2015-04-30 季天鹤央行观察

作者：季天鹤，央行观察专栏作家，万门大学CEO
原创不易，转载请在文章开头注明原作者和来源微信公众号央行观察

最近关于外汇储备注资政策性银行的传闻吸引了众多关注。由于央行来源于银行，所以本文试图从商业银行的视角，结合中央银行的特殊性，来分析如果人行不是以委托贷款转股而是直接拿出外币投资开行股权，会产生哪些货币影响。

在央行，银行可以存入外币，例如商业银行在央行的外币存款准备金，而且存入操作使央行资产负债同时增加。在央行可以结汇，结汇客户总资产不变币种变化，而央行资产不变、外币存款增加、本币存款减少。对央行而言，存入和结汇在市场上合为一个过程，即央行收走外币而银行拿到人民币准备金存款。如果增加一个假想的银行在央行处存放外币的环节，过程便更清楚。人行可以贷出外币，导致央行资产减少“外币现金”增加“外币贷款”。如果央行贷出的这笔“外币现金”被存回人行，那么人行的“外币现金”就回到贷出前的水平，“外币贷款”还在，央行负债侧增加“外币存款”。这和商业银行贷出纸币后又有客户存入纸币的情形相同。

有人或许会问，如果央行可以这样子扩充外币存款，那么世界上不就不会有美元短缺了么，泰国央行只要给自己国内的机构放一笔美元贷款，境内美元的数量不久增加了么，为什么还会出现美元不足？这个问题之所以出现，在于没有意识到，即使泰国央行创造出很多美元存款出来让本国银行、企业、甚至个人持有，当本国银行客户将美元转移至境外或者取出纸币时，真正能够转移和被取出的仍然是泰国央行和银行资产侧“美元现金”的部分。这和本币体系下客户在不同银行间转帐会导致银行资产侧准备金的移动，以及客户在提取纸币时会导致银行库存现金减少是一样的。

无论在境内还是境外，人行一旦将“外币现金”贷出或投资，便不能阻止“外币现金”不回到人行这里成为外币存款。可以想象人行买入在美国的花旗银行新发行的美元债券，而花旗银行将获得的美元现金汇入中国在央行存放，这里的花旗银行当然也可以是国开行，债券当然可以是股权。回流的速度当然取决于人行的对手方的情况和想法了，链条也可能很长，外币现金甚至可以消失（比如人行持有的外币现金是联储负债侧的国外存款，买入花旗银行债券后这笔国外存款也就归了花旗银行，而花旗银行如果归还联储债务，那么这笔国外存款也就消失了），但回流是完全有可能的，而且是无法避免的，因为人行无法跟踪自己当初放贷出去的现金有什么编号和特征。

无论是人行一开始的外币存款还是“外币现金”放出后又回流形成的外币存款，只要外币存款被结汇成人民币准备金存款，就是一个结汇过程。由于人行无法区分初始外币存款和回流外币存款，我们甚至可以想象“初始”外币存款完全可能是再早先“外币现金”回流的结果，因此人行根本无法区分“初次结汇”和“二次结汇”，而只有“结汇”。除非人行满足于持有外国中央银行的存款及其超低的收益率，否则“二次结汇”都不可能完全的避免。如果认为借贷或者股权投资外币现金给国开行会导致可怕的二次结汇，那么美国国债等金融产品也干脆不要持有好了，也不要责怪外汇储备投资收益率如何低。所以，既不应该因害怕“二次结汇”就放弃某些行动，也不应该因为采取某些行动会导致所谓“二次结汇”而对其横加指责，二次结汇就是正常的结汇，正常采取应对准备金过多的措施（例如提高存款准备金率）即可，无需惊慌失措。

