原创 2016-01-18 季天鹤央行观察

央行的银发[2016]11号文规定，境外人民币参加行在境内代理行存放执行正常的准备金率，港澳人民币业务清算行存放人行深圳市和珠海市中心支行清算账户人民币存款、其他人民币业务清算行存放境内母行清算账户人民币存款参照执行。境外银行不包括境外央行（货币当局）和其他官方储备管理机构、国际金融组织、主权财富基金等境外央行类机构。

准备金率传统上是用来应对挤提的。银行储户取现或者转账时，会使银行资产侧的现金或者在央行准备金减少。如果准备金率较高，那么尽管取现或者转账规模很大，银行也能应对。而如果准备金率很小，如果出现比较大额的取现或转账，银行就无法兑付或者满足客户要求，银行就会陷入挤提的境地，贷款质量再高，也无济于事。

所以准备金率都是资产与负债的某种比例。除了存款准备金率，我们还可以考虑同业准备金率，毕竟银行归还拆借本身也是一种提现。2013年钱荒中，对个别银行构成流动性威胁的，不是储户的取款或者转账，而是同业拆借/回购的归还。如果每家银行都有非常高的超额准备金规模和超额准备金率，并且这种超额准备金规模和超额准备金率是考虑了同业负债的话，那么钱荒本来是可以避免的。当然，除了规模，还有期限等因素需要考虑。

而人行的银发[2016]11号文，则让人产生了巨大的迷惑。首先，代理行法人、港澳清算行和其他清算行母行要在央行开新户（下面简称央行新户）。其次，代理行法人给每个境外参加行开新户，叫做“参加行人民币存款准备金”帐户，其他清算行母行为底下的清算行开新户，叫做“清算行人民币存款准备金”帐户。

然后人行说，代理行法人、港澳清算行和其他清算行母行开始交准备金。代理行要往央行新户中放多少钱呢？人行说是所有参加行的“参加行人民币存款准备金”的加总。港澳清算行要往央行新户里放钱的规模下面再说。而其他清算行母行往央行新户里放钱的规模，等于所有“清算行人民币存款准备金”的总规模，毕竟一个母行下面可以有几个小清算行。到这里，一切都还很清楚。

之后就是最让人惊奇的部分，也就是存款基数。代理行要交到央行新户的基数是境外参加行在代理行的全部存款。这本来不奇怪，正如境内存款准备金的基数是一般存款。但问题在于，代理行首先要让境外参加行先拿出一部分存款，放到“参加行人民币存款准备金”这个新户里，然后自己在央行的超额准备金存款中，拿出相当于“参加行人民币存款准备金”总规模的部分，当作法定准备金。这好比在境内，工行先要求每个储户的一部分存款被冻结到新户里，然后自己再按照冻结规模把自己在央行的一部分超额准备金纳入法定规模考核。

再看清算行。港澳清算行的基数是其在央行的人民币存款，这意味着港澳清算行原先的在央行存款中，有一固定比例的部分要放在央行新户里，剩下的大概还是在老户里。相似地，其他清算行的基数，是其在境内母行清算帐户中的存款。其他清算行首先要把在母行清算帐户存款中的一部分，放到在母行的“清算行人民币存款准备金”存款里，然后母行再把自己在央行的超额准备金的等额部分，转化为法定准备金应对考核。

综上我们看到，交准备金的过程分为两部分。首先，离岸参加行在代理行的存款、港澳清算行在央行的存款、非港澳清算行在母行的存款中，都有一部分被放到在代理行、央行、母行的新帐户里；其次，代理行在央行的超额准备金存款和非港澳清算行母行在央行的超额准备金存款中，都有一部分要变成法定准备金存款，而港澳清算行没有这一步，因为其直接与人行对接。

第三，人行会单独考核上述三个准备金比例，对代理行而言是“代理行在央行新户的存款/境外参加行在代理行存款”，对港澳清算行而言则是“在央行新户存款/所有在央行清算帐户存款”，对其他清算行而言则是“母行在央行新户的存款／清算行在母行的清算帐户的存款”。我们已经看出，港澳清算行其实就是在央行存款这一资产中的一部分被冻结了，和文章开始提出的准备金率应该跨越资产和负债两侧很不一样。

