原创 2016-02-17 季天鹤央行观察
做空者的言论本身可以各种犯错，但只要听众按他说的做了，他就说对了。

春节期间， Hayman Capital的Kyle Bass发表了一篇看空中国的投资者信，引发市场关注。这篇投资者信大概可以看作是国外空头的一个典型思路，体现了不少认识上的局限。仔细分析其中的硬伤，可以让我们更好地了解空头的状态。

作者的总体观点，对于专注中国的宏观分析师来说并没有什么新意。银行信贷扩张很快——从四万亿开始已经让人们忧虑了八年了；人民币实际利率升值很多——这显然也不是什么新鲜事了，况且去年IMF不是还说人民币终于到达“均衡水平”么？至于对影子银行之类的关注，更是几年来分析师们已经不遗余力在做的事情，甚至这个话题都有点过气了。

下面我们来看看硬伤。第一个硬伤体现在关于银行资产和GDP增长速度的差异上。Bass认为这体现了信贷的快速扩张，意味着极大的风险，还让他想起了西班牙、爱尔兰、日本、东南亚等国。2015年银行资产增长了25万亿人民币，在作者的图上显示为一个大大的跳升，这显然是让人惊悚的信号。

但事实上，如果我们仔细关注2015年银行的资产负债表（以央行公布的其他存款性公司资产负债表为准），我们发现，正如Bass所言，2015年银行资产负债表增加了27万亿，比它给出的数字还大一点。但事实上，对非金融机构的债权增加11万亿，对其他居民部门的债权仅增加4万亿，剩下了12万亿新增资产。

上述的12万亿新增资产中，最重要的部分有三块：对其他银行的债权（3.4万亿）、对其他金融机构的债权（6.5万亿）、对政府债权（4万亿），这三部分加总已经达到了14万亿，多出来的2万亿主要是银行在央行存款的减少，反映了企业和个人汇出外汇的影响。所以，当我们看到2015年银行资产增加27万亿的惊人数字时，一定要考虑到，其中有一半都是银行间、银行和金融机构间以及对政府的债权。

对企业和个人的债权和对其他银行的债权以及对政府的债券，其风险情况显然是不一样的。银行间的债权当然包括了一些伪装的非金融机构债权，但毕竟银行债券和同业拆借等业务和信贷风险关系不大，更重要的乃是流动性风险，但央行应该不会任由流动性风险肆虐市场。对其他金融性公司的新增债权中有一部分是救市导致的，这部分已经在逐步的撤出。此外，对政府的债权中不少包含了地方政府的债权，风险当然存在，但并不能用一般意义上的不良贷款来考虑。

第二个硬伤是关于流动人口的。Bass提到，流动人口2015年比2014年减少570万人，这个数据在统计局的公报里面可以轻松找到，即“全国居住地和户口登记地不在同一个乡镇街道且离开户口登记地半年以上的人口（即人户分离人口）2.94亿人，比上年末减少377万人，其中流动人口为2.47亿人，比上年末减少568万人。” 作者认为这是中国硬着陆的一个证据，意味着城镇工作机会的减少，削弱中国城市化进程。

流动人口和人户分离人口的区别，在于流动人口的人户分离不在同一个城市内，而是跨城市的。只要仔细观察统计口径，我们便知道流动人口代表的不光是农村和城市之间的流动，还包括了一二三四五线城市之间的人口流动。流动人口的减少，在目前的情况下，反映出小城市的不断发展和机会的增加，也反映了特大城市对劳动力的要求在提高，而很难用来说明中国的城市化进程在反转。

第三个硬伤，就是把中国的银行体系和美国作对比。任何在欧洲金融业工作过的人都知道，把中国银行业和美国银行业作对比乃是宏观分析界的一个巨大错误，因为美国的融资体系和中国很不像，反倒是欧洲和中国非常类似：欧洲人都在讨论银行的融资、货币政策通过银行传导到实体经济等等，大银行而不是大金融市场支配着金融体系。