结汇把挤提中纸币不能满足储户取款数量的问题转化为纸币在什么价格上兑换存款的问题。在典型的挤提情形下，商业银行发放贷款认购债券导致自身存款大于纸币数量，发生挤提时需要以满足1:1的存款/纸币提取关系，会因无法应对提款需求而倒闭。而对于外币和结汇后的本币而言，即使自身的“外币现金”少于结汇后人民币所对应的外币金额，但在银行纷纷兑换外币时，央行可以将本币贬值，这点和经典挤提是不同的。如果央行试图稳定汇率，也就是把本币和外币提取关系固定化，那么又会还原到经典挤提场景，而这也就更说明央行动用外币资产借贷和股权投资都是很正常的银行业务。对于央行资产的变大，应该提出的问题不是“这是不是结汇的错”，而应该考虑为什么市场参与者总找央行结汇而不是把外币投回国外，或者央行总是愿意结汇。对于央行资产的运用，应该提出的问题不是“该不该投资和借贷”，而是“投资了谁”和“把钱借给了谁”。

如果开行被人行以外币注资后选择结汇成人民币在国内使用，结汇会导致央行的人民币准备金存款总量增加。在目前的情况下，这也不失为一个增加人民币准备金存款的办法，不过如果这样的话，央行为什么不直接用人民币注资国开行，在资产侧增加人民币股权，负债侧增加人民币准备金，以及为什么不直接降准呢？而如果开行选择不结汇，而是将外币在国外使用，其结果当然是央行资产侧的“外币现金”资产被转移走，央行就成了一个月末遭遇了“拉存款”的商业银行。前者相当于央行的“外币现金”不变，但总资产负债变大，后者相当于总资产不变，但“外币现金”减少，两者都使央行面临的银行意义上的流动性风险变大，这当然还是在投资开行不赔钱的前提下。

外汇储备投资股权当然不是新闻，但以大金额投资未上市的国开行，其面临的问题和通过二级市场投资几家美国大型上市公司是不同的。商业银行采取风险控制措施来避免挤提的风险，需要持有流动性好的债券，以及合理安排贷款的到期期限，以便出现问题时能够卖出国债或收回贷款，获取现金应对挤提。而如果央行需要稳定汇率，也就是如同商业银行应对挤提一样采取措施，对国开行的股权投资基本上完全无法用来稳定市场，因为很难迅速找到国外买家，而且国外买家甚至会抱着出大乱子捡便宜的心态作壁上观甚至落井下石。如果开行结汇了，人行可以要求开行不得购汇，算是稳住了人行投资的那块股份，但如果开行早就把外币拿到国外花了，那么开行不购汇也无济于事，因为外币现金事实上的确少了。

当然，注资国开行肯定有其他的目的，包括支持经济发展或者支持国开行转型等，但要意识到其中暗藏的流动性风险。此外，如果外汇储备的资产当中含有大量诸如对国开行、进出口行以及其他机构的投资，那么我们就要提醒自己这部分资产在危机当中的流动性是大大低于美国国债的。同样规模的外汇储备，在全都由美国国债组成和全都由国开行股权组成的两种情形下，虽然金额相同，但变现难易程度迥异。还有，如果3.8万亿美元外汇储备中有很大一部分是或者即将成为这样的投资，那么所谓外汇储备留几千亿美元就足够的说法就不成立了，因为除了应对国际收支还要应对潜在的“接盘”需要。

Recently, rumors about the People's Bank of China (PBOC) injecting foreign exchange reserves into policy banks have attracted significant attention. As the central bank originates from the banking sector, this article attempts to analyze, from the perspective of commercial banks, along with the unique characteristics of the central bank, what currency effects could arise if the PBOC directly invests foreign currency into policy banks' equity, instead of using entrusted loans for share conversion.

