2015-04-03 季天鹤央行观察

从会计上看，兑换承诺的消失意味着央行把自己的债务实质上挪为自己的净资产，纸币本质上不再是一种负债而是一种资产。

作者：季天鹤，作者为万门大学CFO，央行观察专栏作家

人们知道，纸币是央行的负债，印钞是一个打白条的过程。但人们也把央行看作印刷厂，认为印钞是把纸张以高出成本几百倍价格出售。

前者引发的问题是资不抵债的央行如何运行。央行资产包括外汇、黄金、债券、贷款，而日本央行等甚至会持有股票，因此面临价格变动风险和违约风险。上述资产在增加时都对应着负债的等量增加，因此在公允价值情形下，两种风险引发的减计会减损总资产，进而在负债不变的情况下减损净资产。认为人民币升值导致外汇储备减值从而央行已经技术性破产的观点，便是一例。

后者引发的问题则是认为央行印钞是用废纸换取人民血汗：央行的外汇、黄金、债券、贷款、股票都是央行开足印钞机印出纸币凭空换来的，特别是外汇储备，出口商辛辛苦苦换来的外汇全都被央行印刷的废纸拿走了。不过这种观点显然和前面关于人民币升值导致央行破产的观点矛盾：如果央行拿到外汇本身就是空手套白狼的话，外汇储备减值也只是让央行的巨额利润少了一点而已，怎么会引发央行破产呢？

上述矛盾产生的原因，在于打白条的央行和印传单的央行在会计上存在区别。如果央行在打白条，那么资产的增加对应着白条的增加，若之后资产减值但白条不变，那么净资产减少，如同借钱炒股亏光只好把房子卖了还债一样。如果央行在印传单，那么传单的增加本身就是资产的增加，而负债不变，因此传单的增加对应了净资产增加，拿传单换外汇/黄金等都是总资产不变，传单减少，其他资产增加的过程，而净资产不变。即使换来的外汇或黄金人间蒸发，央行也只需要减少当时传单增加所对应的净资产增加，回到印传单前的净资产余额，而不会破产。

而传单与白条两种观点并行的原因，在于央行可以将白条和传单相互转化。央行发行了白条之后，如果忽然说对不起这东西我不认了，拿着白条找我什么都得不到。这种行为相当于央行把债权人的资产份额收归自己，债务减少而净资产增加，如同央行本身就印了传单发出去换回黄金一样，净资产比印传单前增加一个相当于传单的数额，央行看上去就象凭空印钞换了资产。而央行发行了传单之后，如果突然宣布传单可以用来兑换央行资产，那么传单一秒钟变欠条，央行总资产不变，负债增加，变化量就是传单的数额，净资产等量减少到印刷传单前的水平，如果传单换来的央行资产出现减值，那么央行净资产就要从印刷传单前的水平减计，央行看上去就破产了。

可惜“技术性破产”和“空手套白狼”这两种观点都是错误的。央行目前没有保证兑换，持有央行印刷的纸币不能找央行要到任何东西，央行不会被挤提倒闭。从会计上看，兑换承诺的消失意味着央行把自己的债务实质上挪为自己的净资产，纸币本质上不再是一种负债而是一种资产，这样的印刷厂记帐法可以创造出大量的所有者权益，也就不会有破产的危险，只不过是印钞产生的净资产增加规模减少而已。因此，目前货币被当作白条导致的“技术性破产”是一种假象，对央行的运行没有实际影响。

另一种认为央行用纸张换外汇是“空手套白狼”的观点也是无稽之谈，本币持有者用本币从央行购汇难道是“白狼套空手”？事实上从白条的角度看，央行只是提供了一种代为保管外汇的服务，随时等候领取。出口结汇已经先带来了外汇购买力，而央行发行的人民币，只是新增外币购买力的本国替代，央行在提供人民币购买力的同时也回收了外币购买力。这和央行直接发行人民币纸币买车的性质是不同的，后者是一个购买过程，而不是购买力交换的过程。另外，只要央行持有的外汇原封不动，央行就只是一个安静的保管者。但如果央行用外汇买车，情况就变了，央行仿佛是用相当于车价的人民币纸币换了汽车，曾经的结汇者用结汇得到的人民币再也无法换回当初那样多的外币了，在这个时候我们才能说央行把结汇者坑了。

钞票之所以被放在负债端当作白条，是因为钞票在历史上需要兑换保证才能顺利流通，钞票发行方必须保证持票者可以在发行人处兑换黄金，否则纸币就只能按照纸张的价格流通。如今，钞票由于不再有兑换的能力，因此这部分白条就显得像是传单了，而会计过程也展现了这部分白条确实可以转换为传单被当作资产，而可兑换变为不可兑换的过程实现了这一转换，央行一下子就可以任意印钞增加自身净资产而无所顾忌了。

与央行相比，商业银行负债（居民存款）虽然也算作货币，但其只能以白条的形式进行会计操作，因为商业银行依然负担着以一比一的价格满足储户取款的义务，只能在一定范围内等量增减自己的资产和负债，而不能随意把存款（或在近代的时候是银行券）当作传单，从而随意增减自己的资产和净资产。而对于印刷厂而言，传单持有者不能从印刷厂兑换东西，因此传单在资产侧。但由于其印刷的传单不是货币，无法具有货币那样巨大的“销量”也就是流通能力，因此无法任意增减，只有卖出去了才能增计所有者权益，而不像央行那样一印好就可以增记。

因此，兑换承诺决定了物品的资产与负债性质，而流通能力则决定了任意增减的能力。央行完全有能力将纸币甚至所有负债都从自己的负债方剥离，从而使自己拥有和总资产一样大的所有者权益。央行和其原先的负债持有方就原先的央行负债做任何交易，从此都可以看作是央行减少一种资产而增加另一种资产的交易：央行减少外汇增持了自己印制的纸币，央行减少黄金增持了自己发行的准备金存款“证”，央行减少了对商业银行债权增持了自己发行的央行票据，等等。

From an accounting perspective, the disappearance of redemption commitments implies that the central bank essentially transforms its debt into net assets, changing the nature of paper currency from a liability to an asset.