Bass认为中国银行业的资产要亏掉10%，也就是20万亿人民币。这个数字显然是太高了，因为银行在央行的资产和对央行债权不可能发生减计；持有的政府债券在短期内还不太会被减计，因为政府还有一些借新还旧的时间；对其他银行和金融机构的债权目前看还不太会出问题，央行通过降准和逆回购就足以平息流动性的紧张。

对其他居民的债权总共27万亿，对非金融机构78万亿，如果一共亏掉20万亿的话，就是20%的损失率了。这么大的不良贷款即使存在，在2016年一年里爆发还不太可能。如果在好几年里面释放的话，银行的不良贷款损失又会被其收入覆盖掉，空头希望看到的亏损-挤提-流动性危机的情节就无法上演了。如果做空半天成了温水煮青蛙，投资人都要没有耐心了。

第四个硬伤，就是认为人行会帮忙填补中国银行的资本窟窿。Bass说联储把自己的资产负债表扩大了4.5万亿美元，才创造了便利条件使得银行能够融到6500亿美元的资本金，因此人行要搞出10万亿美元的等价人民币才能够让银行补充足够的资本金。这种观点在中国显然是异想天开的。

Bass提到了2000年那次中国银行注资，但我们知道那个时候人行一分钱都没有出，而是财政部发债给银行当资产同时持有银行股权，而2003年的汇金注资花了人行的钱，但并没有扩人行的表，因为人行是通过减少外汇资产增加股权资产实现的。在中国，人行不需要像联储那样麻烦。

联储的操作受到很多法规以及政治算计的约束，这在伯南克的回忆录里面展现得淋漓尽致。何况QE和银行的增资也未必有很大关系，把美国银行业的增资和QE相比，恐怕是把美联储当成了欧洲央行。事实上美国融资体系靠金融市场，QE更重要的目的是通过金融市场的渠道来解决一些问题，这些问题里没有银行增资这个议程都很难讲。

而在中国，对银行的注资可以非常直接。比如最近人行用外汇注资了开行等政策性银行，相当于是2003年汇金操作的翻版。又比如很多保险公司手里还有大笔的钱，在一个合适的估值上买入银行并不困难。此外，银行的资本不一定非是普通股，还可以有很多其他的形式，很多投资者都可以进行投资。

最终的结果，将是银行负债侧存款减少，股本增加；资产减计的同时会减少股本，但二级市场的估值是另一回事，受到很多资金和情绪方面的影响。认为人行需要65万亿人民币来买入债券抬高银行资产估值从而填补资本空洞的思路，在中国肯定不现实，更何况中国银行业的很多资产本身并不涉及估值，而是使用摊销和坏账的记账法，和美国那种债券一跌银行就亏的情况不同。

第五个硬伤，是关于中国外汇储备的讨论。Bass提出所谓IMF最低外汇储备规模公式，得出中国应该持有2.7万亿美元，这一计算和之前流行的同样是自称IMF认为的1万亿美元相差颇远。这让人不得不感叹，当外汇储备很多的时候，人们喊着很低的上限，要求多元化经营或者分走一杯羹。而当外汇储备减少的时候，人们又喊着很高的下限，表示外汇储备完全不够。这种反复拿IMF说事的行为真的好么？

且不谈上述IMF公式是否只是传说。Bass搞了一个煞有介事的中国外汇储备调整值，从2016年1月底的3.2万亿美元中，上来就减去了中投的7000亿美元。这简直是中国最最初级宏观分析师都不会犯的错误，而Bass还居然说自己vigorously研究了中国。这样的错误都犯了，就更不用说他也犯了把对政策性银行的注资也算在外汇储备里的错误了。这个伤实在是太硬了。IMF要是也要搞这些调整才能搞清外汇储备，人民币还能进SDR?