In the central bank, banks can deposit foreign currency, for instance, commercial banks' foreign currency deposit reserves at the central bank, and the act of depositing increases both the central bank's assets and liabilities. In the central bank, currency conversion can occur, and the currency conversion process results in the change of currency while keeping the total assets of the converting customer unchanged, while the central bank's assets remain unchanged, foreign currency deposits increase, and domestic currency deposits decrease. For the central bank, depositing and currency conversion are combined into a single process in the market, where the central bank takes away foreign currency and banks receive Chinese currency deposit reserves. If we introduce a hypothetical step of a bank depositing foreign currency with the central bank, the process becomes clearer. The PBOC can lend out foreign currency, reducing the central bank's assets while increasing "foreign currency loans." If the "foreign currency cash" lent by the central bank is deposited back with the PBOC, then the PBOC's "foreign currency cash" returns to the level before lending, while the "foreign currency loans" remain, and the central bank's liabilities increase through "foreign currency deposits." This situation is analogous to commercial banks lending out paper currency and customers depositing paper currency back into the banks.

Someone might question, if the central bank can expand foreign currency deposits in this manner, then wouldn't the world never face a shortage of US dollars? If the Bank of Thailand simply loans US dollars to its domestic institutions, wouldn't the quantity of US dollars inside the country increase, so why does a shortage of US dollars still occur? This question arises because there's a lack of realization that even if the Bank of Thailand creates a lot of US dollar deposits for its domestic banks, companies, or even individuals, when the bank customers transfer US dollars overseas or withdraw paper currency, what can truly be transferred and withdrawn is the portion of the central bank and bank assets, specifically the "US dollar cash." This is analogous to customers transferring money between different banks, leading to changes in banks' reserve balances, and when customers withdraw paper currency, banks' cash reserves decrease, just as it works in a domestic currency system.

Whether inside or outside the country, once the PBOC lends out or invests "foreign currency cash," it cannot prevent the "foreign currency cash" from not returning to the PBOC and becoming foreign currency deposits. Imagine the PBOC purchasing newly issued US dollar bonds from a bank like Citibank in the US, and Citibank receiving the US dollar cash deposited with the PBOC in China. Here, Citibank can easily be the policy bank, and the bonds can be equity. The speed of the return naturally depends on the circumstances and intentions of the PBOC's counterparties, and the chain could be lengthy, even to the point where the foreign currency cash disappears (for example, if the foreign currency cash held by the PBOC is foreign deposits on the Federal Reserve's liability side, and after purchasing Citibank bonds, this foreign deposit becomes Citibank's liability, and if Citibank repays its debt to the Federal Reserve, then the foreign deposit disappears), but the return is entirely possible and unavoidable since the PBOC cannot trace the numbered and unique features of the cash it initially lent out.

Whether the initial foreign currency deposits by the PBOC or the foreign currency deposits formed by the return of "foreign currency cash," as long as foreign currency deposits are converted into Chinese currency deposit reserves, it's a currency conversion process. Since the PBOC can't distinguish between the initial foreign currency deposits and the returned foreign currency deposits, one can even imagine that the "initial" foreign currency deposits could very well be the result of even earlier returns of "foreign currency cash," making it impossible for the PBOC to differentiate between "initial currency conversion" and "secondary currency conversion," but only "currency conversion." Unless the PBOC is content with holding deposits with foreign central banks and their extremely low yields, it's impossible to entirely avoid "secondary currency conversion." If the fear of "secondary currency conversion" deters certain actions, then it would be better to avoid holding financial products like US Treasuries altogether, and there should be no blame on how low the investment returns of foreign exchange reserves are. Therefore, one should not abandon certain actions out of fear of "secondary currency conversion," nor should one excessively criticize actions that may lead to so-called "secondary currency conversion." Secondary currency conversion is a normal form of currency conversion, and dealing with excessive reserves (e.g., increasing reserve requirements) is the normal response, there's no need to panic.