People are aware that paper currency represents a liability for the central bank, and printing money is akin to issuing promissory notes. However, people also view the central bank as a printing factory and perceive money printing as selling paper at a cost hundreds of times higher than its value.

The former perspective raises the question of how a central bank with insufficient assets to cover its liabilities can function. Central bank assets include foreign exchange, gold, bonds, loans, and some, like the Bank of Japan, even hold stocks. These assets face price volatility and default risks. When these assets increase, liabilities also increase in tandem. Under the fair value scenario, the deduction caused by risks from price fluctuations and defaults decreases the total assets and subsequently reduces net assets while liabilities remain unchanged. The notion that the appreciation of the Chinese yuan results in the devaluation of foreign exchange reserves and thus a technical bankruptcy for the central bank is an example of this.

The latter perspective suggests that the central bank is effectively trading worthless paper for the labor and efforts of the people. The central bank's foreign exchange, gold, bonds, loans, and even stocks are all obtained by printing paper currency, especially in the case of foreign exchange reserves. All the foreign exchange that exporters worked hard to earn is taken away by the central bank's printed paper. However, this viewpoint contradicts the earlier notion of the central bank's technical bankruptcy resulting from the devaluation of foreign exchange reserves. If obtaining foreign exchange is essentially empty-handed, the devaluation of foreign exchange reserves would merely reduce the central bank's massive profits by a small amount, so how could this lead to bankruptcy?

The reason for this contradiction lies in the accounting distinction between a central bank that issues promissory notes and a central bank that prints money. If the central bank issues promissory notes, the increase in assets corresponds to an increase in promissory notes. If assets later devalue but promissory notes remain unchanged, net assets decrease. This situation is akin to borrowing money to invest in stocks, losing everything, and having to sell a house to repay the debt. If the central bank prints money, the increase in promissory notes is the increase in assets itself, while liabilities remain constant. Therefore, an increase in promissory notes corresponds to an increase in net assets. Exchanging promissory notes for foreign exchange, gold, etc., is a process where total assets remain unchanged, promissory notes decrease, and other assets increase. Even if the obtained foreign exchange or gold disappears, the central bank only needs to decrease net assets by the amount corresponding to the increase in promissory notes at that time, returning to the net asset balance before printing promissory notes, without facing bankruptcy.

Moreover, promissory notes and the viewpoint of printing money as "empty-handed" coexist because the central bank can convert promissory notes into money and vice versa. After the central bank issues promissory notes, if it suddenly declares that it won't honor them anymore, then the central bank takes ownership of the assets held by promissory note holders. As a result, liabilities decrease, and net assets increase. This is similar to the central bank itself printing promissory notes, exchanging them for gold and increasing net assets by an amount equivalent to the promissory notes, creating the illusion of printing money to acquire assets. If the central bank issues promissory notes and then suddenly announces that these notes can be exchanged for central bank assets, the promissory notes become a form of indebtedness. The total assets of the central bank remain unchanged, but liabilities increase, leading to a decrease in net assets equal to the amount of promissory notes. If the value of the central bank's assets obtained through promissory notes decreases, the central bank's net assets will decrease from the level before printing promissory notes. This could make it appear that the central bank is bankrupt.

Unfortunately, both the notions of "technical bankruptcy" and "empty-handed" are incorrect. The central bank currently does not guarantee redemption, and holding central bank-issued paper currency does not entitle one to anything from the central bank. The central bank will not be forced to close due to a run on its reserves. From an accounting perspective, the disappearance of redemption commitments signifies that the central bank has essentially transformed its debt into net assets. Paper currency is no longer a liability but an asset. This accounting approach can create a significant amount of owner's equity, eliminating the risk of bankruptcy and only slightly reducing the increase in net assets resulting from money printing.

Comparatively, commercial banks' liabilities (individual deposits) are also considered currency, but they can only be accounted for as promissory notes. This is because commercial banks are still obligated to meet deposit withdrawals on a one-to-one basis, limiting their ability to change assets and liabilities arbitrarily. They cannot treat deposits (or banknotes in modern times) as promissory notes and thus cannot freely increase or decrease assets and net assets as the central bank does. However, in the case of a printing factory, the holder of promissory notes cannot exchange them for anything from the printing factory. Therefore, these promissory notes appear on the asset side. Due to their nature, promissory notes cannot possess the enormous "sales volume," i.e., liquidity, that currency does. Thus, their increase or decrease can only be accomplished through selling. Only after they are sold can they increase owner's equity, unlike the central bank, which can increase its equity through a simple printing process.

Therefore, the nature of assets and liabilities is determined by redemption commitments, while the ability to increase or decrease arbitrarily is determined by liquidity. The central bank has the ability to strip paper currency and even all liabilities from its liability side, effectively giving itself the same amount of owner's equity as its total assets. Any transaction between the central bank and its original liability holders can now be seen as the central bank reducing one type of asset while increasing another. For instance, the central bank reduces its foreign exchange holdings and increases the promissory notes it prints. It reduces its gold holdings and increases the "certificates" representing reserve deposits it issues. It reduces its claims against commercial banks and increases its central bank notes.