如果Bass早出生10年的话，他或许会赶上2008年以前的外汇储备大讨论，不知道那个时候他会不会也搞出同样的一套调整值，把汇金对各大银行对外汇储备的注资从外汇储备里面再减一遍，得出中国外汇储备增长很缓慢的结论？此外，他一定会对财政部发行1.5万亿国债后，外汇储备没有相应幅度地减少感到吃惊了。

既然上述硬伤都出来了，最后的结论自然就更为离谱了。Bass认为中国会出现失业率高涨、银行加速亏损、信贷紧缩、老式银行挤兑，上述事件会促使中国政府将利率降低至零、用外汇储备注资银行、印钞注资银行、财政政策刺激提振投资并增加进口。Bass认为日本央行和黑田已经开始了货币战，让日元贬值2%。不过现在日元已经从黑田宣布负利率后的121升值到了110了，不知道Bass作何感想。

他当然看不到，中国的劳动力正在缓慢却坚定地从过剩行业中转移到其他新兴行业，国有银行、国有基金公司、国有保险公司等等早就捆绑在一起不可能互相挤兑、债券市场发行量火爆以及债券市场互联互通正在逐渐释放债券估值收益。他看到了银行资产负债表的扩张，却看不到负债侧货币的流动，看不到货币需求的增长和相应的物价稳定，看不到中国人实际的生活和内心的需要（他的信还引用了Mises关于货币的论述，可他似乎并没有理解Mises对人的行动的关注和强调），看不到中国经济已经被看空好几年了，从崩盘中获利的机会已经很小了，大空头不是这样布局的。

这当然也是为什么这篇硬伤百出的文章会出来。它的作用，并不是告诉市场他发现中国经济有多少问题，事实上其图表都被投行券商们发布过n多次了。这篇文章的作用就是想制造恐慌，让无法识别硬伤的投资者们跟风，让迷信外国投资者的中国散户倒逼监管层，让中国市场的参与者在手忙脚乱中给空头机会。这封信在这个角度，当然有非常大的价值，我自己收到关于这封信的询问，也证明了这封信在一定程度上达到了目的。市场是自我实现的，只要恐慌出现了，他赚到钱了，分析中的硬伤当然就被耀眼的利润冲刷得一干二净了。

上述的硬伤的问世，还和其抱有的中国是一个新兴经济体的观点有关。中国已经有10万亿美元的GDP，不是几个基金经理写写邮件就能忽悠的，其规模和复杂的程度都需要用成熟和复杂的分析方法来仔细探究。中国经济当然有很多自己的困难，需要认认真真地解决，然而，空头想要速胜的愿望恐怕不容易实现。

The statement of a bearish speaker itself can make various mistakes, but as long as the audience follows what they say, they claim to be correct.

During the Spring Festival, Kyle Bass of Hayman Capital released a bearish investor letter on China, attracting market attention. This investor letter can be seen as a typical approach of foreign bears, reflecting several limitations in understanding. Analyzing the weaknesses therein can provide us with a better understanding of the bearish sentiment.

The author's overall perspective doesn't offer anything new for macro analysts focused on China. Concerns about rapid bank credit expansion, which has been a worry for eight years since the four trillion stimulus; substantial appreciation of the renminbi's real interest rate — this is clearly not a fresh observation, and didn't the IMF state last year that the renminbi had reached a "balanced level"? As for the focus on shadow banking, analysts have been scrutinizing this for years; even the topic itself is somewhat passé.

Now let's examine the shortcomings. The first flaw is evident in the difference between bank assets and GDP growth rates. Bass believes this reflects rapid credit expansion, indicating significant risks and reminding him of countries like Spain, Ireland, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Bank assets grew by 25 trillion RMB in 2015, depicted as a dramatic spike in the author's chart, which is clearly a chilling signal.

However, if we carefully examine the bank's balance sheet for 2015 (based on other deposit-taking institutions' balance sheets published by the central bank), we find that, as Bass mentioned, bank balance sheets increased by 27 trillion RMB, slightly more than the number he provided. But in reality, non-financial sector claims increased by 11 trillion, claims against other resident sectors only increased by 4 trillion, leaving 12 trillion in new assets.