对港澳清算行来说，港澳的银行在港澳清算行存款可以有多大，完全取决于港澳清算行自己愿意接受多少超额准备金率，这里的超额准备金率是“港澳清算行在央行存款/港澳的银行在港澳清算行”存款。在银发[2016]11号文之前，这个超额准备金率的分子就是港澳清算行在人行的全部清算存款，而银发[2016]11号文之后，则变成了未冻结部分的清算存款。

如果我们假设一个20%的超额准备金率，那么银发[2016]11号文要求对港澳清算行使用外资行的准备金率，大概在15%，那么相当于把20%的超额准备金率变成了20%*85%=17%，还是相当超额的。很惊奇人行居然并不考虑港澳清算行的负债侧规模，而是搞了一个把超额准备金中一部分冻结这种方式。

而另外两个准备金率，看似对于代理行而言，是其在央行存款与其某种负债的比，对其他清算行的母行而言，是其在央行存款与其内部某种负债的比。但仔细来看，我们会发现，准备金率首先适用于境外参加行在代理行的存款，以及清算行在母行的清算存款。上述存款首先被冻结出来一部分，然后代理行和清算行母行按照上述冻结的部分，在央行负债侧用超额准备金满足法定要求。

比起只让代理行按照参加行存款规模交准备金，以及其他清算行母行按照清算行清算存款规模交准备金相比，银发[2016]11号文的安排，确实触动了参加行和其他清算行。不然的话，代理行交代理行自己的法定准备金，母行交母行自己的准备金，而参加行和其他清算行依然我行我素，至少受不到央行直接的约束。

但如果考虑境外参加行的负债侧，以及其他清算行的负债侧，我们又会发现和港澳清算行一样的模式。境外参加行和其他清算行本不需要满足法定准备金率，因此境外参加行资产侧在代理行的存款和其负债侧存款之比，以及其他清算行在母行的清算存款与其负债侧存款之比，都反映了他们各自的超额准备金率。

银发[2016]11号文的本质，是让两类机构把超额准备金的一个比例（例如15%）变成法定准备金，是让超额准备金率打个小折扣而非切掉一块。“超额准备金率*(1-15%)”和“超额准备金率-15%”的意义可是相当不同。超额准备金率越接近０，两者的差距就越大。两者相等的情况，是超额准备金率为100%时。

如果按照境内银行的方式施用法定准备金率，那么应该要求境外银行在代理行的存款余额，与境外银行负债侧存款乃至同业债务的规模相比，不小于某个值，或者清算行在人行或母行的存款，与清算行负债侧存款乃至同业债务的规模相比，不小于某个值。这种情况下，境外银行的超额准备金率才是被切掉了15%，而不是被打了个85折。当然，不知道上述的策略是否在人行的权力范围之内，毕竟涉及到境外的银行，人行也可能是权宜之计，才想出目前这一安排。

权宜之计并不让人担心，而让人担心的，人行是不是被自己的用语给突然弄糊涂了，而其实他自己其实是非常清楚的。“交存存款准备金”是一种纯粹资产侧的操作，资产侧的准备金存款和负债侧的一般存款不是同一种存款，不可能出现某家银行用自己的负债侧存款在资产侧交准备金的情况。所谓境内代理行将参加行“参加行人民币存款准备金”账户中的存款准备金“合并交存”至所在地中国人民银行“境外银行人民币存款准备金”账户的这种说法，只能是金额上相等，不可能是会计上成立的操作。当然，人行肯定会给银发[2016]11号文作进一步的说明，包括会计上分录的处理等，相信一切都会一目了然。

The People's Bank of China's Circular [2016] No. 11 stipulates that overseas RMB participant banks shall maintain the normal reserve requirement ratio on their domestic agent bank deposits. Hong Kong and Macau RMB clearing banks shall maintain RMB deposits in the People's Bank of China's Shenzhen and Zhuhai central branch clearing accounts, while other RMB clearing bank parent banks shall maintain RMB deposits in their domestic parent bank clearing accounts, following similar execution. Overseas banks do not include foreign central banks (monetary authorities), other official reserve management institutions, international financial organizations, sovereign wealth funds, and other similar foreign central bank-like entities.

The reserve requirement ratio is traditionally used to address bank runs. When bank depositors withdraw or transfer funds, the bank's assets, specifically cash or reserves at the central bank, decrease. With a higher reserve requirement ratio, banks can better handle significant withdrawal or transfer volumes. Conversely, if the reserve requirement ratio is low and substantial withdrawals or transfers occur, banks might struggle to meet customer demands and could face a situation of "bank run," irrespective of their high loan quality.