Currency conversion transforms the problem of inadequate paper currency to meet withdrawal needs into a question of at what rate paper currency exchanges for deposits. In a typical run situation, where commercial banks issue loans and subscribe to bonds, leading to their deposit amount exceeding the amount of paper currency, the issue revolves around satisfying the 1:1 deposit-to-paper currency withdrawal ratio. However, for foreign currency and post-conversion domestic currency, even if the "foreign currency cash" is less than the corresponding amount of foreign currency for Chinese currency after conversion, the PBOC can devalue the domestic currency when banks start exchanging foreign currency, which is different from the classical run scenario. If the PBOC attempts to stabilize the exchange rate, analogous to commercial banks dealing with a run, by adopting measures to ensure a fixed deposit-to-paper currency ratio, it would revert to the classical run scene, highlighting that the PBOC's use of foreign currency assets for lending and equity investment is quite normal banking activity. The question about the increase in the PBOC's assets shouldn't be whether "currency conversion is wrong," but rather, why market participants keep converting currency with the PBOC instead of investing foreign currency back overseas, or why the PBOC is always willing to engage in currency conversion. When considering the utilization of the PBOC's assets, the question should not be whether "lending or equity investment should be done," but rather "lending to whom" and "who the money is being lent to."

If policy banks, after receiving foreign currency injections from the PBOC, choose to convert it to Chinese currency for domestic use, currency conversion would result in an increase in the PBOC's Chinese currency deposit reserves. In the current situation, this method could potentially increase Chinese currency deposit reserves. However, if this is the case, why doesn't the PBOC directly invest in policy banks with Chinese currency, increasing Chinese currency equity on the asset side and increasing Chinese currency deposit reserves on the liability side, or directly lower the reserve ratio? On the other hand, if policy banks choose not to convert, but rather use the foreign currency abroad, the result is that the central bank's asset-side "foreign currency cash" is transferred away, and the central bank becomes like a commercial bank facing the end-of-month "run on deposits." The former is akin to the PBOC's "foreign currency cash" remaining constant, but total assets and liabilities increase, while the latter is similar to total assets remaining constant but "foreign currency cash" decreasing. Both scenarios increase the central bank's liquidity risk in a banking sense. Of course, all this assumes that the PBOC's investment in policy banks does not result in losses.

Investing foreign exchange reserves into equity is certainly not a new development, but injecting a significant amount into unlisted policy banks poses different challenges compared to investing in several large publicly traded US companies through secondary markets. Commercial banks implement risk control measures to mitigate run risk, requiring the holding of liquid bonds, along with appropriately arranging loan maturity terms to enable selling bonds or recalling loans to generate cash in case of problems. Similarly, if the central bank needs to stabilize the exchange rate, which is similar to commercial banks managing run risks, measures taken to stabilize the policy banks' equity investment are mostly ineffective in stabilizing the market. This is because finding foreign buyers quickly is difficult, and these buyers might even watch and wait for an opportunity to profit or even worsen the situation. If policy banks conduct currency conversion, the PBOC can require them not to buy foreign currency, thereby stabilizing the PBOC's investment in the equity. However, if policy banks have already used the foreign currency abroad, then not purchasing foreign currency would be futile, as the foreign currency cash has indeed decreased.

Of course, injecting capital into policy banks surely serves other purposes, including supporting economic development or policy bank transformation, but one must be aware of the hidden liquidity risk in such a move. Moreover, if a significant portion of the foreign exchange reserves' assets consists of investments in policy banks, export-import banks, and other institutions, then it's important to remind ourselves that the liquidity of these assets during a crisis is much lower than that of US Treasury bonds. With the same scale of foreign exchange reserves, scenarios where they consist entirely of US Treasury bonds and scenarios where they are all invested in policy bank equity, even though they hold the same amount, their ease of liquidation differs significantly. Furthermore, if a substantial portion of the $3.8 trillion in foreign exchange reserves is or will become such investments, then the claim that foreign exchange reserves only need to keep a few hundred billion US dollars on hand won't hold, because apart from addressing international trade needs, there's also the potential need for "takeovers."