Out of this 12 trillion new assets, the most important parts include three segments: claims against other banks (3.4 trillion), claims against other financial institutions (6.5 trillion), and claims against the government (4 trillion), which together total 14 trillion, exceeding the additional 2 trillion, primarily reflecting reduced bank deposits at the central bank, reflecting the impact of businesses and individuals transferring foreign exchange. Therefore, when we see the astonishing figure of a 27 trillion RMB increase in bank assets in 2015, we must consider that half of it pertains to interbank, bank-to-bank, and bank-to-financial institution claims, as well as claims against the government.

The risk situations for claims against corporations and individuals, other banks, and the government are clearly different. Interbank claims include some disguised claims of non-financial institutions, but these are primarily related to liquidity risk rather than credit risk, and the central bank should not allow liquidity risk to ravage the market. Some of the increased claims against other financial institutions are due to market stabilization efforts, which are gradually being withdrawn. Additionally, many claims against the government include local government claims; while risks exist, they cannot be considered in the general sense of non-performing loans.

The second flaw concerns the discussion of floating population. Bass mentions that the floating population decreased by 5.7 million people in 2015 compared to 2014. This data can easily be found in the statistics bureau's report, stating, "The population whose residence registration is not in the same township street as their registered residence and who have left their registered residence for more than six months (referred to as the population with separated residence registration) is 294 million, a decrease of 3.77 million from the end of the previous year, including 247 million floating population, a decrease of 5.68 million from the end of the previous year." The author sees this as evidence of a hard landing in China, implying reduced urban job opportunities and weakened urbanization.

The distinction between floating population and population with separated residence registration lies in the fact that the latter's separation occurs not within the same city but across cities. By closely observing the statistical methodology, it becomes clear that the floating population represents not only movement between rural and urban areas but also the movement of people between first to fifth-tier cities. The decrease in the floating population, in the current context, reflects the ongoing development of small cities and increasing opportunities, as well as the heightened labor demands of mega-cities. It doesn't necessarily indicate a reversal of China's urbanization process.

The third flaw is about comparing China's banking system to that of the United States. Anyone who has worked in the European financial industry knows that comparing China's banking industry to that of the United States is a major mistake in macro analysis, as the financing systems of the United States and China are quite different. On the contrary, the systems of Europe and China are quite similar: Europeans discuss financing, how monetary policy is transmitted through banks to the real economy, and the dominance of large banks over financial markets.

Bass believes that China's banking assets will lose 10%, which is 20 trillion RMB. This number is clearly too high, as the bank's assets at the central bank and claims against the central bank cannot be written off; the government bonds held will not experience significant write-downs in the short term, as the government still has time for refinancing; claims against other banks and financial institutions are not likely to face problems for now, as the central bank can use reserve requirement cuts and reverse repurchases to alleviate liquidity stress.

Claims against other residents amount to a total of 27 trillion RMB, 78 trillion for non-financial institutions. Even if there were a loss of 20 trillion in total, it would equate to a 20% loss rate. Such a large amount of non-performing loans is unlikely to materialize in a single year in 2016. If spread over several years, the losses from non-performing loans in banks would be covered by their income, and the narrative of loss-default-liquidity crisis, which the bears hope to see, would not likely occur. If shorting China takes too long, investors might lose patience.

The fourth flaw is assuming that the People's Bank of China (PBOC) will help fill the capital gap of Chinese banks. Bass claims that the Fed expanded its balance sheet by 4.5 trillion USD to create favorable conditions for banks to raise 650 billion USD in capital. Therefore, PBOC would need to create an equivalent of 10 trillion USD in RMB to provide enough capital for banks. This view is clearly far-fetched in the Chinese context.

Bass mentions the capital injection into Chinese banks in 2000, but we know that the PBOC didn't contribute any money at that time; it was the Ministry of Finance issuing bonds to the banks as assets while holding shares of the banks simultaneously. The China Investment Corporation's capital injection in 2003 used PBOC's funds, but it didn't expand PBOC's balance sheet because PBOC used a reduction in foreign exchange assets to increase equity assets. In China, PBOC doesn't need to be as cumbersome as the Fed.