Thus, the reserve requirement ratio is a certain proportion of assets to liabilities. In addition to deposit reserve ratios, interbank reserve ratios can also be considered since the repayment of interbank borrowing itself is a form of withdrawal. During the money crunch in 2013, the liquidity threat to individual banks was not from depositor withdrawals or transfers, but from the repayment of interbank borrowing or repurchase agreements. If each bank had substantial excess reserve balances and excess reserve ratios, accounting for interbank liabilities, the money crunch could have been avoided. Of course, factors like scale and maturity need to be considered.

Regarding the People's Bank of China Circular [2016] No. 11, it is perplexing in its nature. Firstly, legal entities of agent banks, Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks, and other clearing bank parent banks are required to open new accounts with the People's Bank of China (referred to as "PBOC new accounts"). Secondly, legal entities of agent banks establish "RMB Deposit Reserve" accounts for each overseas participating bank, while clearing bank parent banks establish "RMB Deposit Reserve" accounts for their clearing banks, under their jurisdiction.

Subsequently, the People's Bank of China states that agent banks, Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks, and other clearing bank parent banks are to start depositing reserves. How much money should agent banks place into the PBOC new accounts? The People's Bank of China states that it is the sum of all participating banks' "RMB Deposit Reserve" accounts. The scale of funds Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks need to deposit into the PBOC new accounts is detailed below. The scale of funds other clearing bank parent banks need to deposit into the PBOC new accounts is equal to the total scale of "RMB Deposit Reserve" accounts, as there can be multiple smaller clearing banks under one parent bank. Up to this point, everything is clear.

The surprising part comes next – the deposit base. The base for agent banks to deposit with the PBOC new accounts is the total deposit of overseas participating banks with the agent banks. This is not unusual, similar to how the base for domestic deposit reserves is general deposits. However, the issue arises when agent banks first require overseas participating banks to set aside a portion of their deposits in the "RMB Deposit Reserve" account, and then agent banks themselves set aside an amount equivalent to the total scale of "RMB Deposit Reserve" accounts in their own excess reserve deposits at the central bank, as statutory reserves. This is akin to demanding that a portion of each depositor's funds be frozen into a new account, followed by converting a corresponding portion of the bank's excess reserves into statutory reserves based on the frozen portion, akin to setting a new statutory reserve assessment.

The situation for clearing banks is similar. The base for Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks is their RMB deposits with the central bank, meaning that a fixed proportion of their original deposits with the central bank must be placed in the PBOC new accounts, leaving the rest in the old accounts. Similarly, the base for other clearing bank parent banks is their deposits in the clearing accounts of their domestic parent banks. These parent banks must first move a portion of their deposits from the clearing accounts to the "RMB Deposit Reserve" account, and then convert an equivalent amount of their excess reserves at the central bank into statutory reserves, to meet the assessment requirement.

In summary, the process of depositing reserves consists of two parts. First, a portion of the deposits of offshore participating banks with agent banks, RMB deposits of Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks with the central bank, and deposits of other clearing bank parent banks with their domestic parent bank clearing accounts, is frozen and moved into the new accounts of agent banks, the central bank, and parent banks, respectively. Second, a portion of the excess reserve deposits of agent banks with the central bank and the excess reserve deposits of clearing bank parent banks with the central bank is converted into statutory reserves. In contrast to simply having agent banks deposit reserves based on the size of participating bank deposits, and clearing bank parent banks deposit reserves based on the size of clearing bank deposits, the arrangement in Circular [2016] No. 11 genuinely affects participating banks and clearing banks. Otherwise, agent banks would deposit statutory reserves based on their own deposits, parent banks would deposit statutory reserves based on their own deposits, and participating banks and clearing banks would remain unaffected by direct constraints from the central bank.

However, when considering the liabilities of offshore participating banks and clearing banks, a pattern similar to that of Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks emerges. Both types of institutions are not required to maintain a statutory reserve ratio. Therefore, the proportion of assets to liabilities for offshore participating banks' deposits with agent banks, and for clearing banks' deposits with parent banks, reflect their respective excess reserve ratios.

