reserve deposits and interbank deposits. If the second scenario is particularly developed, the total amount of interbank deposits placed by foreign banks with domestic banks could exceed the total amount of reserve deposits that domestic banks have with the central bank. In such a scenario, foreign banks might hold certain assets they deem secure in China, such as government bonds, directly causing a reduction in interbank deposits and an equivalent reduction in the sum of "reserve deposits at domestic banks + government bond assets."

Another possibility is for the central bank to lend to domestic banks. This would increase the central bank's asset side with claims on domestic banks and increase its liability side with required reserve deposits. The increase in deposits, together with existing domestic bank deposits at the central bank, would transform into the central bank's "foreign liabilities." The interbank deposits between domestic and foreign banks would disappear.

If capital outflow is represented by foreign currency remittances, the foreign exchange deposits of domestic entities should be on the liability side of domestic banks rather than the central bank. For domestic banks, they might have foreign currency deposits on the liability side of the central bank, or they might directly hold foreign currency deposits on the liability side of foreign banks or foreign central banks. When capital outflows occur, customer foreign currency deposits in domestic banks decrease, while foreign bank foreign currency deposits increase. Simultaneously, the foreign currency deposits on the liability side of domestic banks decrease, and the asset side could be either foreign currency deposits at the central bank or at foreign banks or central banks abroad. If the former is the case, the central bank's foreign exchange reserves assets would also decrease. If the central bank and domestic banks hold illiquid foreign currency assets, which cannot be easily converted into deposits at foreign central banks or banks, the central bank and domestic banks might encounter a situation of being squeezed out, requiring lending support from foreign banks or foreign central banks.

Converting RMB to foreign currency and remitting it directly affects both markets mentioned above. If the "hiding foreign exchange among the people" is significant, where domestic banks directly hold a large amount of foreign assets, then customers of domestic banks converting RMB deposits to foreign currency and remitting it would result in a decrease in foreign currency assets of the domestic banks as well as a decrease in RMB deposits. If the statutory reserve requirement remains unchanged, as the RMB deposit base decreases while required reserve deposits at the central bank remain the same, the excess reserve ratio for RMB deposits would increase. However, in China, due to the appreciation of the RMB, banks have tended to hold fewer foreign currency assets. When banks exchange RMB for foreign exchange with the central bank and subsequently hold foreign currency assets, the first step for banks is to buy foreign exchange from the central bank, leading to a decrease in their RMB reserve deposits at the central bank and an increase in foreign assets, or an increase in foreign currency reserve deposits at the central bank. On the liability side, customer RMB deposits are converted into foreign currency deposits, and the bank's own foreign assets simultaneously leave the balance sheet. The foreign exchange assets of the central bank and foreign currency deposits on the liability side simultaneously leave the balance sheet. Due to the simultaneous decrease in required RMB reserves on the asset side and RMB customer deposits on the liability side of commercial banks, under the condition of a constant statutory reserve requirement, the excess RMB reserve ratio decreases.

In the above operations, whether RMB or foreign currency, the transfer or remittance of capital between domestic and foreign entities affects the base money and broad money supply. Apart from leading to the transfer between different items of assets and liabilities, it also causes the contraction of the balance sheet of domestic banks. However, the relationship between transfers and the balance sheet is not unidirectional. The conversion of RMB or foreign currency and their subsequent remittance could also result in an expansion of the balance sheet, such as when a headquarters of a bank lends to a bank in Brazil, causing the balance sheet of the lending bank to expand, while the bank or non-financial entity in Brazil holds RMB deposits within China, and the domestic "capital" or "money" does not necessarily decrease due to this "capital outflow." Thus, the phrases "capital outflow" or "capital flight" obscure the different changes in assets and liabilities underlying the operation of transfers or remittances and can easily lead to confusion in analysis.

Even in the absence of new loans, RMB and foreign currency "capital flight" have different implications for monetary policy. This is because the RMB is a liability of the People's Bank of China, while foreign currency is an asset of the central bank and a liability of foreign central banks. The cross-border flow of the RMB does not change the control that the central bank has over it. On the other hand, the cross-border flow of foreign currency and related foreign exchange transactions can impact the base money and broad money supply and can cause disruption by leading to a "run" on the central bank. However, the ability to convert between RMB and foreign currency means that the currency of cross-border flows can change rapidly. Therefore, it is premature to assume that the importance of holding foreign currency liquidity assets has decreased due to the internationalization of the RMB, at least for now.