The Fed's operations are constrained by many regulations and political calculations, as evident in Ben Bernanke's memoir. Moreover, the relationship between quantitative easing (QE) and bank capitalization might not be significant. Comparing the increase in the capitalization of U.S. banks to QE might mistakenly liken the Fed to the European Central Bank. In reality, the U.S. financing system relies on financial markets, and the primary purpose of QE is to address issues through the financial market channel. Bank capitalization isn't a central agenda, it's hard to argue.

In China, capital injection into banks can be direct. For instance, recently, the PBOC injected capital into policy banks using foreign exchange reserves, similar to the China Investment Corporation's 2003 operation. Additionally, many insurance companies have significant funds, and it's not difficult for them to invest in banks at an appropriate valuation. Furthermore, bank capital doesn't have to be ordinary equity; it can take various forms, and many investors can participate.

The end result will be a reduction in bank liabilities and an increase in capital. While asset write-downs will reduce capital, secondary market valuation is another matter, influenced by funds and sentiment. The notion that PBOC needs 6.5 trillion RMB to buy bonds and boost bank asset valuations to fill the capital gap is unrealistic in China, especially since many of China's bank assets aren't subject to valuation changes but use amortization and bad debt accounting methods. This flaw is quite glaring. If PBOC were to need to make these adjustments to understand foreign exchange reserves, would the renminbi even be included in the SDR?

If Bass were born ten years earlier, he might have caught the big debate about foreign exchange reserves before 2008. I wonder if he would have come up with the same set of adjustments then, deducting the investments of China Investment Corporation and coming to the conclusion that China's foreign exchange reserves were growing slowly? Additionally, he would surely be surprised by the lack of significant reduction in foreign exchange reserves after the Ministry of Finance issued 1.5 trillion RMB in bonds.

Since the above-mentioned flaws have emerged, the final conclusion naturally becomes even more absurd. Bass believes that China will experience a surge in unemployment, accelerated bank losses, credit tightening, and a run on traditional banks, which will force the Chinese government to lower interest rates to zero, use foreign exchange reserves to recapitalize banks, print money to inject capital into banks, stimulate fiscal policies to boost investment and increase imports. Bass believes that the Bank of Japan and Haruhiko Kuroda have already begun a currency war, causing the yen to depreciate by 2%. However, the yen has risen from 121 to 110 since Kuroda announced negative interest rates; I wonder what Bass thinks about that.

Of course, he might not realize that China's labor force is slowly but steadily transitioning from surplus industries to emerging industries, and state-owned banks, funds, and insurance companies are all interlinked and unlikely to provoke each other. He might not see the booming issuance of bonds in the bond market and the gradual release of bond valuation profits in the interconnection of bond markets. He sees the expansion of bank balance sheets but doesn't see the flow of liability-side money, the growth in money demand, stability in prices, the actual lives and inner needs of Chinese people (he references Mises' discourse on money in his letter, but he seems to miss Mises' focus on human action and emphasis). He doesn't see that China's economy has been viewed negatively for several years, and the opportunity to profit from a collapse is small; the big shorts don't position themselves like this.

Of course, this is also why this article full of flaws was produced. Its purpose is not to tell the market how many problems it discovered in the Chinese economy; in fact, its charts have been published by countless investment banks. The purpose of this article is to create panic, coax investors who can't identify the flaws to follow suit, push superstitious foreign investors in China to pressure regulators, and make market participants in China give bears a chance amidst chaos. From this perspective, this letter certainly holds significant value; the inquiries I've received about this letter also demonstrate that, to some extent, the letter has achieved its purpose. Markets are self-fulfilling; once panic arises, they make money, and the glaring flaws in the analysis are ultimately washed away by dazzling profits.

The emergence of the above-mentioned flaws is also related to the viewpoint it holds regarding China as an emerging economic entity. China already has a GDP of 10 trillion USD; it's not something that a few fund managers writing emails can easily deceive. The scale and complexity require mature and intricate analytical methods for thorough exploration. The Chinese economy undoubtedly has many of its own difficulties that need to be earnestly addressed. However, the desire of the bears for a quick victory is probably not easily achievable.