The essence of Circular [2016] No. 11 is to transform a proportion (e.g., 15%) of the excess reserve ratio into a statutory reserve ratio, a slight discount instead of a complete reduction. The significance of "excess reserve ratio*(1-15%)" and "excess reserve ratio-15%" is quite distinct. The closer the excess reserve ratio is to 0, the greater the disparity between the two. When the two are equal, the excess reserve ratio is 100%.

If we assume a 20% excess reserve ratio and consider Circular [2016] No. 11, which requires Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks to apply the reserve ratio of foreign-funded banks, around 15%, this translates to roughly 17% after a discount of 15%. This is still a relatively high excess reserve ratio. It is astonishing that the People's Bank of China doesn't consider the liability side scale of Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks and instead freezes a portion of their assets.

The other two reserve ratios seemingly pertain to agent banks' deposit balance with the central bank compared to some form of liability, and to clearing bank parent banks' deposit balance with the central bank compared to some form of internal liability. Upon closer examination, we realize that these reserve ratios primarily apply to the deposits of overseas participating banks with agent banks, and the deposits of clearing banks with parent banks' clearing accounts. A portion of these deposits is first frozen, and then agent banks and clearing bank parent banks satisfy statutory requirements by using excess reserves with the central bank's liability side, based on the frozen portion.

Compared to simply having agent banks deposit reserves based on the size of participating bank deposits, and clearing bank parent banks deposit reserves based on the size of clearing bank deposits, the arrangement in Circular [2016] No. 11 indeed affects participating banks and clearing banks. Otherwise, agent banks would deposit statutory reserves based on their own deposits, parent banks would deposit statutory reserves based on their own deposits, and participating banks and clearing banks would remain unaffected by direct constraints from the central bank.

In summary, the process of depositing reserves consists of two parts. First, a portion of the deposits of offshore participating banks with agent banks, RMB deposits of Hong Kong and Macau clearing banks with the central bank, and deposits of other clearing bank parent banks with their domestic parent bank clearing accounts, is frozen and moved into the new accounts of agent banks, the central bank, and parent banks, respectively; Second, a portion of the excess reserve deposits of agent banks with the central bank and the excess reserve deposits of clearing bank parent banks with the central bank is converted into statutory reserves. In contrast to simply having agent banks deposit reserves based on the size of participating bank deposits, and clearing bank parent banks deposit reserves based on the size of clearing bank deposits, the arrangement in Circular [2016] No. 11 genuinely affects participating banks and clearing banks. Otherwise, agent banks would deposit statutory reserves based on their own deposits, parent banks would deposit statutory reserves based on their own deposits, and participating banks and clearing banks would remain unaffected by direct constraints from the central bank.

In essence, the Circular [2016] No. 11's arrangement allows these two types of institutions to transform a portion of their excess reserve ratios (e.g., 15%) into statutory reserve ratios, with a slight reduction rather than a complete removal. The meanings of "excess reserve ratio*(1-15%)" and "excess reserve ratio-15%" are quite different. The closer the excess reserve ratio is to 0, the greater the disparity between them. The two are equal when the excess reserve ratio is 100%.

If we apply the statutory reserve ratio in the manner of domestic banks, overseas banks would be required to deposit a certain proportion of their deposits with agent banks, clearing banks, or parent banks, relative to their liabilities, be it deposits or interbank debts. In this scenario, the excess reserve ratio for overseas banks would be reduced by 15%, rather than discounted by 85%. Of course, whether this strategy falls within the People's Bank of China's jurisdiction is uncertain, as it involves foreign banks, and the central bank's arrangement might be a temporary measure, leading to the current situation.

Temporary measures do not cause concern, but it is concerning whether the People's Bank of China has become confused due to its own language, even though it fully understands the matter. "Depositing Reserve Deposits" is a purely asset-side operation; asset-side reserve deposits and general deposits on the liability side are not the same type of deposit, and a situation where a bank uses its liability-side deposits to pay reserve deposits on the asset side is not feasible. The notion that offshore participating banks' legal entities combine their deposit reserves in the "RMB Deposit Reserve" account of agent banks into the "Overseas Bank RMB Deposit Reserve" account with the local People's Bank of China, is only equivalent in amount; it cannot be a valid accounting operation. Of course, the People's Bank of China will certainly provide further explanations for Circular [2016] No. 11, including how accounting entries are processed. Everything will likely become clear.